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ABSTRACT 
 
The Riotous Presence in American Literature and Culture 
 
Rebecca Skidmore Biggio 
 
 
This project seeks a comprehensive understanding of riot as an operating principle in 
American history and culture—a principle variously revealed in, explored, or obscured 
by literature produced by popular and political novelists at the turn of the twentieth 
century. In defining riot as a presence, I identify as central to US history a haunting 
incoherence between fundamental cherished ideals of representative government and the 
use of violence or threats of violence to assert the privilege of one group through the 
subjugation of another. 
 
Because representations influence the way we characterize historical events both 
prospectively and retrospectively, I conduct my investigation through the reading of 
iconic and influential literary texts. These literary texts, published broadly between 1880 
and 1910, function as historical interventions rather than simple records of the American 
past. Charles W. Chesnutt’s The Marrow of Tradition (1901), Albion W. Tourgée’s A 
Fool’s Errand (1879), and Thomas Dixon, Jr.’s The Leopard’s Spots (1902) are set in the 
present and shape the very cultural context on which they comment. Pauline Carrington 
Bouvé’s Their Shadows Before (1899), Mary Johnston’s Prisoners of Hope (1898), and 
Pauline E. Hopkins’s Winona (1902) join issues of the past with issues of the present, 
establishing the continuity of historical events. Mark Twain’s A Connecticut Yankee in 
King Arthur’s Court (1889) and Sutton Griggs’s Imperium in Imperio (1899) are 
prospective rather than retrospective, confirming the adaptability and embeddedness of 
riot, its many uses and manifestations in US culture, and its many disguises. Through the 
privileging of contexts beyond cause and effect, through the exploration of the normal 
functioning of the society in which these events can and do occur, literature offers a field 
for exploration of the social and cultural conditions necessary for the violence of riot to 
occur. 
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Introduction. Rethinking Riot 
 When I first began this project, the 100th anniversary of the Atlanta race riot had recently 
passed. Commemorating the violence of 22-25 September 1906, with walking tours and 
historical research made public via the internet, The Coalition to Remember the 1906 Atlanta 
Race Riot has begun a project of remembrance and redefinition. The Coalition to Remember is 
one of many emerging organizations serving to honor the victims of late-nineteenth- and early-
twentieth-century race riots like those that occurred in Wilmington, North Carolina in 1898, in 
Chicago, Illinois in 1919, in Tulsa, Oklahoma in 1921, and in Rosewood, Florida in 1923. In 
1993, for example, five university professors submitted “A Documented History of the Massacre 
Which Occurred at Rosewood, Florida, In January 1923” to Florida’s Board of Regents. In 1997, 
the Oklahoma House of Representatives requested the formation of the Oklahoma Commission 
to Study the Tulsa Race Riot of 1921. In 2000, North Carolina’s General Assembly founded the 
1898 Wilmington Race Riot Commission “to develop a historical record of the event and to 
assess the economic impact of the riot on African Americans locally and across the region and 
state.” In addition to promoting awareness, some of these groups, like the Tulsa and Rosewood 
organizations, have sought reparations for the victims’ families. Each of these public initiatives 
represents both a commendable recuperative effort and an important trend toward a collective 
attempt to uncover the lost truths behind these painful reminders of domestic terrorism occurring 
Within Our Gates, to borrow the title phrase from Oscar Micheaux’s 1920 cinematic response to 
the riots in Chicago. 
 In part colluding with and in part diverging from the work of these vital programs, I 
argue against the collective tendencies of the public to see these events as contradictions, as 
exceptional, irrational occurrences outside of the normal functioning of American history and 
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culture. Instead, I argue that these race riots are fundamentally American, that they are an 
ongoing and central part of American social process. Isolating individual riots as spontaneous 
and aberrant events, as breaks in the cultural process rather than as moments of revelation, is 
dangerous, because this type of thinking alienates the symptoms from the disease. Recognition of 
the individual events and of the victims is essential, yet it is also critical to look beyond these 
seemingly discrete tragedies to the larger structural instabilities that they reveal. The Riotous 
Presence in American Literature and Culture looks for patterns, for repetition, for similarities, so 
as to understand these events in national, cultural, and historical contexts. In order to be truly 
productive, recognition must also be preventative and transformative. We must place these 
events in the context of a larger culture of violence, of revolution and resistance, and of the 
underlying ideologies that guide us in our understanding of violence as aggressive or defensive, 
as aberrant or normative. 
 There remains significant disagreement about how to identify these isolated events, these 
symptoms of greater cultural maladies. In their introduction to Democracy Betrayed: The 
Wilmington Race Riot of 1898 and Its Legacy (1998), Timothy B. Tyson and David S. Cecelski 
discuss at length the available “descriptive terms,” any one of which might be a more 
procedurally accurate or desirable designation for what happened in Wilmington: “‘coup d’état,’ 
‘massacre,’ ‘revolt,’ ‘pogrom,’ ‘revolution.’ Each conveys a part of the truth, yet none captures 
the full scope of these events.” Tyson and Cecelski go on to explain their use of “race riot” in 
their title in terms of paying “homage to conventional usage” and in the interest of ensuring “that 
we would be understood” (6). While I find this quest for a satisfying descriptor a useful one, this 
sort of redefinition is not exactly what I am after. Rather, it seems necessary to me to approach 
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the same set of questions from a slightly different angle, to ask, instead: What does it mean to 
call something a race riot? 
 My project looks less to the “history of what happened” than to the discourses 
surrounding eruptions of violence like the Wilmington race riot (6). Cecelski and Tyson and their 
impressive cohort of interdisciplinary contributors, and others involved in similar recuperative 
projects focusing on other race riots, have done much to reconstruct a faulty historical and 
interpretive record, leaving me free to build upon their pathbreaking work. To these ends, I 
explore the ways in which the determination “race riot” prospectively characterizes an event. 
When we read of a race riot in the newspaper for the first time, when the event is new, when we, 
as a public, are unfamiliar with the details of what happened, when the context, perhaps, remains 
in question, we formulate a certain kind of response based on the terminology. What does “race 
riot” say about an unfamiliar event? Whose involvement does it imply? More specifically, who 
do we assume has rioted? Who are the victims and the perpetrators? What started it? How did it 
end? What sorts of contexts and histories and agendas are implied and by whom? How is it 
disseminated—in the press, in the courts, in the streets? Conversely, when we retrospectively 
identify an event as a race riot, we give it a certain kind of place in history. We suggest a certain 
kind of context, of conflict, of outcome, of illegitimacy. We presuppose for future generations 
that this event has a certain value, a certain kind of meaning. My interest, then, is in the causes 
and consequences surrounding the application of this terminology. Most importantly, perhaps, I 
am interested not in options for renaming but in options for re-evaluating riot, not as a single 
event but as a pattern, as a phenomenon, as a presence. 
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The Riotous Presence 
 Central to my study, then, is the difficult process of defining riot, which, in recent 
scholarship, has often come down to a careful rewording of dictionary definitions. For instance, 
Paul A. Gilje begins his historical study, Rioting In America (1996), with this standard definition 
of riot as “a tumultuous disturbance of the public peace by three or more persons assembled 
together and acting with a common intent” (4). Once refined for the purposes of his discussion, 
riot becomes “any group of twelve or more people attempting to assert their will immediately 
through the use of force outside the normal bounds of law” (6). As Gilje’s increasingly directive 
rhetoric suggests, even the most inclusive definitions succumb to the temptation to see riot both 
as isolated in time and space and as an exceptional occurrence, outside of and contradictory to 
the foundations of American Constitutional principles. Because we are bound by these ideas 
about riot, we find ourselves constantly rephrasing, focusing on secondary factors—like whether 
three or twelve people constitute a riot and whether the requisite action is best considered 
tumultuous or forceful. In his introduction to American Mobbing, 1828-1861: Toward Civil War 
(1998), David Grimsted similarly outlines the meaning of riot according to the terms of his 
study, although Grimsted is careful to add that rioters act “ostensibly to correct problems or 
injustices within their society without challenging its basic structures” (xii, emphasis mine). In 
this way Grimsted differentiates between riot and some of the other terminology in 
consideration. Revolution or coup d’état, for example, do presuppose a fundamental change to 
the social order that riot and its implied spontaneity do not. In other words, riots are an operating 
principle within the social order. 
 Even the most inclusive traditional definitions of riot are faulty, because they are 
dependent upon the idea that there is some fundamental cultural order to be disrupted rather than 
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an ongoing state of structured disorder. Looking back to the colonial and early national periods 
in The Dominion of Voice: Riot, Reason, and Romance in Antebellum Politics (1999), Kimberly 
K. Smith establishes a theory of mob action as central to the foundational principles of the 
United States, both pre- and post-Revolution, to “the question of how the people should 
participate in politics” (vii). In her consideration of a developing national political culture, Smith 
offers an extended discussion of “the people” as a problematic concept in a post-Revolution 
climate of government-by-the-people, therein calling attention to the fraught transition of 
riotousness from colonial rebellion to “the establishment of democracy.” Pre-Revolution, rioting 
was understood as “a form of popular politics” indicative of a “breakdown in deference 
relations.” Post-Revolution, however, “riots tended to call into question the ability of the people 
to rule themselves.” No longer representative of “the dangers of government tyranny,” rioting in 
“the context of a democratic regime” illuminated the “dangers of democratic politics—namely, 
its tendency to degenerate into mob rule” (39). Here Smith’s conclusions suggest that the 
people’s tendency to engage in mob violence did not undergo a significant change after the 
Revolution but that the way Americans perceived mob violence in terms of political participation 
did indeed shift substantially. The people who made up the mob, no longer deferential subjects 
of a separate tyrannical government, were now the sovereign representatives of national 
authority. This change prompted a reconsideration of the way Americans defined the place of 
mob violence in their social order.     
 Within shifting definitions of the place of violence in political participation emerged a 
raced, classed, and gendered understanding of mob violence as legitimate reason for exclusion 
from the political realm. Tracing the evolution of a preference for rational debate as the ideal 
form of democratic participation in the antebellum period, Smith notes the corresponding 
 6 
distinctions “between force and argument, mirroring the opposition between riots and legitimate 
political activity” (70). By the antebellum period, riots had come to be seen as “apolitical 
disturbances.” “Seeking to legitimate democratic government by disassociating it from mob rule” 
after the Revolution, Smith claims, many political elites “characterized riots not as a form of 
political action but as a negative model of politics—an example of what democratic politics is 
not” (12). In this way, a purportedly calm and rational political experience, represented by 
articulate debate and characterized by restraint, came to represent fitness for citizenship and 
legitimate democratic participation, to the exclusion, or disqualification, of others who engaged 
in more disorderly or emotional expressions of citizenship. “Significantly,” Smith writes, “this 
interpretation shifted focus from the rebellious character of rioting to its passionate, violent 
aspect, thus giving prominence to the interpretive categories of violence and argument 
(corresponding to the underlying categories of passion and reason) instead of obedience and 
rebellion” (12-13). Consequently, presupposing proper political participation in direct opposition 
to violent rebellion nullifies the potential for understanding violent resistance as legitimate. 
Deference, then, is built into the system in ways it was not before.  
 In fact, the potential for violent disorder defines the very terms of the social order, and 
the response of the body politic to try to reshape that disorder into rational hegemony is an 
exercise in obfuscation rather than a genuine transformation. Literary critic Ed White probes this 
concept in The Backcountry and the City: Colonization and Conflict in Early America (2005) via 
Jean-Paul Sartre’s philosophy of group fusion and White’s own analysis of the “rural-urban 
‘class’ conflicts of early America” (77). “The group-to-be,” White argues, “had to perceive both 
its necessity (its danger) and its possibility (its defense) in the material environment. But material 
possibility, in this brute form, is not the crux of Sartre’s analysis.” White’s point is that “the 
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cultural tools” must be present for group fusion: “the perception of other groups and group 
members, a sense of serial impossibility and group possibilities, and a self-understanding of past, 
present, and future moments critical to the group” (77). Rather than a matter of biological 
necessity, the fused group is the result of the combination of material need and the cultural 
understanding of that need as being somehow inhibited by members of other groups. Group 
fusion, then, at its most basic, is a survival technique wherein groups define themselves in 
relation to many other groups who pose a potential threat to the collective, a threat that cannot be 
adequately defended by the individual, or serial, components of the group. It follows that the 
fused group depends upon a culturally grounded preparation for potentially violent defense 
against other groups. If threats provide the group with the terms of its cultural closure and 
coherence, as White suggests, then the cultural means for violent repression of threats is central  
to group fusion. Group fusion and the potential for violence therein are fundamental parts of the 
social order that cannot be undone by the political rhetoric of reason or the articulation of a 
collective preference for rational debate.  
To consider the formation of the fledgling nation in terms of group fusion and the 
collective response to the threat/disorder of tyranny and invasion is also to note that the group 
contains the elements of the threat/disorder. Grimsted parses this paradox when he observes that 
“riots were neither rare nor commonplace in antebellum society but a piece of the ongoing 
process of democratic accommodation, compromise, and uncompromisable tension between 
groups with different interests” (viii). Rather than a single, conceptually coherent social order—
the nation—Grimsted identifies regional, political and racial conflicts played out through violent 
repression. Focusing on slavery, which he calls “the nation’s deepest and most divisive 
anomaly,” Grimsted traces the patterns of anti-abolition mobs, fugitive slave riots, extralegal 
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Southern mobs, insurrection scare panics, and election riots, among others, throughout the 
antebellum period. As Southern anti-abolition mobs, for example, suggest, localized expressions 
of mob violence were often aligned with local or regional if not national authority and therefore 
inspired the sort of deference that rational debate was to have replaced. Grimsted contends that 
“mobs against ‘abolitionists’ also were too pragmatically effective to allow doubting. These riots 
encouraged silence, caution, and fear about broaching anything but unqualified praise of slavery” 
(123). In this way mob violence asserted itself in place of rational or juridical debate. As 
Grimsted argues, “mob activity, like personal violence was less an attack on legality than an 
alternating system to which Southerners could resort when it offered securer promise of gaining 
‘justice,’ revenge, power, or property. It was often justified in terms of weaknesses in the formal 
legal system in ways that were dubious but telling about its alternative status”(110). In other 
words, mob action regularly supplanted national authority, violently replacing it with local 
authority, and highlighting the dissension among a multiple and fragmented body politic. The 
issues of slavery and abolition were fundamental faultlines along which various groups were 
divided, and conflicts surrounding these issues placed violent control of a threatening force at the 
center of group identities. 
 Indeed, the first sixty years or so of the nation’s political order resulted in Civil War. 
Grimsted traces the people’s penchant for mob violence to the immediate prewar period, when 
“Kansas brought into conflict the sectional patterns of violence that had been developing for two 
decades and focused them on the slave issue” (247). With the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854, 
Democratic Senator Stephen Douglas of Illinois sought to soothe the sectional tensions 
exacerbated by the spread of slavery in the South and in the territories and by increased 
resistance in the North by declaring that Kansas’ status as a slave or free state would be decided 
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by popular sovereignty. The resulting intermittent violence of 1855-1858 elucidates the literal 
danger of popular sovereignty to devolve into mob violence and further into Civil War. “The 
importance of Kansas,” Grimsted offers, “lay less in the bloodshed than in the political 
reverberations of the conflict, as the country became divided on a sectional basis between 
controlling parties dedicated centrally to slavery’s constriction and to slavery’s expansion” (247). 
Sectional divisions were further solidified by proslavery violence in Kansas. For many opposing 
settlers, “their antislavery was less a moral commitment than what they saw as the policy that 
best served their just interest and influence. And the threats, bombast, and violence of proslavery 
groups offered blaring testimony for abolition’s most effective theme from 1835 on: slave 
owners were as determined to master and debase whites who disputed their dominion as they did 
the blacks they owned” (249). Bleeding Kansas was not merely a fight for a territory but the 
consolidation of otherwise disparate groups in opposition to or defense of the immediate and 
compelling social threat of slavery, which gained force through the visible ruptures of riot in the 
early national and antebellum periods. In short, the dynamics of American politics and American 
political theory made repression an operative principle and civil war almost inevitable, given the 
regional and political tensions defined by the system of slavery.  
 These internal tensions did not develop as a result of the Revolution but rather were built 
into the revolutionary project. In defining riot as a presence, I am building on Andy Doolen’s 
definition of a “fugitive imperial state” which “also haunts, also embodies slavery’s tragic past, 
but it still appears invisible to historical analysis and retains the source of its power” (xxi). Early 
American republican ideology is predicated on the positive denial of imperial practices. “These 
practices,” Doolen argues,  
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occur when the state converts skin and blood into the legal justifications for 
slavery, when it polices racial hierarchies with a special class of penal laws, when 
it reinforces ideals of white racial purity through official rituals of execution and 
banishment, and finally when the state invents official narratives of insurrection 
and invasion as a strategy for reinforcing political authority. These racial 
fictions—taking the form of official discourse of law, policy, proclamation, and 
public ritual—constitute the logic of U.S. imperialism in the late colonial and 
early national periods, transforming the terror of white supremacy into a rational 
and permanent presence. (xxi) 
Here Doolen establishes that imperialism, terror, and racial violence do not simply posit slavery 
as “America’s dirty secret” but are rather fundamental to the maintenance of American 
republican ideals (xvi). “The critical paradigm of American exceptionalism, which reaffirms the 
fundamental ideals of the age of revolution” Doolen notes “has long denied the existence of 
imperial authority in early America. This critical perspective proliferates the myth that the 
American Revolution extirpated the force and logic of empire with the irresistible and heroic 
dreams of egalitarianism and freedom.” Instead, Doolen argues, “the republican rhetoric of 
liberty and equality for all not only obscured but, more insidiously, legitimized the operations of 
imperialism” (xiii).    
This rhetoric also posits race and repression as agents of the political tensions built into 
the socio-economic and political system. As Matthew Frye Jacobson points out in Whiteness of a 
Different Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race (1998), “in practice the idea of 
citizenship had become thoroughly intertwined with the idea of ‘whiteness’ (and maleness) 
because what a citizen really was, at bottom, was someone who could help put down a slave 
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rebellion or participate in Indian wars” (25). White male citizenship was therefore visibly 
defined in opposition to the riotous or rebellious violence of non-citizen, non-white Others. Just 
as citizenship has long been defined in terms of white Americans’ perceived capacity for rational 
self-government, “Americans’ handling of racial questions had profound implications for the 
political experiment for which God had set aside the continent in the first place.” As Jacobson 
argues, “the matter at hand was no less than the fate of ‘self-government’ as a viable political 
principle” (71-72). So, the fate of the American political experiment was dependent on the 
exclusion of the “racially marked Others” whose very presence at the same time “reified and 
further united the ‘white persons’ of the 1790 naturalization law. In as much as no one was 
suggesting that citizenship actually be revoked from those who had already entered under the 
terms of 1790, any discussion of the total exclusion of certain groups—whether Africans, Asians, 
or both—tended tacitly to endorse the unifying logic of a single European race whose credentials 
for self-government were above reproach” (74). In this way, the mob action of whites—in 
service of putting down revolt or defending national borders—comes to be defined and 
understood as normative, legitimate, and self-defensive in contrast to the riotous, disorderly, 
passion-driven mob action of racial Others. 
In other words, the structural principle of repression is manifest in the black bodies that 
trouble the body politic. Black bodies are the visible reminders of slavery’s presence within the 
purportedly exceptional republic, the whisperers of the open secret of empire. “From the 
standpoint of human subjects,” David Theo Goldberg observes, “nothing is more ‘natural’ to 
think and speak about than the body. It is directly experienced, its deficiencies immediately felt; 
and it is usually taken as the receptacle or ‘container’ of pleasures and pains, desires and needs. 
The bodies of others are unproblematically observable, confronted, and engaged” (54). 
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Observable black bodies simultaneously elicit the violent control of what was perceived to be a 
potentially violent presence—the enslaved, or African disorder generally. The perceived threat 
contained within black bodies is therefore central to group fusion in the formation of white 
national identity. As Goldberg argues, “the body comes to stand for the body politic, to 
symbolize society, to incorporate a vision of power. Porous and permeable though the 
boundaried ‘skin’ of the body politic may in fact be, it is constituted always in terms of the 
bordered criteria of inclusion and exclusion, identities and separateness, (potential) members and 
inevitable nonmembers” (54). As a political system founded upon “the potential for ‘invasion or 
insurrection’ and its attendant ‘necessities,’” American republican ideology virtually mandates 
that racial exclusions be maintained through violence (Jacobson 25). These fundamental, 
foundational, structural instabilities make racial violence an almost inevitable presence in 
American life. 
Following Goldberg and Jacobson, then, I suggest that not only is race as a concept 
developed in conjunction with political ideologies about mob action and representative 
citizenship but that mob action is defined as legitimate or illegitimate (reason or passion) in 
conjunction with shifting and transforming ideas about race. Indeed, nationalism is less a 
narrative than a “field of racialized discourse” including rules of discursive control (Goldberg 
42). “As the formative rules are historically specific and thus subject to change,” Goldberg 
suggests, “so, too, is the discursive object in question. Racism is not a singular transhistorical 
expression but transforms in relation to significant changes in the field of discourse” (42). The 
interconnected discourses of race and riot become inextricable as each defines the other. Riot 
comes to be understood as riot, rather than as defensive or legitimate political action, based on 
the racial classifications and relative social standings of the groups involved, and any action on 
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the part of non-white raced groups comes to be understood in terms of riot. Race intervenes to 
redefine riot not in the pre-Revolutionary terms of a breakdown in deference relations, as English 
colonials had once understood their own rebellious mob action, and not in the post-
Revolutionary white ideal of unified defense against external threats to the democratic ideal. 
Instead, race codes riot as tyranny itself, as disorder fundamentally opposed to the orderly 
exercise of democratic citizenship or responsibility. According to Goldberg, “race is a discursive 
object of racialized discourse that differs from racism. Race, nevertheless, creates the conceptual 
conditions of possibility, in some conjunctural conditions, for racist expression to be 
formulated.” Therefore, “the law, moral discourse, and the social sciences can thus silently 
incorporate racialized language . . . while claiming to be antiracist” (42). Via this racialized 
discourse, American “democratic” politics simultaneously denies racial Others citizenship as 
well as any recourse to resist their own oppression.   
 Similarly, I carry Doolen’s logic into postbellum America when I argue that riot and 
racial violence are the physical manifestations of official discourses of exclusion and 
justification, which have changed in form but not in function since the colonial period. With the 
abolition of slavery and the passage of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments in 1868 and 
1870 respectively, legal and social conceptions of citizenship and “the people” became 
exponentially more complicated, as did the dynamics of race and riot. African American men, 
who had been officially excluded from the polity by the institution of chattel slavery, were 
suddenly thrust into the political sphere, a polity founded, in the early national period, explicitly 
on their exclusion. For this reason, my study focuses on the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, and specifically on the post-Reconstruction period, which includes the 1890s, a decade 
commonly marked as the deplorable “height” of lynching. Lynching and race riots in the 
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postbellum period, like slavery in antebellum America, were not the nation’s dirty secrets. 
Rather, in a period of American history when dominant contemporary narratives indicated that 
social equality had been achieved, that the United States had again reinvented itself, rewritten its 
rules, and recovered its republican ideals from the jaws of slavery, lynching and race riots are 
reconstitutions of the principles of slavery, insidiously legitimated by the rhetoric of republican 
renewal, national reunion, and Emancipation. 
 The riotous presence, then, is created and nurtured by this haunting incoherence within 
the US between fundamental cherished ideals of representative government or the rule of law 
and the use of violence or threats of violence to assert the sovereignty of one group through the 
subjugation of another. Doolen recognizes this paradox when he identifies the production of 
white racial solidarity, the maintenance of a master class, and terror as “embedded in colonial 
and national narratives” (xx). This disparity between an ideal American republic and the 
structural, functional white supremacy by which it is maintained is entrenched in racialized 
nationalist discourse and is the determining factor in the maintenance of the cultural order. Like 
Doolen’s fugitive empire, which is haunting because of its quiet insidiousness, the riotous 
presence is also ghostlike, so much a part of the structure of culture and the everyday lives of 
Americans that its paradox is hard to locate and even more difficult to explain. Often those who 
would unmask it are also the Others whose voice it denies. The riotous presence is the function 
of an ongoing circular process, of a troubled revolution continuously maintained and reenacted 
via racial violence and forceful exclusion. Doolen writes: “In a revolutionary society of rebirth, 
where colonial subjects became citizens and colonies became states, slaves were reborn as slaves 
(xix). Similarly, in a cultural order fundamentally disrupted by fraternal disunion and civil war, 
where national union is both achieved and strengthened via the reconsolidation of masculine 
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white supremacy, de jure slaves are reborn as de facto slaves, and the racial hierarchy remains 
intact. In fact, the racial hierarchy is reasserted in the interest of national reunion, whereupon any 
continued agitation on the part or behalf of ex-slaves and African Americans threatens not only 
white supremacy but the renewed democracy enabled by its conceptual overthrow.   
 When I say that I am working to establish that lynching, race, riots, and slave 
insurrections are not separate and distinct but interconnected manifestations of an ongoing 
riotous presence in American history and culture, I am not assigning value to or eliding the 
differences between an act like lynching, which serves to brutally reinforce a culture of control, 
and a slave insurrection, which, also brutally, works to challenge that same culture of control 
from within. What I want to do, in identifying a riotous presence, is to link these purportedly 
discrete eruptions of violence to the dominant ideology that makes them both possible and, 
arguably, necessary. This is a culture that cultivates an ideology of manly independence in white 
men at the same time as it denies other men (and women) the right to assert their own 
independence on the same terms. It is a culture that suggests that defensive violence, on behalf of 
one’s home and one’s country, is both a right and a responsibility of citizenship at the same time 
that it disavows any resistance to its own brutal tyranny. It is an unstable culture that, in making 
oppression and exclusion a fundamental if unacknowledged part of its democratic discourse of 
liberty and freedom for all, virtually guarantees that violence will be a daily and nearly 
unavoidable occurrence. These violent events, these eruptions of underlying instabilities, are not 
separated by time or space or transitory social systems. They will repeat and reoccur, in different 
contexts, as long as the social order depends upon the violent management of its structural and 
ideological instabilities. 
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Reading and Writing Riot 
 The Riotous Presence in American Literature and Culture combines political theory, 
philosophy, critical race theory, and history with literary scholarship in a multidisciplinary 
approach to identifying and laying bare the contesting and incompatible social logics of ideal 
American constitutional democracy and functional white supremacy. Literary, historical, and 
political science scholars have identified mob action as central to the foundational principles of 
the United States, both pre- and post-Revolution. However, much of this discussion is devoted to 
antebellum America and to limited conceptions of race in the context of anti-slavery. The Civil 
War dramatically changed the racial landscape of the United States, as well as legal and cultural 
definitions of “the people.” Therefore a reconsideration of these theories in the context of 
postbellum American is both warranted and necessary. Recent histories of postbellum racial 
violence, like Philip Dray’s At the Hands of Persons Unknown: The Lynching of Black America 
(2002) and Leon F. Litwack’s Trouble In Mind: Black Southerners in the Age of Jim Crow 
(1998) focus primarily on the frequency and ritual of lynching. The implication, in both literary 
and historical scholarship, is that lynching and race riots are related but somehow distinct events. 
Now-classic studies like Trudier Harris’ Exorcising Blackness: Historical and Literary Lynching 
and Burning Rituals (1984) as well as recent analyses, like Sandra Gunning’s Race, Rape, and 
Lynching: The Red Record of American Literature, 1890-1912 (1996), also examine mob 
violence almost exclusively in the context of lynching. With this important context in mind, my 
project seeks to focus on and to reconceptualize riot as a category for historical analysis, not 
limited to but focusing on the postbellum period. 
Riot, then, is useful because it renders the tacit explicit. In other words, riot can function 
as a written text, as a potentially transformative moment during which cultural instabilities are 
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pushed to their breaking point. Accordingly, I conduct this investigation through the reading of 
iconic and influential literary texts, which serve as my entry into the fields of racialized discourse 
and the rules of discursive control on which the riotous presence thrives. Because representations 
influence the ways we characterize historical events both prospectively and retrospectively, these 
literary texts, published roughly between 1880 and 1910, function as interventions in rather than 
simple records of United States history. I look to literature of the post-Reconstruction period for 
a more comprehensive understanding of riot, because literature attempts to move beyond the 
simple reporting of an event and toward representation of a complex cultural dynamic. Through 
the representation of events beyond cause and effect, through the exploration of the normal 
functioning of the society in which these events can and do occur, literature exposes things 
beyond even the author’s intentions. This is not to say that all literature either supports or resists 
a dominant national narrative, or that I have chosen literature for this study specifically because 
it does either. Literary representations like those I examine here offer a field for exploration of 
the social and cultural conditions necessary for the violence of riot to occur and reveal how 
individual and cultural perceptions are shaped, how riot is understood. The literary 
representations included in this study expose the violence of riot, broadly understood, as the 
tangible manifestation of an operating principle in American history and culture rather than an 
isolated eruption with a beginning and an end. They go beyond placing the event in context to 
privileging the context over the event. 
 Literature experiments with and explores different modes of producing a discourse of the 
events. Accordingly, the novels of chapter 1 and chapter 2 are set in the present and shape the 
very cultural context on which they comment. Chapter 1, “‘De w’ite folks is riz’: Riot, 
Revolution, and Race War in The Marrow of Tradition,” offers a case study via Charles W. 
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Chesnutt’s The Marrow of Tradition (1901), in which Chesnutt establishes that culture is based 
on tenuous social fictions which are maintained and strengthened in the press, in the courts, and 
in private homes. I follow Chesnutt’s lead in sorting through the application of different terms to 
describe the 1898 Wilmington, North Carolina, race riot, and to differentiate the legitimate 
violence of one group from the illegitimate violence of the other. These normative discourses by 
which culture is both regulated and managed are utterly fragile. Riot, in Chesnutt’s novel, is the 
natural result of the normal functioning of such a society fractured by the constructs of social, 
familial, and political legitimacy based on race. In The Marrow of Tradition, the onset of riot 
signals the inevitable rupture of these social fictions, and with that rupture comes the opportunity 
to reenvision society by more coherent principles. 
Literature investigates the driving impulse behind the need to keep talking about it—the 
trauma of the event and its aftermath, as well as the cultural trauma it obscures. Where Chesnutt 
attempts to extend the boundaries of riot, the novels of chapter 2 attempt to contain it, to preserve 
a cultural order in which riot operates within the bounds of law. In “‘From all such proffers of 
friendship’: Dixon, Tourgée, Brothers and Liberals,” I discuss fundamental similarities between 
the virulent racism of Thomas Dixon, Jr.’s The Leopard’s Spots: A Romance of the White Man’s 
Burden, 1865-1900 (1902) and the “radical” liberalism of Albion W. Tourgée’s A Fool’s 
Errand: By One of the Fools (1879) within the specific context of post-Reconstruction-era white 
supremacist violence. Despite his reputation for color-blind politics, Tourgée’s authorial inability 
to imagine African American lives as authoritative or independent rather than socially and 
politically dependent helped to create and sustain a cultural climate in which Dixon’s vicious tale 
of black degeneracy and white triumph could enjoy such an immense popular success. These two 
politically oppositional novels represent two warring factions of a white masculine cultural 
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discourse which sacrifices African American social and civil rights at the alter of national white 
reconciliation—the reconstitution of an ideal and imagined white fraternity. 
 The intersecting discourses of race and riot—and of class and gender—are variously, 
potentially, and actually transformed in literature, as the novels of chapter 3 illustrate. Pauline 
Carrington Bouvé’s Their Shadows Before: A Story of the Southampton Insurrection (1899), 
Mary Johnston’s Prisoners of Hope: A Tale of Colonial Virginia (1898), and Pauline Elizabeth 
Hopkins’s Winona: A Tale of Negro Life in the South and Southwest (1902) are collected here 
because the authors’ common experiences as women in a decidedly masculine culture 
significantly shaped their narrative approaches to oppressive violence, organized resistance, and 
purportedly collective memory of the same. Via retrospective interpretations of more distant 
historical events, these authors take on issues of white supremacist violence and of representation 
within the mediated feminine genres of adolescent fiction, historical romance, and maternal 
melodrama, emphasizing the ways in which cultural violence is represented and discussed 
primarily in terms of the male participants and the meanings assigned by a masculine culture. 
Moreover, each of these novelistic negotiations of racial, sexual, and class-based cultural politics 
works to effect an outsider consciousness by which the authors present themselves as uniquely 
capable of recognizing structural violence, yet they ultimately reveal their own cultural 
limitations. 
 The fantastic novels of chapter 4, Mark Twain’s A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur’s 
Court (1889) and Sutton E. Griggs’s Imperium in Imperio (1899), are prospective rather than 
retrospective, therein raising this pertinent question: Does violence create literature, and, if so, 
how? In building to Twain and Griggs I also build to uncertain conclusions. Both understood the 
structural instabilities, both wrote novels that draw us into the violent manifestations or effects of 
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those instabilities, but both also struggle for a narrative capable of accounting for American 
history and culture. They represent the riotous presence in action, as it develops from an 
inherently fraught conception of republican ideology and through its various revelatory moments 
of crisis, as the threat of disorder consistently self-replicates with each attempt to achieve or 
maintain a stable order within an unstable cultural framework. Twain and Griggs are, however, 
less interested in providing an alternative to the prevailing cultural disorder than they are in 
suggesting the dangers inherent in replicating narratives of nationalist exceptionalism. These 
dangers, they reveal, are most visible at the underside of standard narratives of progress, in the 
plausibility of underlying rumors of violent protest and in the riots they portend. Also implicit in 
these novels is a demand for greater accountability, for greater responsibility, on the part of 
cultural and political leaders and among the people who make up the greater body politic, yet the 
means to achieve this remains undetermined. 
 The Riotous Presence in American Literature and Culture is, then, a study of both the 
power and the limitations of fiction to represent this world and to imagine a better. Whether or 
not they are aware of their own cultural boundaries or capable of transcending the various 
cultural influences with which they grapple, these novelists do draw us into an understanding of 
the structural instabilities of American culture and provide us with strategies for addressing the 
present, rethinking the past, and redirecting the course of our collective lives. They also 
illuminate for us the many problems inherent in mounting individual resistance efforts from 
within such an incongruent social system in fact predicated on the structural nullification of real 
resistance to oppression, violent or otherwise. In declaring itself the exception to the oppressive 
nation-state, the American political machine has rendered the exception the rule, a conceptual 
constraint within which these authors visibly labor. Significantly, the resulting novels are not 
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blatant and predictable stories of injustice but rather representations that elicit the complex 
exchanges of participants, victims, and observers within the complicated history of our legal 
system.
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Chapter 1. “De w’ite folks is riz”: Riot, Revolution, and Race War in The Marrow of 
Tradition 
 
If the mainspring of popular government in peacetime is virtue, the mainspring of popular 
government in revolution is virtue and terror both: virtue, without which terror is disastrous; 
terror, without which virtue is powerless. 
—Robespierre, Virtue and Terror (115) 
 
The moment you pronounce, in one of your decrees, the word slave, you will be pronouncing 
your own dishonour and the overthrow of your constitution. 
—Robespierre, Virtue and Terror (20) 
 
 Nearly a century after its original publication, The Marrow of Tradition (1901), Charles 
W. Chesnutt’s “magnum opus,” would finally receive the critical status its author so desired 
(Andrews 175). Set against the backdrop of the 1898 Wilmington, North Carolina, race riot, The 
Marrow of Tradition goes beyond reporting a “counterhistory that resists dominant history and 
rewrites it in resolutely local terms,” to reflecting the mechanisms that allowed for the 
privileging of one historical narrative over another (Wilson 112). That is, through the 
juxtaposition of multiple perspectives and experiences, Chesnutt reveals how the actions of the 
white supremacists in the context of the Wilmington riot and beyond came to be historically 
understood as legitimate in opposition to the “illegitimate” actions of Wilmington’s black 
citizens. The Marrow of Tradition reveals the mechanisms of a white supremacist culture that are 
central to the creation of these fictions of legitimacy in terms of genealogy, personal 
relationships, political activism, and, ultimately, violence. The novel is as much a study of white 
methods, a history of subordination, and a rhetoric of legitimate revolution as it is a study of the 
specifics of 10 November 1898. Mirroring the practices of an inherently white supremacist 
culture, Chesnutt exposes the ways in which white supremacy functions as a self-regenerating 
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sociopolitical order through the recognition of some violence as legitimate while discounting 
other violence as spontaneous, disordered, and illegitimate.   
 In the years before the Wilmington massacre, the Port City was a place of opportunity for 
blacks, many of whom held high-paying positions of relative power, both within the city’s 
business class and as members of local government. By the time of the riot, blacks outnumbered 
whites in Wilmington, where they served on the city’s board of aldermen, as police officers, as 
justice of the peace, and as coroner; they were restaurant owners, barbers, tailors, butchers, 
grocers, mechanics, brickmasons, watchmakers, and real estate agents, and many kept offices 
downtown rather than in segregated black neighborhoods (Prather, “We Have Taken a City” 16-
17). After the March 1897 municipal elections in Wilmington, when Fusionist efforts at the state 
level to overhaul North Carolina’s election practices had seen results locally, the balance of 
power in city government shifted away from the Democrats (20-21). This rise of Fusion politics 
throughout the Black Belt, created by the success of the Republican-Populist union in 1894, 
inspired a statewide white supremacy campaign in 1898, spearheaded by prominent white 
Democrats and carried out in the white press. In August 1898, an anti-lynching editorial written 
and published by black Wilmington newspaperman Alexander Manly, in which he castigated 
white men for the rape of black women and suggested that sex between white women and black 
men was just as often consensual, became a platform for the white supremacy leaders, who 
vocally promoted and nurtured myths of black brutality and fears of “Negro Domination” among 
the state’s white citizens.1  
By the time of the November election, tensions were high and citizens on both sides of 
the color line were attempting to arm themselves. On election day, 8 November, a combination 
of intimidation and fraud resulted in Democratic victory. On 9 November, Wilmington’s white 
 24 
supremacist contingency, led by a group of influential Democrats dubbed the “Secret Nine” and 
by visible figurehead Alfred M. Waddell, gathered members of Wilmington’s black leadership to 
issue an ultimatum stipulating that they agree to the demands outlined in the newly penned 
“White Declaration of Independence,” which included the resignations of the standing Fusionist 
government and the forceful expulsion of Manly.2 Wilmington’s black leadership drafted their 
response, but their messenger did not succeed in delivering it to Waddell as instructed.3   
 The anticipated violence did not occur until 10 November, two days after the election. 
Armed whites gathered in the morning at the Wilmington Light Infantry, prepared to enforce the 
objectives outlined in their new “constitution.” The violence began with the destruction of 
Manly’s press in the morning and spread into the streets where the shooting started.4 Much of the 
firefight would take place in Brooklyn, one of Wilmington’s predominantly black 
neighborhoods, between heavily-armed whites and poorly-armed blacks, while incidents 
continued throughout the city, including the stopping and searching of blacks. The white 
supremacist involvement already included both volunteer citizens and organized militia groups 
the Red Shirts and the Rough Riders when martial law was declared that afternoon to “preserve 
peace” (WRRC 433-434). The violence in the streets persisted, with the military ordered to 
“shoot to kill,” while the mayor, the board of alderman, and the police force were compelled to 
resign and were replaced by Democrats on Waddell’s orders (WRRC 434; Prather 36-37). By 
dusk the shooting had abated, but it continued intermittently into the night in Brooklyn. The mob 
had claimed an unknown number of black victims, with later reports ranging from nine to more 
than 100 (Prather 35).5 Prominent Republicans, both black and white, and middle class blacks 
were forcibly exiled from the city. Other frightened blacks, including women and children, fled 
the city in droves to hide in nearby woods and swamps for several days. Martial law remained in 
 25 
effect the following day, while Waddell, newly-“elected” mayor of Wilmington by the newly-
placed Democratic board of aldermen, reorganized his command (WRRC 435-436; Prather 37). 
 With few exceptions, the contemporary mainstream white press, both locally and 
nationally, white political and intellectual leaders, and white clergy not only accepted but 
championed the white supremacists’ version of events in the wake of the 1898 race riot. These 
accounts documented the purported aggression of Wilmington’s African American community 
and depicted the white supremacist brigade simultaneously as political revolutionaries in the 
process of overthrowing an unqualified and oppressive black regime and as the justified 
defenders of a specific version of law and order in which white social and political superiority 
remained intact. At the national level, black leaders like W. E. B. Du Bois, poet Paul Lawrence 
Dunbar, editor T. Thomas Fortune, and congressman George H. White, along with a minority of 
white supporters, fought for public recognition of the event as the racial massacre that it was, but 
their appeals were undercut by the lack of response from the McKinley administration, public 
sentiment, and a growing tendency toward assimilation rather than militancy among the black 
middle classes in both sections. Among white Democrats in the South, Wilmington was touted as 
a successful model of political method and served as a figurehead for the subsequent 
disfranchisement campaign of 1899-1900 (Haley 210-217). Despite resistance at both the 
national and local levels, the coup was successful for the white supremacist “revolutionaries,” as 
they had dubbed themselves, and their version of events would dominate popular narratives and 
history books for nearly a century. 
 Bundled into the Democratic rhetoric of white revolution is also the white claim of 
defensive action or pre-emptive strike in the name of law and order, which Chesnutt refutes 
through his juxtaposition of the contemporary post-Reconstruction race riot and antebellum slave 
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insurrection. Chesnutt reconfigures the power relations at play both in white riots and in slave 
insurrections and reveals a tragic and predictable continuity between the two, despite the 
intervention of such seemingly definitive progressive events as Emancipation and 
Reconstruction. In both scenarios, Chesnutt reveals, it is the whites who revolt against their own 
avowed principles of law and order in their self-serving and violent subversion of black 
citizenship. Where Chesnutt disputes and works to reveal the inherent contradictions in white 
supremacists’ classifications of the Wilmington violence as a combination of white revolution 
and black insurrection, he does, however, share with white supremacist ideologues in the 
prediction that Wilmington forebodes a coming race war. For Chesnutt, the US, catastrophically 
divided by the fictions of race, has reached an intermittent point of chaos at which the potential 
for real revolution becomes recognizable amid the fractured logic of the current state of 
American racial divisiveness. 
 
Riot 
In the olden time the white South labored under the constant fear of negro insurrections. 
Knowing that they themselves, if in the negroes’ place, would have risen in the effort to throw 
off the yoke, all their reiterated theories of negro subordination and inferiority could not remove 
that lurking fear, founded upon the obscure consciousness that the slaves ought to have risen. 
—The Marrow of Tradition (276) 
  
 Contemporary literary responses to the Wilmington massacre represented diverse 
positions on an ideological spectrum, from that of Chesnutt in The Marrow of Tradition to 
Thomas Dixon Jr. in The Leopard’s Spots: A Romance of the White Man’s Burden, 1865-1900 
(1902). The first literary representation was Hanover; Or, The Persecution of the Lowly (1900), 
in which David Bryant Fulton, an African American and former Wilmington resident, creates a 
“semi-fictional” (Lowery 416) account of the riot that begins with an 11 November report from 
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the Associated Press in which “gangs of Negroes” are reported to have been “growling and 
threatening the whites” (Fulton 3). After a brief historical introduction, Fulton turns to a 
fictionalized narrative in which major white players are easily recognizable and principle black 
figures are identified by name. Fulton emphasizes the defensive role played by African 
Americans, particularly black women, during the riot, as well as the disingenuous deflection of 
responsibility for the violence by the white elite onto lower class whites, while adhering, for the 
most part, to the dominant sequence of events established in the historical records.6   
 The Marrow of Tradition, published shortly after Fulton’s text, offers a more interpretive, 
ambitious, and widely circulated challenge to the dominant white narrative. In an essay 
published 20 October 1901 in the Cleveland World, Chesnutt would identify the “primary 
object” of his novel as “to entertain” and, at the same time, “to throw light upon the vexed moral 
and sociological problems which grow out of the presence, in our Southern states, of two diverse 
races, in nearly equal numbers” (McElrath, Essays and Speeches 169). Although The Marrow of 
Tradition was not as popularly lucrative as Chesnutt had hoped, Sheila Smith McKoy notes that 
Chesnutt’s protest in novel form was more successful than Fulton’s Hanover, because of 
Hanover’s open reliance on the journalistic technique of eye-witness narratives: “Inevitably, it 
[Hanover] was easily silenced in the same manner in which the white rioters silenced the black 
press” (51). Alternately, Dixon’s The Leopard’s Spots dramatized the celebrated revolutionary 
narrative that was already being played out in the mainstream press. Sales of Dixon’s novel of 
white Southern strife and national reconciliation far surpassed both Fulton’s and Chesnutt’s 
works, thus reinforcing further the power of literature to shore up a nation’s faith in cherished 
historical narratives and myths of racial superiority. 
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 Later scholarly responses disputed dominant historical narratives. Helen G. Edmonds’ 
The Negro and Fusion Politics in North Carolina, 1894-1901, published in 1951, challenged the 
Democratic interpretation of the riot, although the first book-length historical study, H. Leon 
Prather Sr.’s We Have Taken a City: Wilmington Racial Massacre and Coup of 1898, would not 
be published until 1984. A decade later, with Philip Gerard’s novel, Cape Fear Rising (1994), 
the Wilmington violence made its comeback in fiction for regional if not national audiences. 
Largely responsible for rekindling interest in the event and in historical interpretations, Prather’s 
text would eventually become the foundation for a growing body of historical and literary 
scholarship, the most versatile and influential example of which is Democracy Betrayed: The 
Wilmington Race Riot of 1898 and Its Legacy (1998), an interdisciplinary collection of essays by 
both literary scholars and historians. As this centennial collection illustrates, scholars now 
overwhelmingly acknowledge the appalling interpretive fallacies in contemporary records of the 
event.  
 Retrospectively recognized for the important cultural work he was doing at the time, 
Chesnutt explicitly points to a tradition of racial violence both in Wilmington and in the United 
States more generally—“a tradition whose marrow is colonial racism,” as Jae H. Roe suggests 
(231). When Smith McKoy observes that “Chesnutt revises Wilmington’s riot history by making 
the white riot visible,” she emphasizes the continuity of the event within a much broader 
American history of self-legitimating racial violence (49). The riot itself occupies a tenth of The 
Marrow of Tradition—the actual violence spans only 36 of 329 pages—but a small part of a 
novel often identified chiefly in terms of its historical link to the 1898 Wilmington race riot.7 
Chesnutt’s long-term focus is not on the specifics of the violence but on the multiple people and 
plot lines he follows throughout the narrative. In fact, Chesnutt (dis)places the riot so that it 
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occurs in his novel before the election, a move Eric Sundquist credits as “revealing the violent 
logic of disfranchisement and Jim Crow as it was bound up with the existing legal processes of 
United States racial justice” (Nations 420). Chesnutt’s fictional tampering with the order of 
history reveals a deeper historical truth behind the motivations of the white conspirators, one not 
adequately addressed in the mainstream media or in the official historical records. The 
foreshadowed election is, in fact, conspicuously absent from the novel’s order of events, as 
Chesnutt’s narrative ends with the riot and the resultant confrontation between William Miller 
and Philip Carteret. In The Marrow of Tradition, political equality and due process are not 
merely subverted but entirely erased by the overt violence of white supremacy. Cultural 
obsessions with blood, genealogy, and cultural legitimacy effectively displace the American 
fiction of true democracy. 
 Chesnutt’s multiple plotlines and perspectives open up the term “riot” to multiple 
meanings and usages, thereby revealing the different forms by which violence both mirrors and 
begets violence across the seemingly fixed boundaries of time and space. The intersecting 
plotlines place the personal politics of Chesnutt’s characters inextricably within the electoral 
politics of the city and therefore within the overarching racial politics of the state and nation. 
Chesnutt preserves many of the historical drama’s most prominent players through fictionalized 
characters, as he does with the “Big Three,” a composite of the historical conspirators of 
Wilmington’s “Secret Nine.” General Belmont, the consummate aristocrat, is modeled in part on 
Alfred Waddell, even though Waddell was never a member of the Secret Nine (Sundquist 417); 
Major Philip Carteret, editor of the white supremacist Morning Chronicle, is the fictional 
counterpart of Josephus Daniels, editor of Democratic mouthpiece the Raleigh News and 
Observer; and Captain George McBane stands in for Benjamin Tillman and Mike Dowling, 
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leaders of the terrorist Red Shirts (441). The Big Three all get their titles from their actual or 
honorary service in the now-defunct Confederate States Army, and continue to assume the 
respect implied therein, despite the actual irrelevance of these titles in post-Reconstruction 
society. These characters underscore the political conspiracy behind the violence, as well as the 
multiple and complex manifestations of white supremacy. 
 McBane is a particularly disturbing example of white brutality, and his acceptance by 
Belmont and Carteret exaggerates the application of fictions of legitimacy along racial lines.   
Carteret and Belmont may not like McBane, but “they need the terrorist arm he represents” (Roe 
235). Chesnutt makes clear that the differences between Carteret and McBane are superficial, 
despite Carteret’s insistence otherwise. When the anti-lynching editorial is first published by 
Barber, black editor of the Afro-American Banner (a stand-in for Alexander Manly and his paper, 
the Wilmington Record), McBane immediately advises violence: “‘I say lynch the nigger, break 
up the press, and burn down the newspaper office,’ McBane responded promptly” (Chesnutt 86). 
Carteret sees McBane as vile and tactless, yet he admits to sharing McBane’s sentiments, 
“though he would have expressed them less brutally” (87). Carteret’s insistence that they 
withhold the editorial is less immediately severe and certainly more calculating, but both men 
contribute equally to the violence at novel’s end. Carteret allows the “demonstration” to be set in 
motion, and he only makes cursory objections to the violence when it swells beyond his control, 
when it is too late to stop the bloodshed. He does not object to what he sees as necessary 
violence against the African American men who resist his authority, but he is outraged when the 
violence extends to black women and children, even to his own family’s faithful servant, 
Mammy Jane. McBane’s presence among the Big Three is representative of the commodification 
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of legitimacy that occurs when previously shunned and undesirable groups, like lower class 
whites, are granted a degree of social and political legitimacy in exchange for their loyalty.   
 Making explicit several distinctly different manifestations of the term riot, which are both 
historically contingent and particularly dependent upon who is supposed to be rioting, Chesnutt 
lays bare racialized methods of classifying violence as defensive or aggressive, as resistance or 
rebellion. The ongoing feud between McBane and Josh Green further exemplifies the fictions of 
social legitimacy and their extension to the realm of violence, or vice versa, as the personal 
conflict between Green and McBane contributes directly to the actions of both men during the 
riot. When Green was ten years old, a group of Klan members murdered his father and tortured 
his mother into insanity while he hid in the bushes near their home. He recalls that the leader’s 
mask slipped and he saw McBane’s face. Green’s recollection of this experience as “branded on 
my mem’ry, suh, like a red-hot iron bran’s de skin,” explicitly connects the postbellum violence 
of McBane and the Ku Klux Klan with the rituals of slavery in the image of the branding iron 
(111). At the same time, this image equates the psychological and emotional violence 
experienced by Green and his mother to the physical violence that caused the death of his father 
and to the physical and emotional violence of slavery. Under the system of slavery, branding of 
slaves and other physical, mental, and spiritual punishments were given the lie of legitimacy by 
the power of law. Here Chesnutt observes the changing discourse and the simultaneous inertia of 
actual changes in practice. Chesnutt’s description of McBane’s violent death by Josh Green’s 
hand as “merciful, compared with the nameless horrors he had heaped upon the hundreds of 
helpless mortals who had fallen into his hands during his career as a contractor of convict labor” 
further connects convict labor to riot politics (309-310). McBane is a scapegoat for the more 
seemingly respectable whites, like Carteret, who avert their eyes from deplorable practices like 
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convict leasing while profiting from the products. Green’s final revenge is almost simultaneous 
with this own murder by the white mob, thereby linking the two men in death as in life. 
 The conflict between Green and Miller also emphasizes intra-racial tension and class 
difference as well as the embrasure of different methods to combat the violence and subjugation 
of white supremacy. In terms of the riot, Miller’s resistance is more passive and focused on the 
ends rather than the means. He tells Green and the group of men seeking his leadership that 
“Alive, I may be of some use to you, and you are welcome to my life in that way,—I am giving it 
freely. Dead, I should be a mere lump of carrion” (282). Miller’s medical career and the hospital 
built by his father provide him both tentative standing with the white community and a sense of 
purposeful contribution to the plight of his people. His lighter complexion and relative prosperity 
contribute to a black experience much different from Green’s. Darker-skinned and impoverished, 
Green’s resistance is overt, physical, immediate. He refuses to live another day in social, 
political, and economic subjugation: “I’d ruther be a dead nigger any day dan a live dog!” (284). 
Their roles in the riot reflect their more general social positions and personal politics. Green is 
the mythic folk hero, like David Walker or Nat Turner, whose “commitment to an ideology of 
violent resistance also virtually requires his death, just as middle-class anxiety about the ‘bad 
nigger’ as a type who would jeopardize social progress created in folklore the necessity that the 
black outlaw pay for his moment of heroic glory” (Sundquist 445). Miller is the middle-class 
accommodationist, a more moderate figure along the lines of Frederick Douglass, perhaps most 
closely (but not perfectly) aligned with Chesnutt’s own cultural identity, although his status as a 
legitimate hero is also checked in the end: “Neither Miller’s own philosophy of accommodation 
and invocation of biblical meekness, nor his anxiety about identification with ‘his people,’ will 
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be overridden by the violent events of the Willington massacre, but his identity as the book’s 
hero will be stringently tested” (Sundquist 440).   
 Through the mixed-race character of Janet Miller, Chesnutt dramatizes the complexity, 
and ultimately the futility, of upholding value distinctions, both personally and politically, based 
on the impossibility of genealogical purity, which is the very foundation of Carteret’s campaign. 
The mounting tension between Miller’s wife, Janet, and Carteret’s wife, Olivia, is due to the fact 
that the two women share a father, Samuel Merkell. Olivia’s mother is his white wife and Janet’s 
mother, Julia Brown, is a woman who was once his slave. The undesirable but indisputable 
connection between the two women haunts them both, but Olivia in particular is paralyzed by her 
obsession with Janet. Janet is for her the haunting reflection of herself in blackface. As Major 
and Mrs. Carteret discuss the possibility of Merkell’s having left a will, Major Carteret outlines 
Janet’s precarious position for his wife: “Who was she, to have inherited the estate of your 
ancestors, of which, a few years before, she would herself have formed a part?” (256). At various 
times, depending on the political climate, Janet has been both property and person, inheritance 
and potential inheritor. Janet’s personal and political identities as a mulatta situate her as 
intermediary, both between black and white and between private and public discourses. At once 
Olivia Carteret’s sister and the target of Major Carteret’s violent expulsion campaign, she is 
living evidence of the incongruent social politics of the New South.    
 John Delamere and his grandson Tom further embody the clash between the Old and 
New South. Mr. Delamere represents a sympathetic white elite and a passing generation of 
Southern “gentlemen.” He subscribes to an antiquated code of honor in which the division of 
social roles along racial lines is accepted, but, at the same time, loyalty is rewarded, laws are 
respected, and whites, for the most part, take seriously their self-appointed accountability to a 
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subservient race. While he stands out as a moral voice among his peers, he continues to exhibit a 
troubling sense of paternalistic responsibility. In contrast to his grandfather’s moderate and 
potentially redemptive character, Tom’s gambling, stealing, and disregard for all codes of moral 
conduct and for human life, white or black, is more sharply distinguished. His blackface 
impersonation of Sandy Campbell, which begins as a seemingly harmless mockery at a church 
bake sale, escalates to his calculated framing of Campbell for the murder of Polly Ochiltree when 
he attempts to rob her while dressed in blackface and in Campbell’s clothes. Tom’s crime, and 
the pursuant near-lynching of Campbell, Mr. Delamere’s loyal servant, provide fodder for the 
white supremacy campaign already underway. Mr. Delamere’s dogged defense of Campbell and 
attempts to stop the lynching deprive the white mob of a scapegoat, delaying their satisfaction 
until the eve of the election. 
In identifying the Wilmington riot as revolution, Chesnutt employs the Democrats’ own 
terminology to bring the white riot to the forefront and to reveal the self-legitimating circular 
reasoning behind the rhetoric of justified white revolution. The inter-connected plot lines 
ultimately converge in the riot near the novel’s end, which the conspirators both anticipate and 
even welcome, according to their terms. While violence may be messy and uncomfortable for 
Carteret and Belmont, they cannot fool even themselves in denying that they expect resistance 
and are prepared to address that resistance with violence. Carteret describes the actions of the 
Big Three, both in their deliberate manipulation of the community’s fears and passions and in the 
anticipated confrontation, as both glorious and defensive: “We wish to right a wrong, to remedy 
an abuse, to save our state from anarchy and our race from humiliation. I don’t object to 
frightening the negroes, but I am opposed to unnecessary bloodshed” (250). Here Carteret 
implicitly admits his own sense of control over the outcome of the event, reflecting the sense of 
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control shared by the Wilmington Secret Nine, and paradoxically acknowledging that he is 
responsible for whatever may come of his carefully engineered scheme, whether success or 
tragedy. McBane’s reply to Carteret’s insistence that no “premeditated murder” be committed is 
that he’ll personally “pay for burying all the niggers that are killed,” a statement that clearly 
indicates the emptiness of Carteret’s hope for a peaceful resolution while it also reveals the 
importance of performing a rhetoric of justified revolution even among themselves (250).   
 
Revolution  
The conspirators were jubilant at the complete success of their plans. It only remained for them 
to so direct this aroused public feeling that it might completely accomplish the desired end,—to 
change the political complexion of the city government and assure the ascendancy of the whites 
until the amendment should go into effect. A revolution, and not a riot, was contemplated. 
—The Marrow of Tradition (249) 
 
 There is more at stake in Chesnutt’s distinction between “revolution” and “riot” than 
historically accurate terminology. In structurally placing the two terms back to back and in 
opposition to each other, Chesnutt configures revolution and riot as mirror images alternately 
reflecting the ostensibly rational, legitimate, sanctioned violence of the majority and its converse, 
the irrational, illegitimate, disruptive violence of riot by an unsanctioned minority. Where 
Chesnutt wants to blur the distinctions implied in these apparently oppositional terms, 
Wilmington’s white supremacists worked to solidify their segregated usage along racial lines. 
Inherent in the white supremacists’ use of the term revolution is the suggestion of legal and 
political imbalance, specifically, that African Americans were somehow taking over 
Wilmington’s local government, treating the white citizens unfairly, and depriving them of their 
natural rights. With a nod to the Revolution of 1776, white supremacists conjured images of their 
own oppression at the hands of a tyrannical foreign government, for they were unprepared and 
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unwilling to accept African Americans as legitimate US citizens. The rhetoric of revolution 
obscures the fact that the white violence was, in fact, a pre-emptive strike, indeed, a coup, which 
displaced the city’s duly elected black officials and replaced them with white Democrats. 
 In order to justify their “revolution” as reactive rather than proactive for a national 
audience, local white supremacists played on well-established racial animus and complementary 
fears of black aggression and “negro domination.” The perception of black-on-white violence 
was the big news rather than the forceful overthrow of Wilmington’s democratically-elected 
Republican government. Reports in the contemporary white press immediately following the riot 
ignored this immediate history as well as the prehistory of slavery, subjugation, and lynching 
entirely and depicted Wilmington’s black community as unprovoked, savage, bestial, and 
lawless. At the same time, whites were portrayed as the virtuous victims of and respondents to 
random black violence. This headline from the Raleigh News and Observer (Nov. 11, 1898)—“A 
DAY OF BLOOD AT WILMINGTON: Negroes Precipitate Conflict by Firing on the Whites”—
situates the responsibility for the violence exclusively with the African American community 
(“For the Record”). The use of so general a term as “conflict” implies a lack of accountability on 
the part of the whites involved and considers the violence a more general, ahistorical clash 
between two groups. The ongoing intimidation and election fraud perpetuated just days earlier, 
on 8 November, fail to warrant a mention. 
 Initial reports not only made editorial distinctions between the behavior of the whites and 
that of the blacks on 10 November, but they effectively constructed two separate events in the 
physical eruption of violence and the political revolution. Next to this article—which carries the 
secondary headline “No Further General Violence Feared”—appears a picture of Alfred M. 
Waddell, with a caption that reads: “HON. ALFRED MOORE WADDELL; The New Mayor of 
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Wilmington Who was Elected Yesterday,” as though the two are separate and distinct, as though 
Waddell’s election is, in fact, not part of the same story as the riot, which, according to this 
report, occurred on the same day (“For the Record”). The phrasing of this headline illuminates an 
interesting discrepancy in the historical record, because the official (if fraudulent) elections were 
held on 8 rather than 10 November. This article virtually admits that Waddell’s “election” was 
the result of fraud and violence rather than popular vote. This small detail, however, mattered 
little in terms of public opinion, because the coup had already been successful. 
 The timing of these events, on the other hand, factored heavily into the white 
supremacists’ claims of defensive action. Headlines like this one from the Wilmington Morning 
Star (Nov. 1898)—“BLOODY CONFLICT WITH NEGROES. White Man Forced to Take Up 
Arms for the Preservation of Law and Order. BLACKS PROVOKE TROUBLE”—would have 
carried less weight had the “white man” not so recently reasserted himself as officially 
representative of “law and order.” This declaration both implicitly celebrates the success of the 
white supremacist “revolution” and justifies the white violence as a pre-emptive strike. The 
secondary headline here reads “The Whites Fired Upon by Negroes—The Firing Returned,” 
clearly excusing the white violence as a defensive response to unmitigated black aggression 
(“For the Record”). Again, the white press, in depicting the riot, identifies an ahistorical black 
antagonism as the cause of the violence through its presentation of the event in isolation. In fact, 
the white press not only isolated the riot, they also isolated parts of the event, choosing to begin 
their report at the point that the African American community took up arms in defense of their 
lives. Any violence, whether threatened or actual, on the part of the white community before that 
point is obscured by these reports, and any violence afterward is explained away as defensive, 
justifiable, and legitimate.  
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 The white supremacist rhetorics of revolution and of preventative violence overlap in 
contradictory and inconsistent ways and illustrate the ability of the dominant group to manipulate 
the terms of their own violence. Waddell’s version of the story, ghostwritten by Charles Francis 
Bourke and printed in Collier’s Weekly on 26 November 1898, subjugated the violence of the 
riot to the political outcome in an interesting inversion of the tenor of these earlier accounts 
(Wilson 107). Identified in the byline as “Leader of the Reform Movement and now 
Revolutionary Mayor of Wilmington,” Waddell issued an interpretive statement clearly intended 
for a national audience (“The Story of the Wilmington, N.C. Race Riots”) and representative of 
what would become, according to the Final Report of the 1898 Wilmington Race Riot 
Commission, the “standing story—[that] whites performed an act of revolution to wrench the 
city from the brink of lawlessness and chaos” (205-206). Waddell’s claim that the “government 
we have established, it is a perfectly legal one,” justifies his actions, and those of his co-
conspirators, by characterizing both their motivations and ensuing actions as purely political, 
and, in contrast to the connotations of the term “riot,” both deliberately controlled and within the 
bounds of law. It is important to note that in identifying the event as a revolution, Waddell is at 
once claiming agency and responsibility for the political success of white supremacy and 
aligning Wilmington’s black community with the violence and chaos the white Democratic 
revolution claims to have eliminated. In calling it a revolution, Waddell, who also mixes up the 
timing of the events, is limiting his own accountability and the accountability of the white mob. 
He presents the damage of the riot as collateral, secondary and necessary to the political goals he 
and his co-conspirators have achieved, and deflects responsibility for it onto the displaced 
minority group. 
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 In the press, white supremacists denied responsibility for any violence on the grounds 
that they were simply mirroring the violence of the enemy, countering the actions of 
Wilmington’s black community. Chesnutt draws that mirror outward to reflect an immediate pre-
history of conspiratorial design within a larger tradition of American racial subjugation and 
violence. In its presentation of a more contextualized perspective, Chesnutt’s fictional version of 
events makes clear that these distinctions, between revolutionary and riotous violence, are social 
constructs, that the fiction of legitimate revolution is drawn along the same lines as the fiction of 
race. In fact, race is revealed as the site of distinction between legitimate and illegitimate 
violence. 
 In The Marrow of Tradition, Chesnutt refutes the media’s presentation of two separate 
but simultaneous events by pointing to the construction of artificial boundaries along racial lines 
and emphasizing the continuity of the proceedings. The chapter titled “‘Mine Enemy, O Mine 
Enemy!’”8 begins with this telling description of the progression of events leading up to the 
violence of the riot: “The proceedings of the day—planned originally as a ‘demonstration,’ 
dignified subsequently as a ‘revolution,’ under any other name the culmination of the conspiracy 
formed by Carteret and his colleagues—had by seven o’clock in the afternoon developed into a 
murderous riot” (298). Here Chesnutt does several things. First, in outlining the different names 
applied to the same series of events at different points in the course of a single day, he collapses 
the demonstration, the revolution, and the larger conspiracy into one event—the riot. Second, his 
emphasis on the progression of events belies the implication of a spontaneous eruption of 
violence on the part of the blacks. That is, the origins of the violence can be traced back to the 
morning’s “demonstration” by the white Democrats, which can be traced back to the ongoing 
conspiracy of the Big Three, which can be traced back beyond the frame of the event or even of 
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Chesnutt’s narrative. Third, Chesnutt suggests that the Big Three anticipate the transition from 
their clandestine plotting to overt violence in the streets of Wellington and follow through 
regardless of the inevitable consequences. Chesnutt highlights this foreknowledge with his 
choice of the word “developed” rather than “devolved” or “deteriorated” to mark the significant 
transition into unchecked mass violence. While “devolved” might have indicated an accidental 
descent, a falling apart, an unintentional loss of control, “developed” subtly designates a 
predicted escalation. 
 Chesnutt is careful to place any retaliatory black violence well into the progression of the 
riot and to emphasize the inevitability of the white conspirators’ actions to lead to violence. For 
Chesnutt, the riot effectively begins when at “three o’clock sharp the streets were filled, as if by 
magic, with armed white men” (274). The next description of the event comes when Watson, 
“the colored lawyer,” meets Miller on his way out of town and reports what he has seen: “The 
white people are up in arms. They have disarmed the colored people, killing half a dozen in the 
process, and wounding as many more. They have forced the mayor and aldermen to resign, have 
formed a provisional city government à la française, and have ordered me and half a dozen other 
fellows to leave town in forty-eight hours, under pain of sudden death” (279). Watson’s 
reference to the troubled and brutal history of the French Revolution invokes the inherent 
contradictions of challenging governing authority in violent ways, despite claims of 
justification.9 That all of this occurs, including the forced expulsion of the Republican 
government, prior to the armed stand taken by Josh Green and his fellow blacks (the only scene 
of aggressive, violent action by a group of blacks in the novel) points to the fact that the riot 
functions as a cover for the political coup, not the other way around, as reported by the white 
press.   
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 Chesnutt’s use of the term “revolution” mocks statements like Waddell’s, which rely on 
the patriotic connotations of “revolution” in order to hide the violent methods of the white 
supremacist community behind their ultimate political achievement. Chesnutt’s language—“until 
the amendment should go into effect” (249)—clearly identifies the action taken by the white 
conspirators as an attempt to subvert the due process of law, to, in fact, subvert the very 
legislation, the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments to the Constitution that granted the 
franchise and the right of due process to African Americans, with other (state) amendments that 
would effectively nullify them. Whereas Waddell presents the revolution as a just one, Chesnutt 
reveals a complex set of manipulations on the part of the “Big Three” and the use of violence as 
a substitute for legislation.   
 Chesnutt’s dramatization of the conspiratorial workings of the Big Three is important 
because it redefines the origins of the event and exposes the white riot as the only riot. More 
significantly, it establishes the thought processes and cultural norms that create the potential for 
the eventual success of the white supremacist conspiracy. We see in Chesnutt’s fictionalized 
rendering of the Big Three’s discretionary tactics that the targeting of specific members of the 
African American community was, in fact, less discriminatory than a strategic attack on the 
community as a whole. Belmont and McBane have already settled on the black editor Barber as a 
target for their “demonstration.” Belmont decides, too, that “that yellow lawyer, Watson” must 
go, because he’s “altogether too mouthy, and has too much business” (250-251). Watson’s crime 
is taking “their legitimate source of income” from white lawyers (251). For the same reason they 
must get rid of “that damn nigger real estate agent,” whom McBane identifies as having taken 
“most of the nigger business” from a white agent (251). Both Belmont and McBane emphasize 
the right of white businessmen to earn what they call a “legitimate” living off of the black 
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population. In no way do Belmont and McBane consider the rights of black businessmen to earn 
a living, or the rights of black citizens to choose their own representatives in the spirit of free 
commerce. These men are specifically targeted, because they offer alternatives to the injustice 
and fraud perpetrated by men like Belmont and McBane against the black community and, in 
turn, threaten the livelihood of white Wellington.   
 Belmont and McBane do not limit their attack to black Wellingtonians, but include their 
white supporters as well. While they may not have been made overt targets of the actual physical 
violence, Belmont emphatically asserts that “every white Republican office holder ought to be 
made to go. This town is only big enough for Democrats, and negroes who can be taught to keep 
their place” (251). The Big Three and their white supremacist supporters have an antebellum 
way of life in mind, and they intend to reclaim and preserve that way of life by forcefully ousting 
anyone, white or black, who does not acquiesce to predetermined social roles. 
 While the Big Three expand their list of victims to include white offenders as well as 
black, the white supremacist leaders also narrow their list, declining to target certain blacks who 
uphold the desired social hierarchy and those whose political positions might draw attention to 
their scheme, like the federally-appointed collector of the port.10 This includes the “nigger 
preachers,” who, according to McBane, “want to stay here, where the loaves and fishes are” 
(251). The preachers can be bribed, McBane asserts, and allowed to remain in exchange for 
publicly supporting the white supremacist cause. Dr. William Miller is also spared the wrath of 
General Belmont, because his spending money in the community “contributes to its prosperity,” 
but, because of McBane’s aversion to “smart niggers” and Carteret’s admittedly personal dislike 
for him, Miller is ultimately targeted for expulsion (252). That their personal grudges affect their 
political decisions is a knowledge that lingers in the air until it is released by the offensive 
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Captain McBane: “‘What’s the use of all this hypocrisy, gentlemen?’ sneered McBane. ‘Every 
last one of us has an axe to grind! The major may as well put an edge on his. We’ll never get a 
better chance to have things our way. If this nigger doctor annoys the major, we’ll run him out 
with the rest’” (252). Such consciousness both of personal grievances and of the possibility of 
exposure point to the duplicity of the Big Three in their idealized re-making of the population of 
Wellington. While their targets may indeed have been chosen carefully and their intended 
victims limited to those who had offended them in some way, however unrealistic, both their 
intentions and eventually their violence would spread to the whole of Wellington, beyond even 
the black community. Their obvious desire for some measure of secrecy and for avoiding legal 
interference from without signal a clear knowledge that their behavior would not have been 
universally condoned by a national white audience, especially if it were revealed that their 
careful targeting of perpetrators was not as discriminating nor as restrained as they wished to 
project. 
 The purported legitimacy of the white supremacist mission, including public acceptance 
of the conspirators’ actions as legitimate, is also dependent on the public perception of 
spontaneity, although the rhetoric of justification is a way of validating actions already in place. 
The white press’s separation of the events along the lines of violence (riot) and politics 
(revolution) carries with it the implication of different degrees of spontaneity and planning. The 
marking of the violence as spontaneous, as disordered, as black, effectively differentiates it from 
the necessary collateral violence of revolution and further justifies the white violence against an 
immediate and unforeseeable threat. Chesnutt breaks down this myth of separation by directly 
connecting the planned revolution with the outbreak of physical, uncontrolled violence and, more 
importantly, its conspirators with the knowledge that the revolution would inevitably culminate 
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in this kind of unchecked mayhem. The Big Three’s presentation of their intentions as a 
relatively orderly demonstration, then, in which only specific (implicitly guilty) perpetrators 
were targeted, rather than the entire African American community, inserts the disruptive and 
spontaneous black violence of riot into an otherwise tidy and disciplined white confrontation, 
thus defining their own actions as legitimate and normative. 
 
Insurrection 
“What’s de trouble, suh? Why, all hell’s broke loose in town yonduh. De w’ite folks is riz ’gins’ 
de niggers, an’ say dey ’re gwine ter kill eve’y nigger dey kin lay han’s on.” 
—The Marrow of Tradition (277) 
 
 In Wilmington, the white supremacists’ public presentation of the white riot as a justified, 
popularly sanctioned revolution is dependent upon the fabrication of an imminent threat by an 
enemy other. In the normative discourse of a white supremacist society, the enemy of legitimate 
revolution is almost always the non-white racial other. As Smith McKoy observes, “when race is 
coupled with violence, the national inclination is to blacken the violence, even when that 
violence victimizes communities of color” (12). In The Marrow of Tradition, Chesnutt 
emphasizes the fluid form and repetitive function of this national phenomenon by explicitly 
juxtaposing the post-Reconstruction (white) race riot with the antebellum slave insurrection. 
Chesnutt’s phrase “De w’ite folks is riz” points to a specific history of differentiating between 
legitimate (white) and illegitimate (black) violence at the same time as it dramatizes the 
continuity of racist discourse, ideology, and practice across ostensibly inviolable historical and 
legal boundaries. The mirror-image comparison between white riot and the suppression of real or 
imagined antebellum slave uprising illustrates the power politics at play in North Carolina in 
1898. 
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 Chesnutt’s juxtaposition of slave insurrection and white riot equates fundamental aspects 
of the two types of violent uprising, thereby revealing the cultural mechanisms that allow for the 
placement of fault for white violence against blacks with the black community. In terms of real 
insurrectionary violence, like the uprisings led by Denmark Vesey (1822),11 Nat Turner (1831), 
and John Brown (1859), revolting slaves and all associated with them were inherently defined by 
their slave status as illegitimate and therefore criminal and deserving of all violent retribution, 
both legal and extralegal, enacted by the white “victims.” However, as Saidiya Hartman 
observes, it “is a tricky matter to detail the civil existence of a subject who is socially dead and 
legally recognized as human only to the degree that he is criminally culpable” (24). In other 
words, slaves, and even free blacks, held criminally culpable in instances of real or suspected 
insurrection could not be, legally or socially, victims themselves; they and their supporters were 
always already the criminal party in any altercation with the dominant white majority. In fact, as 
David Grimsted’s account of the mayhem following Turner’s insurrection documents, one did 
not need to be personally involved with the insurrectionary violence to bear the brunt of white 
retribution: “The mass killing and sadistic maiming of blacks began after the militia units arrived 
in the area to find most of the guilty jailed or dispersed, though Turner was still at large. Those 
killed and hurt after the rebellion’s suppression were innocent victims of white citizens who 
exorcised their horror through atrocities on stray blacks” (136-137). That white violence against 
blacks continued, moreover intensified, after the militia arrived, as it did in Wilmington, points 
to the significant fact that the militia functions in collusion with the extralegal activities of the 
whites and its presence not only ensures their protection but also visibly justifies their continued 
aggression against blacks. 
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 Real insurrectionary violence by slaves and free blacks was much less frequent in the 
antebellum period than were insurrection scare panics and the ensuing white riots in which 
whites anticipated and punished black offenders even before an alleged insurrection took any 
physical shape. While Grimsted describes the insurrection scares as white riots, he also 
acknowledges that they would not have been so defined in the minds of white Southerners: 
“Doubtless slaves plotted other uprisings, but the records about other ‘insurrections’ testify to 
white fears rather than black action. The number of victims killed in these scares proclaims the 
depth of Southern fears about their slave population. Although there were only thirty-five 
instances of extralegal action against alleged insurrectionary plots, 448 persons were killed, 447 
of them mob victims. Of these only 26 were whites and but 8 statedly free blacks” (135). Like 
the continuation of white violence against blacks after the immediate threat has passed in 
instances of documented black uprising, the ratio of white to black victims in insurrection scare 
riots clearly identifies these events as instances of white aggression. White fear of black violence 
provides adequate and acceptable justification for extensive and exaggerated white violence 
against blacks in a reoccurring pattern of deflecting the responsibility for white violence onto its 
black victims. The formula by which many insurrection scare riots unfolded provides a template 
for the later deflection of responsibility onto minority groups in the post-Reconstruction race riot 
and in the ritual of lynching. Grimsted observes that “Southern mobs always offered ‘proof’ of 
guilt which no one could doubt: victims were ‘whipped until they confessed’—and implicated 
others, as the mob suggested” (15). In formulating the Wellington event in terms of a white 
uprising, Chesnutt evokes this specific pattern of white instigation and deflection, therefore 
making a distinct if subtle connection between antebellum “insurrections” and the post-
Reconstruction Wilmington/Wellington “race riot.” 
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 Like the slave population in the antebellum South (as well as the free black population in 
the North), the African American population of Wilmington in 1898 functioned as a continuous 
threat to the sovereignty of white Democrats. The very presence of black Wilmingtonians was a 
constant reminder of the fragile fictions of racial superiority on which the foundation of white 
supremacy was based. White Democrats saw conspiracy around every corner, especially in the 
Fusionist coalition of Populists and Republicans. As Sandra Gunning observes, “whereas the 
years prior to Emancipation were marked (often, though not exclusively, in the South) by 
organized white violence against African Americans under the rubric of punishments necessary 
for slave discipline, after 1865 white-on-black violence came to be seen as urgently self-
defensive” (6). In antebellum America, slaves deprived of all social and political power still 
posed a specifically violent threat to a white community literally lording over them. In post-
Reconstruction North Carolina, that threat came in the form of black political and social 
achievement. Therefore, black violence and black political power are again conflated in terms of 
dominant interpretations of the events; socio-political “insurrection” is interpreted under the 
same rubric as slave insurrection. As in real insurrections like Nat Turner’s, black violence and 
black political power are necessarily compressed, because slaves were by definition denied any 
form of social, economic, or political existence. Arguably, violence was their only recourse to 
the injustice of slavery. In Chesnutt’s configuration, the political achievement of black 
Wellingtonians is equal to violence against whites in the eyes of white Democrats. In both 
Wilmington and in Chesnutt’s fictional Wellington, white subversion of the Reconstruction 
amendments, disfranchisement campaigns, and defamation campaigns in the white press 
effectively reconstituted black politics in terms of black violence, recreating the threat of violent, 
“illegitimate” insurrection in a post-Reconstruction setting.   
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 In The Marrow of Tradition, the attempted lynching of Sandy Campbell stands in as a 
microcosmic representation of the formulaic and ritualized deflection of white violence onto the 
black community. Through the specific aspects of Campbell’s plight, Chesnutt implicitly 
connects antebellum and post-Reconstruction configurations of white riot and mob violence with 
intermediary (and continuing) acts of lynching. Because the physical expression of the mob’s 
anger is focused on one individual as representative of the group rather than the entire group as a 
whole, the internal lynching drama focuses in on and explicates the fundamental elements 
involved in the evolution of a race riot, whether or not that riot takes the specific form of slave 
insurrection, lynching, or urban massacre. The progression of events leading up to Campbell’s 
near-lynching exposes the ritualized, performative, and regenerative nature of these seemingly 
disparate events as part of the continued maintenance of white supremacy.   
 Even before mob violence becomes a bloody reality for Chesnutt’s fictional Wellington, 
we see in Campbell the literal criminalization of a black man by white violence. This sequence 
of events evinces many of the classic elements of racial (il)legitimacy, criminalization, and 
deflection of responsibility. When the white Mrs. Polly Ochiltree is found lying dead, in a pool 
of her own blood, robbed and apparently murdered, the white people of Wellington immediately 
suspect that the perpetrator is black. Through his narrative voice, Chesnutt observes that this 
conclusion might have been logical based on sheer numbers, as “the population of the town was 
a least two-thirds colored” (179). However, we see that this logic is not a factor at all. Rather, the 
race and status of the victim are key in characterizing both the crime and the criminal. Major 
Carteret’s white supremacist newspaper, The Morning Chronicle, describes the crime as “an 
atrocious assault upon a defenseless old lady, whose age and sex would have protected her from 
harm at the hands of anyone but a brute in the lowest human form” (185). That “brute” is 
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implicitly black, which follows that rape must have been an element of the crime, although there 
is no evidence to support this conclusion. Angela Y. Davis emphasizes this assumption as a myth 
that “has been methodically conjured up whenever recurrent waves of violence and terror against 
the black community have required convincing justifications” (173). Both Davis and anti-
lynching crusader Ida B. Wells note the abrupt onset of the specter of the black rapist in the post-
Reconstruction period. The rape of white women by black men was considered neither a 
significant image nor worrisome problem during slavery, and black men did not systematically 
begin raping white women after Emancipation. As Gunning rightly asserts, this “translation of 
the freedman’s impulse toward democracy into ultimately a threat against the most personal, 
most sacred aspect of white life meant that what might have begun in the late 1860s and 1870s as 
a political struggle was increasingly characterized by the late 1890s as a social rape, an 
encroachment on the sacred Anglo-Saxon right to everything in American society and 
civilization” (7). 
 Sandy Campbell is charged with the literal rape of Polly Ochiltree, although no one, 
including the Big Three, is terribly concerned with the details of the case. Campbell’s guilt is 
established by the accusation, and the accusation establishes his guilt. In the pathology of the 
lynch mob, guilt and punishment were not necessarily reconcilable. According to W. Fitzhugh 
Brundage, it “was not essential to mob members that their victims be actually guilty of a crime, 
but it was important that some sort of infraction had taken place” (Lynching 49). Punishment 
becomes an easy mechanism once a defendant has been established. McBane’s sweeping 
generalizations based on the racial identity of the victim and the supposed racial identity of the 
criminal solidify the connection between the literal rape of which Campbell is accused and the 
social rape for which he is being punished: 
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  “Burn the nigger,” reiterated McBane. “We seem to have the right nigger, but  
  whether we have or not, burn a nigger. It is an assault upon the white race, in the  
  person of old Mrs. Ochiltree, committed by the black race, in the person of some  
  nigger. It would justify the people in burning any nigger. The example would be  
  all the more powerful if we got the wrong one. It would serve notice on the  
  niggers that we shall hold the whole race responsible for the misdeeds of each  
  individual.” (182) 
The purpose of McBane’s proposed burning spectacle is not to punish the guilty but to instill fear 
and anger toward blacks in Wellington’s white population and to terrorize the black population. 
In terms of the lynching ritual, murder was not the sole purpose of the punishment: “Most mass 
mobs had didactic aims; their actions both conveyed the degradation that they believed their 
victim deserved and underscored the legitimacy of the extralegal execution” (Brundage 39). The 
performance of the lynching ritual established the guilt of the accused while reinforcing the need 
for conspicuous retribution. Punishment of the crime, for McBane, as well as for perpetrators of 
many contemporary lynchings, was merely a tool for the furtherance of domestic terrorism and 
the use of force to enable political goals. 
 The need for spectacle as it repeatedly occurs in the lynching ritual, for the performance 
of white supremacy, explains the continuation of excessive white violence against blacks well 
beyond (or in the absence of) any immediate threat from revolting slaves, and, in terms of the 
Wilmington riot, the massacre of black citizens who had, for the most part, drawn back from the 
polls and even left the city with the sense of impending danger. The performance of crime, 
criminal, and guilt, enacted by the circular violence of lynching, of slave insurrections, and of 
race riots, both established the “legitimacy” of white supremacy and the “illegitimacy” of the 
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racialized Other. As Michael Hatt argues, lynching is a performative ritual, replacing “moral or 
juridical debate” (80), a type “of utterance [which] enact[s] rather than describe[s] or name[s]” 
(76). The performance of the lynching ritual perpetuated a vicious, self-sustaining cycle of black 
criminalization. If blacks are lynched, it must be because they are guilty. If they are guilty, then 
they must be lynched. As Trudier Harris, Hatt, and others have determined, the ritual was 
established by the “frequency of repetitions” and the eventual commonplace nature of the 
performance (Harris 3). The lynching ceremony typically included a large crowd “in a mood 
which bordered upon hysteria”; the hanging, burning, shooting, torturing, or castration of a black 
man or woman by white men, women, and children; and, frequently, the bringing of food and 
taking of body parts as souvenirs (6). The mutilation of the body and the taking of souvenirs 
dehumanized the victim, while the presence of white children and the picnic atmosphere further 
established the normalcy of the event. In reducing its black victim to object, the white mob 
reinforced its own subjectivity: “The mob does not simply wish to see a dead black body, since 
this implies the absence of a living subject, but seeks to reduce the body to dead flesh, to a form 
that is unrecognizable as a person” (Hatt 81). Lynchings by mass mobs “helped to create a 
climate in which other lynchings, even when unaccompanied by ritual, could seem legitimate” 
(Brundage 44). These elements combined in order to reinforce a cultural norm that reached well 
beyond the specific victims of actual lynching and further dehumanized a newly codified 
citizenry. 
 Of course, the ritualized, spectacular, and exaggerated punishment of antebellum slaves 
provided the precedent for white supremacist identification of their own postbellum violence as 
revolutionary in opposition to the riotous, insurrectionary, and inherently criminal violence of 
blacks. As Chesnutt reveals, these seemingly disparate forms of racialized violence are 
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interconnected in that they not only punish the accused but they establish a pattern for the 
continued dehumanization of non-whites. Guilt is established by the accusation, the accusation 
stands because of the non-personhood of the accused, and an excessive and public punishment 
ensures that the cycle will repeat with the next accusation. The ritual further identifies the 
extralegal violence of the whites as legitimate and normative, thereby stripping blacks of any and 
all form of recourse against white terror. Hartman accordingly describes the transition from 
slavery to freedom in terms of dominant white conceptions of racial difference and the law:  
  The legacy of slavery was evidenced by the intransigence of racism, specifically  
  the persistent commitment to discriminatory racial classifications despite the  
  prohibition of explicit declarations of inequality or violations of life, liberty, and  
  property based on prior condition of servitude or race. On one hand, the   
  constraints of race were formally negated by the stipulation of sovereign   
  individuality and abstract equality, and on the other, racial discriminations and  
  predilections were cherished and protected as beyond the scope of law. (121) 
Even in the post-Reconstruction period, when federal laws have been established to formally 
incorporate former slaves and their descendants into the voting citizenry, extralegal white 
violence stands in as a regulating mechanism for white supremacy. 
 Chesnutt defines popular conceptions of and justifications for mob action in relation to 
the law through the character of Judge Everton, representative of relatively sympathetic white 
legal authority, to whom Miller and Watson have gone for help in saving Campbell from the 
lynch mob. Everton “admitted that lynching was, as a rule, unjustifiable, but maintained that 
there were exceptions to all rules,—that laws were made, after all, to express the will of the 
people in regard to the ordinary administration of justice, but that in an emergency, the sovereign 
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people might assert itself and take the law into its own hands,—the creature was not greater than 
the creator” (193). Here Chesnutt replicates the white supremacist authority’s likening of itself to 
a “sovereign people” in order to reveal the arbitrary application of the law by whites. Everton’s 
evocation of an “emergency” to which the sovereign (white) people must respond is both typical 
of and central to the fiction of exclusive white legitimacy and the maintenance of “true” 
revolution in the face of discounted violence. It allows for the classification of extralegal 
aggression by whites as exceptional, as aberrant, and as responsive to an urgent threat rather than 
as a centuries-old form of social control and domination. As Everton’s statement makes clear, 
extralegal white actions are validated as legitimate because the situation is emergent; the law has 
either failed or been slow to respond to white demands, leaving them to fend for and to 
physically defend themselves.  
 The rush to execute Sandy Campbell and the corresponding non-punishment of young 
Tom Delamere once his guilt is realized point to the freedom of whites to do violence against 
others without fear of consequences. As Carteret’s handling of the evidence presented to him by 
old Mr. Delamere implies, consequences for whites disrupted the fiction of inherent white 
superiority. Campbell’s innocence and the absence of sexual malice are finally recognized when 
Lee Ellis realizes his misidentification of Campbell on the night of the murder, and that he had, 
in fact, seen Tom wearing blackface and dressed in Campbell’s clothes. This information, when 
brought to Carteret by Tom’s grandfather, provokes an intense dilemma for the Big Three.  
Carteret’s prompt response to Delamere’s allegations against his grandson is that “a white man 
must not be condemned without proof positive,” despite the fact that lesser evidence against 
Campbell had amounted to, for Carteret, “overwhelming proofs against him” (225-226). Even 
more importantly, public revelation of Tom’s guilt would reflect unfavorably on the white 
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supremacy campaign. The Big Three are quick to conceal Tom’s identity and to minimize the 
import of the crime, reducing it from murder to robbery accompanied by accidental death. In 
providing Campbell with a respectable white alibi in old Mr. Delamere and identifying the real 
perpetrator as “some unknown man” (230), the conspirators are able to preserve their “race 
prestige” on which depended the “success of the impending ‘revolution,’ for which he [Carteret] 
and his confreres had labored so long” through the continued implication of the blackness of the 
criminal and, at the same time, forestall the lynching of a man they know to be innocent (228). 
Their reluctance to see Tom Delamere punished or to reveal his guilt to the community bears 
witness to their own active roles in the fiasco: “The white people of the city had raised the issue 
of their own superior morality, and had themselves made this crime a race question” (227). Any 
acknowledgement of Tom as the real criminal would undermine the white supremacist rhetoric 
and make fools of the party’s leaders. 
 Of the sequence of events following Ochiltree’s death, Chesnutt observes that “a slight 
change in the point of view had demonstrated the entire ability of the leading citizens to maintain 
a dignified and orderly process of the law whenever they saw fit to do so” (233). This arbitrary 
application and outright manipulation of the law and of ostensibly unchecked passions to support 
the white supremacist agenda is, in Chesnutt’s estimation, the real insurrectionary violence 
captured in his novel. When he offers an alternative perspective in which the onset of white 
violence appears to Wellington’s black community at large as an uprising of white against black, 
he inverts the terms of legitimate and illegitimate violence, thus identifying white violence 
(lynching and riot) as both extralegal and ultimately insurrectionary in terms of declared but not 
actual American ideals of freedom, equality, and self-governance. In revealing the process by 
which white violence is constructed as the mirroring of black violence, Chesnutt discloses that 
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the inverse of insurrectionary white violence is legitimate black government and socio-political 
power. 
 
Race War 
“They’ll not carry the war so far into Africa as that.” 
—The Marrow of Tradition (280) 
 
 In the aftermath of the Wilmington violence and in the early years of the twentieth 
century, the impending threat of race war became a reality for both white supremacists and 
proponents of African American equality. Members of both groups felt an increasing urgency for 
a definitive solution to the “race problem,” and neither group was prepared to concede the 
demands of the opposition, as both Chesnutt and Benjamin Tillman, white supremacist leader 
and South Carolina senator, made clear in public speeches following the Atlanta “race riot” of 
22-25 September 1906. Where Tillman unsurprisingly condemns acts of African American 
resistance as “criminal” and predicts a dramatic increase in the number and severity of race riots 
in the coming decade, purportedly because lynching has been unsuccessful in preventing the rape 
of white women by black men (“Race War is Coming”), Chesnutt praises his people for rising to 
the challenge. In “Age of Problems,” a speech delivered to the Cleveland Council of Sociology 
in early November, less than two months after the bloodshed in Atlanta and in direct response to 
Tillman, Chesnutt admires African Americans’ capacity and willingness for both economic and 
physical resistance: “the Negro is beginning to find himself, to become conscious of the 
tremendous power latent in nine or ten millions of human beings: They are beginning to resent 
oppression. By concerted effort, they have well nigh bankrupted a number of street railroads in 
the South which jim-crow them. They killed at least one white man, in the Atlanta riot” 
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(McElrath, Essays and Speeches 248). This celebration of organized and violent resistance by 
African Americans, especially the killing of a white man, can be read as an invitation to further 
engagement. Chesnutt also implies that white public support of aggressive black resistance is 
forthcoming when he says that “in spite of surface indications to the contrary, they are making 
friends” (McElrath 249).     
 Both Chesnutt and Tillman emphasize urgency in their remarks, foreboding chaos and, 
ultimately, a reconceptualization of the existing social order, whether that is the expulsion of all 
blacks from the South and eventually from the country, as Tillman suggests, or the practical 
extension of “facility and opportunity . . . to fill the duties of citizenship” to African Americans, 
as is Chesnutt’s hope (McElrath 247). Where Tillman predicts race war in the form of “an 
immense number of bloody race riots, North and South, beside which the Atlanta riot will pale 
into insignificance,” Chesnutt welcomes the opportunity inherent in the visible rupture of 
contesting and incompatible social orders (“Race War is Coming”). Importantly, both men 
reconfigure the battle lines so that interests are no longer determined by race but by allegiance. 
In placing blame on the white North for “the scheme of reconstruction,” Tillman abandons the 
sentimental narrative of sectional reunion in a desperate attempt to preserve white supremacy as 
the dominant political system. His willingness to sacrifice dissenting whites, to lump them in 
with blacks as the enemy, reveals a fundamental dissonance between the constructed rhetoric of 
natural white superiority and the need to use violence to enforce it. Somewhere deep down, the 
very foundation of race as a “natural” measure of human difference crumbles in Tillman’s 
rhetorical separation of race and political white supremacy. Escalating from the scripted 
“revolution” of the Wilmington riot, or the enactment of the “contained” threat of slave 
 57 
insurrection, race war bodes an extended chaotic interlude and the possibility of real revolution, 
from which anyone might emerge victorious. 
 In “The Future American,” published in the Boston Evening Transcript on 1 September 
1900, even before the publication of The Marrow of Tradition, Chesnutt articulates the need for 
visible rupture to occur before there can be reconciliation: “The outbreaks of race prejudice in 
recent years are the surest evidence of the Negro’s progress. No effort is required to keep down a 
race which manifests no desire nor ability to rise; but with each new forward movement of the 
colored race it is brought into contact with the whites at some fresh point, which evokes a new 
manifestation of prejudice until custom has adjusted things to the new condition” (McElrath 
134). Here Chesnutt acknowledges that race prejudice is custom and that custom can only be 
changed by openly confronting and disrupting race prejudice. Evidence of that change, however 
subtle, occurs in the form of conscious intent, “new manifestation[s] of prejudice,” that represent 
conscious efforts to preserve white supremacy when individuals are forced to recognize an 
underlying incompatibility between avowed principles and social custom. This incoherency 
becomes recognizable through “outbreaks” or visible ruptures in the social order, like the 
Wilmington riot: “It is much easier, by a supreme effort, as recently attempted with temporary 
success in North Carolina, to knock the race down and rob it of its rights once and for all, than to 
repeat the process from day to day and with each individual; it saves wear and tear on the 
conscience, and it makes it easy to maintain a superiority which it might in the course of a short 
time require some little effort to keep up” (134). These day to day struggles place pressure on the 
inconsistencies of the existing social order and agitate toward the eruption of riot. 
 This is the essential principle Chesnutt traces in The Marrow of Tradition: the cultural 
transition from the maintenance of a tenuous jurisdiction over this riotous presence to a more 
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fundamental loss of control over the institutional modes of violent repression. Multiple sites of 
rupture on a smaller, more personal scale are present in the novel, which both perpetuate and are 
influenced by a certain ideological environment in which avowed legal and social principles are 
undercut by cultural assumptions about racial difference. This day to day process of preserving 
white supremacy is the custom to which Chesnutt alludes in “The Future American” and in The 
Marrow of Tradition. This custom, or tradition, is not necessarily a matter of conscious intent or 
purpose in and of itself, but it shapes both individual identity and cultural process.   
 This is true in the case of Janet Miller, who functions in the novel as a visible symbol of 
the incongruent social order and also of the shame of miscegenation for Philip and Olivia 
Carteret. Upon discovering the written proof that Janet is Samuel Merkell’s daughter by his legal 
marriage to Julia Brown, thus legitimate heir to his estate, Olivia Carteret is determined both to 
keep the marriage a secret and to preclude Janet from claiming her rightful inheritance (270-
271). In destroying the papers verifying the legal status of Julia’s marriage, Olivia follows in the 
footsteps of her Aunt Polly Ochiltree, who years before, upon receipt of the same information, 
branded Julia a thief and turned her and her child, penniless, out into the street (137-138). Joyce 
Pettis connects the melodramatic subplot and the ostensibly personal actions of the women to the 
parallel political plot of the novel when she observes that in “choosing to ignore the legality and 
morality of a social institution as revered as marriage out of racial motives, Olivia and Polly 
reveal that they are ignoble and as fully capable of abusing power for personal position and 
prestige as their male counterparts. The effect of their deceitful manipulations is significantly 
similar to that of the riot engineered by the men” (47). However, there is more at stake here than 
the supposed superior morality of the Carterets, representatives of pure, white aristocracy. 
Olivia’s actions, like her husband’s in fomenting the riot, reveal a structural inconsistency 
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between the rules of social and legal engagement and their application along the lines of race, 
which, as Janet’s character illustrates, is itself ambiguous. Olivia’s behavior is deceitful, but it 
remains in line with culturally accepted manipulations toward the maintenance of white 
superiority, thus both reinforcing the existing system and demonstrating the effects of its 
influence. 
 The riotous presence is essentially dormant until these cultural incoherencies give way to 
a conscious need to defend white supremacy, when the established system of social control, as 
exemplified by Olivia Carteret’s systematic abuse of her sister Janet, reaches a point where it no 
longer seems to be working effectively. Chesnutt’s analysis in The Marrow of Tradition 
functions by working through the layers of justification and rationalization to get at the 
underlying social dynamic as structural principle. Through his tracing of incoherent social 
patterns and cultural logics in the many intersecting plotlines and genealogies of The Marrow of 
Tradition, Chesnutt exposes more subtle means of consciously justifying white supremacy in 
many forms, including charges of “negro domination,” legislative subversion of the 
Reconstruction amendments at the state level, grandfather clauses contrived to exclude ex-slaves 
and their descendants from the polls, and Black Codes, which represented a concentrated effort 
to combat the effects of Emancipation and actively reassert white supremacy in the South. These 
instances, addressed in the novel, point to similar conscious attempts to regulate challenges to 
white supremacy, like the Supreme Court decisions in Dred Scott v. Stanford (1857), in which 
the Supreme Court refused citizenship to blacks; In re Ay Yup (1878), the first prerequisite case 
in which racial qualifications for citizenship were decided along the lines of both “common 
knowledge” and “scientific evidence” (Haney Lopez 5); and the more contemporary Plessey v. 
Ferguson (1896), which codified the doctrine of “separate but equal.” The prerequisite cases are 
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especially interesting, because they not only “demonstrate that race is legally constructed,” but 
they also reveal the inability of the Supreme Court to articulate a satisfactory definition of 
whiteness, the thing at stake (Haney Lopez 20). Whiteness has historically been precariously 
identified by what it is not, but even those distinctions do not hold, as we see in “one drop” rules 
and other invocations of blood purity continued attempts to define race and its cultural 
boundaries in increasingly absurd ways (Haney Lopez 27).12 
 When social, juridical, and other conscious systematic attempts to justify white 
supremacy fail to conceal the inconsistencies or to validate the illogical social practices they 
attempt to legislate, the riotous presence reaches a crisis point. It is here that it begins to manifest 
in the overt violence of riot. The (white) violence of riot can be conceived as revolution, to 
rearrange culture in such a way as to preserve white supremacy when its instabilities become 
both obvious and threatening, or as insurrection, to identify a threat from without. Riot can also 
be conceived as race war when the situation seems so dire that the cultural fiction of a stable 
society appears more fundamentally threatened. Riots are the “outbreaks,” the “supreme efforts” 
of which Chesnutt wrote in “The Future American.” In identifying them as different parts of an 
overall complex historical/cultural picture, Chesnutt goes beyond making comparisons between 
different categories of racial mob violence or between different manifestations of this violence in 
different periods of American history. Nor does he collapse all types of rupture into one 
amorphous category. Rather, through these juxtapositions and the eruptions of violence they 
represent, Chesnutt reveals an ongoing riotous presence manifest in the structural imbalances, 
artificial social arrangements, and basic contradictions of American socio-political and cultural 
life. The riotous presence is latent, becoming patent only through conscious attempts to regulate 
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it, when individuals are forced to recognize the incoherency of their principles and the absurdity 
of their practices.   
 In The Marrow of Tradition, Chesnutt outlines a concept of race war as what results from 
the loss of control over the riotous presence. Race war tenders the opportunity for true 
revolution, if only because the results may not be exactly what the “victors” had in mind. At 
either extreme, the final result may be the suppression of the rupture and restoration of a 
functional but incompatible white supremacist social order, or it may be the reorganization and 
reconceptualization of a fundamentally different social order. On the other hand, the actual 
results may fall somewhere in between. In “Age of Problems,” Chesnutt emphasizes the ongoing 
nature of the battle and the gradual nature of change: 
  We live in an age of social unrest—indeed every age is an age of unrest, an age of 
  transition. If science has taught us anything, it is that constant movement,   
  incessant change, is the law of life. . . . And change involves, always,   
  readjustment, and readjustments create problems. . . . Our Race Problem . . . is  
  not unsolvable, but it is difficult, and we shrink from the application of the  
  remedy. I think I see the remedy, I am sure I foresee the difficulty of its   
  application. (McElrath 238-239) 
The “remedy” for Chesnutt lies in the chaos of riot, in the battle of race war, where every point 
of opposition stands at least as evidence of progressive agitation and at best as the fundamental 
disruption of the existing power structure. 
 In the course of the Wellington revolution, the terms of white supremacy change, 
illustrating the sort of fundamental structural upset Chesnutt saw possible within the chaos of 
riot. In his defense of Sandy Campbell, Mr. Delamere is pitted against Carteret and his cohorts 
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when the threatened lynching of his favored servant impugns Delamere’s family and his honor as 
well as the white ideals of character he represents. His word is no longer “bond,” and he sees in 
Carteret’s actions a direct violation of the paternalistic responsibility on which he bases his own 
claim to white supremacy: “I fear I have outlasted my epoch,—I have lived to hear of white men, 
the most favored of races, the heirs of civilization, the conservators of liberty, howling like red 
Indians around a human being slowly roasting at the stake” (211). Compelled to choose between 
a moral responsibility to his faithful servant, whom he knows to be innocent, and the social 
responsibility of maintaining the fiction of white supremacy, Delamere is forced to violate his 
principles so as to preserve them. He announces the interdependency of the two communities—
white and black—and the damage the revolution causes to the integrity and welfare of the 
whites. The whites, who have defined their own superior social standing in terms of 
responsibility to a supposedly subordinate race now degrade themselves in the violent subversion 
of their own laws and avowed moral principles: “‘The law,’ retorted Mr. Delamere, ‘furnishes a 
sufficient penalty for any crime, however heinous, and our code is by no means lenient. . . . It 
would be better to let a crime go entirely unpunished, than to use it as a pretext for turning the 
whole white population into a mob of primitive savages, dancing in hellish glee around the 
mangled body of a man who has never been tried for a crime’” (212). Twice Delamere likens the 
white population to “savages” in terms of their treatment of blacks, thus inverting the terms of 
racial superiority. Campbell, whose moral fiber remains intact and who has demonstrated his 
willingness to sacrifice himself rather than betray the trust of his white benefactor, has proven 
himself more capable of representing a white ideal character than the majority of the whites. 
 This fracture of white supremacy within the chaos of riot provides an entrance for other 
forms of social change. Delamere’s fraught shift in allegiance is one example, and the emergence 
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of an ideal black character in Campbell is another. The Millers also represent a shift toward an 
ideal black character, as the enduring animosity both Carterets feel toward the Millers is fed by 
the Carterets’ ultimate recognizance that that the distinctions between them are superficial and 
that the Millers have, in fact, proven themselves to be of superior morality and determination. By 
their very presence, the Millers threaten to expose the Carterets, and, therefore, to expose the 
rhetoric behind the “‘white man’s views of the negro’” as “a charade of several dimensions, in 
which the ‘best people’ often played the most responsible roles, as they did, for example, in the 
1898 Wilmington riot on which The Marrow of Tradition is based” (Sundquist 273). The 
possible “corruption” of Carteret’s precious familial line, as well as the literal moral corruption 
of the greater Carteret family’s means, renders questionable the very paternalistic antebellum 
social system that he and his white supremacist coconspirators are trying so desperately to 
preserve, and are at the same time violating, with their “revolution.” The supposed superior 
morality of the white aristocracy is further challenged during the riot when the white rampage 
claims as its victims Jerry Letlow and Mammy Jane, faithful servants to the Carteret family, as 
well as the Millers’ young son. Letlow’s manner of death is particularly revealing, as, upon 
waving a white flag of truce from the window of the burning hospital, expecting Carteret to 
come to his rescue, he is instead answered by “a volley of shots from the mob” (307). Chesnutt 
emphasizes the horrible contradiction evident in his white characters’ willingness to kill blacks, 
including women and children, even though they have been dependent on them as childcare 
givers, domestic servants, confidants, and companions.   
 Chesnutt seems to recognize that social disorder is the normal state of affairs, that the riot 
is, in effect, ongoing, a continuous presence adopting different forms at different moments in 
time. Tom Delamere’s dual blackface performances—first for a Northern audience at the St. 
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James Hotel and later disguised as Campbell while robbing Polly Ochiltree—are central to the 
action of the novel and to a cultural climate of racial performance and social disorder. Sundquist 
describes Delamere’s cakewalk impersonation of Sandy as “a seemingly diversionary episode” 
(Nations 271). However, Delamere’s initial blackface act reflects a larger social condition: “In 
Chesnutt’s use here the cakewalk functions first as a metaphor for the South’s ‘performance’—
its often disingenuous display of racial harmony and black progress, or its calculated explanation 
for the lack of either—before a northern ‘audience,’ whether in the press, Congress, in business 
and industry, or in literature” (273). Chesnutt’s use of minstrelsy clearly evokes the dangers 
evident in the performance, even if on an ostensibly purely social level, of racial stereotypes and 
intimately connects the larger cultural adherence to predetermined social roles to the normalizing 
of white violence against blacks. As Sundquist notes, the two blackface acts call attention to the 
two available contradictory alternatives for representing blacks in the press: the “sensational 
journalistic image of Sandy as a brutish criminal” and the caricatured image of the minstrel, both 
images which preclude the ability to legitimately resist violence against person or community 
(423). While Delamere’s cakewalk impersonation may seem diversionary or inconsequential at 
first, his initial minstrel act eventually leads directly to a subsequent turn in blackface and the 
near-lynching of Sandy Campbell, who, socially and culturally defined as illegitimate, has no 
recourse to stall the force of the accusations against him. The absolute willingness of both Tom 
Delamere and the white mob to sacrifice Campbell signals the circular nature of the 
performance: white violence against black people precipitates more white violence against black 
people. 
 In The Marrow of Tradition, Chesnutt establishes that culture is based on tenuous social 
fictions, which are maintained and strengthened in the press, in the courts, and in private homes. 
 65 
The onset of riot signals the inevitable rupture of these social fictions, and with that rupture 
comes the opportunity to reenvision society by more coherent principles—like returning to the 
basics of human sympathy and saving the life of a child. This, perhaps is the “love story with a 
happy ending” of which Chesnutt writes while promoting his novel in the Cleveland World on 20 
October 1901: “The book is not a study in pessimism, for it is the writer’s belief that the forces 
of social progress will in the end prevail, and that in time a remedy may be found for every social 
ill” (McElrath 170). Rather than end his novel with the massacre, Chesnutt elevates Miller’s 
dilemma to the climactic point of the narrative. From the violence of riot, an opportunity has 
emerged in which the power dynamics are disrupted so as to be, at least temporarily, reversed; in 
this moment, it is Miller who holds the power of life and death in his hands. Characteristically, 
Chesnutt’s novel finds hope in “erecting individual proofs of the positive trends he wished to 
identify with and sponsor” (Andrews 190). Both Carteret, in his ability to recognize the Millers’ 
humanity, and the Millers, in their act of compassion even in a moment when they would seem 
justified in retribution, like Mr. Delamere before them, stand in as evidence of the possibility of 
reconciliation. Miller’s decision to save Carteret’s son, despite Carteret’s responsibility for his 
own son’s death, is both sentimental and hopeful, turning the story away from the overwhelming 
political and social obstacles and reinforcing the visceral and emotional human element 
struggling to emerge from beneath the rubble. 
 Following the dispersal of the white mob in the wake of the riot, Chesnutt observes that 
“our boasted civilization is but a thin veneer, which cracks and scales off at the first impact of 
primal passions” (310). This narrative intrusion is prompted by the juxtaposition of the violence 
of the riot, particularly the bloody climax in which both Green and McBane are killed, with the 
“promise of good things for the future of the city,” represented by Miller’s hospital, which “lay 
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smouldering [sic] in ruins” (310). In these two images, Chesnutt reveals the destructive violence 
of riot as it lies just beneath the surface of social progress and productivity, ever present and born 
of the incompatible logics of ideal American democracy and functional white supremacy. In the 
novel, the violence of riot does not come as a surprise but functions as the exceedingly natural 
result of the normal functioning of such a society fractured by the constructs of social, familial, 
and political legitimacy based on race. If this inevitable eruption forebodes change and the 
eventual reconciliation of white and black, at the same time, “the application of the remedy” 
proves both difficult and chaotic and potentially takes the form of a drawn out and enduring war 
between the races, with many sacrifices to be made.  
                                                
Notes to Chapter 1 
1 Some scholars suggest that the piece was written by someone other than Manly, although, according to Sundquist, 
evidence indicates that Manly wrote the article himself (To Wake the Nations 416). For more information about the 
historical event and political context, see H. Leon Prather, Sr. “We Have Taken a City” in Cecelski and Tyson, 
Democracy Betrayed (U of North Carolina P, 1998); Prather, We Have Taken a City: Wilmington Racial Massacre 
and Coup of 1898 (Associated University Presses, 1984); and the Final Report of the 1898 Wilmington Race Riot 
Commission (May 31, 2006). 
2 The Secret Nine, so named by Harry Hayden, a white Wilmington Democrat, were J. Alan Taylor, Hardy I. 
Fennell, W.A. Johnson, L.B. Sasser, William Gilchrist, P.B. Manning, E.S. Lathrop, Walter L. Parsley, and Hugh 
McRae (Prather, “We Have Taken A City” 20). See also Harry Hayden Papers, 7, Special Collections Library, Duke 
University, Durham, N.C. 
3 In Appendix N, “Timeline,” of the Wilmington Race Riot Commission’s Report, this document is referred to as the 
“White Declaration of Independence” (432). In “We Have Taken a City,” Prather identifies it as the “Wilmington 
Declaration of Independence” (29). “White Declaration of Independence” is reprinted in WRRC Final Report 115. 
Wilmington’s black elite drafted a response to the ultimatum set forth by white supremacist leaders. However, 
Armond Scott, who was sent to deliver the reply in person, as ordered by Waddell, mailed it instead, probably 
because he was intimidated by the presence of armed white men and of his name on a list of black citizens targeted 
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for expulsion (WRRC 433; Prather 31). Because the reply was mailed rather than hand-carried, it failed to meet 
Waddell’s deadline. There is often an undercurrent of responsibility attached to reporting this detail, however, as 
Prather, among others, notes that the tardiness of the reply likely “only provided a convenient excuse for white 
leaders already bent on violence” (31). 
Two versions of the response from Committee of Colored Citizens exist. The original of the letter promoted by 
Waddell as the one he received is in the Alfred Moore Waddell Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of 
North Carolina Library, Chapel Hill.   
4 Prather suggests that William Mayo was killed by the first shot fired, as reported in the Wilmington Messenger, 11 
Nov. 1898 (32). WRRC has William Mayo, a white man, “wounded” in the firefight, but does not note his death nor 
does it identify him as the victim of the first shot (start of riot) (433). 
5 Reports persist that there were many more black deaths than were officially recorded, including reports that bodies 
were buried in unmarked graves and never recovered and reports that men, women, and children, forced to flee the 
city into the surrounding areas, died of exposure and were therefore indirect victims of the riot. 
6 William Gleason asserts that Fulton’s text is problematic, because it has been cited by historians, including 
Edmonds and Prather, as documentation of historical fact. See “Voices at the Nadir: Charles Chesnutt and David 
Bryant Fulton” in Critical Essays on Charles Chesnutt (ed. Joseph R. McElrath, Jr. New York: G.K. Hall, 1999.  
228). 
7 In Sundquist’s 1993 Penguin edition of the text of The Marrow of Tradition, the riot occurs on pages 247-310. In 
his essay for the Cleveland World, 20 October 1901, Chesnutt identifies the riot in his novel as a composite account 
of both the 1898 Wilmington, North Carolina, race riot of 10 November and the 1900 New Orleans, Louisiana, race 
riot of 23-27 July, which centered around the attempted arrest of Robert Charles: “The incidents of the race riot 
described in the story were studied from two recent outbreaks of that kind—one in Wilmington, N.C., and the other 
in New Orleans” (McElrath, Essays and Speeches 169). See also William Ivy Hair, Carnival of Fury: Robert 
Charles and the New Orleans Race Riot of 1900 (Louisiana State UP, 1976) and Ida B. Wells, Mob Rule in New 
Orleans in Southern Horrors and Other Writings: The Anti-Lynching Campaign of Ida B. Wells, 1892-1900 
(Bedford, 1997).   
8 See Micah 7: 8: “Rejoice not over me, O my enemy! though I have fallen, I will arise; though I sit in darkness the 
Lord is my light” and Micah 7: 6: “For the son dishonors his father, the daughter rises up against her mother, The 
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daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law, and a man’s enemies are those of his household” (The New American 
Bible).  
9 See also Maximilien Robespierre, Virtue and Terror, and especially the introduction by Slavoj Žižek (Verso, 
2007). Fiat Justitia is the title of Chesnutt’s chapter 36, in which the Carteret family sees unexpected results of the 
riot in Dodie’s failing health and their inability, because of the chaos of the riot, to summon a white doctor, therefore 
forcing Carteret’s hand and sending him to Miller’s door. Žižek identifies this term, in the context of the French 
Revolution, as “justice, the point of non-distinction between justice and vengeance, in which the ‘people’ (the 
anonymous part of no-part) imposes its terror and makes other parts pay the price—the Judgement Day for the long 
history of oppression, exploitation, suffering” (xi). 
10 Chesnutt meticulously recreates specific elements of the Wilmington affair, as he does when he makes reference 
to a collector of the port, who briefly appears on the Big Three’s list of blacks targeted for expulsion. In the novel, it 
is quickly decided that they “better not touch him. It would bring the government down on us, which we want to 
avoid” (251). This unnamed collector’s appearance in the novel, although very brief and amid a list of other very 
minor characters receiving only mention, is reminiscent of historical accounts of collector of customs John 
Campbell Dancy, a black outsider appointed to his position in 1897 by President McKinley, taking over the job of a 
prominent white Democrat and earning the “exorbitant” salary of $4,000 per year (Prather 17). Dancy, like his 
fictional double, attracted the wrath of white supremacists because of his enviable position and power, at the same 
time his external connections made him an unwise target for overt intimidation or violence. These are the details that 
Chesnutt is careful to preserve, the smaller and more telling elements of the overall picture neglected by the media’s 
grand narratives of violence and white justification.   
11 Michael P. Johnson argues that the Denmark Vesey conspiracy was the creation of members of the court and 
intimidated witnesses rather than a planned insurrection in “Denmark Vesey and His Co-Conspirators.” William and 
Mary Quarterly 3rd Ser. 58.4 (Oct. 2001): 915-976.    
12 See Chesnutt’s essay, “What Is a White Man?” (1889) in McElrath, Charles W. Chesnutt: Essays and Speeches.  
68-73. 
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Chapter 2. “From all such proffers of friendship”: Dixon, Tourgée, “Brothers,” and 
Liberals 
The continued performance of this never ending drama has already stretched through well-nigh 
three centuries, with not a hint of termination. The Emancipation Problem may be regarded as 
the close of the first act. The Golden Jubilee of this event justifies a moment’s pause for a 
cursory glimpse at the past, a glimpse of the present, and, if it might be vouchsafed, an inkling of 
the future. 
—Kelly Miller, “Out of the House of Bondage” (13) 
 
 In his journals and essays, Chesnutt repeatedly classes Albion W. Tourgée’s best-selling 
novel, A Fool’s Errand: By One of the Fools (1879) among “not a great many” other admirable 
“books about life along the color line and amongst the colored people,” of which Harriet Beecher 
Stowe’s “epoch-making” Uncle Tom’s Cabin (1852) stands as the consummate representative 
(McElrath Essays and Speeches 516). Yet Chesnutt finds Tourgée’s rendering “romantic” and 
his ability to represent the cultures of the South tempered by his “necessarily limited intercourse 
with colored people” and by his “limited stay in the South” (Brodhead 125). Chesnutt’s qualified 
praise of Tourgée’s fiction elicits the complex and often flawed nature of white Radicalism in the 
Reconstruction and post-Reconstruction periods. Despite Tourgée’s explicit condemnation of 
racial violence and legal segregation and his important public work as an advocate for African 
American civil rights, there was something about Tourgée’s fiction that seems to have left 
Chesnutt with reservations.   
  Popularly representative not only of different generations but of divergent racial politics, 
Tourgée and Thomas Dixon, Jr. occupied different ends of the political spectrum in terms of 
their public engagement with the “race question.” By the 1890s, Tourgée had become a dogged 
opponent of legal segregation, which he saw as compromising rather than strengthening the 
Union, and his persistence made him unpopular with many who were largely ready to move on 
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from the messy business of the Civil War. A Union veteran and a carpetbagger in North Carolina 
during Reconstruction who steadfastly refused to ignore structural reconstitutions of the 
principles of slavery like lynching and disfranchisement, Tourgée also served as a lawyer and as 
a judge and was highly respected, if disliked, for his notorious impartiality on the bench. He 
would later found the National Citizen’s Rights Association (NCRA) in 1891, draft anti-lynching 
legislation for the state of Ohio, and challenge segregation at the Supreme Court level as lead 
attorney in the landmark 1896 Plessy v. Ferguson case. When Dixon’s The Leopard’s Spots: A 
Romance of the White Man’s Burden, 1865-1900 (1902) was initially published in the US, 
Tourgée was serving as American consul in Bordeaux, France, where he received a 
complimentary copy from publisher Walter Hines Page. According to Tourgée’s biographer 
Mark Elliott, Page probably believed that Tourgée “would find the subject matter of great 
interest” (17). In fact, Tourgée was so disgusted with Dixon’s historical fabrications that as 
“copies of Dixon’s novel continued to arrive at his doorstep, an increasingly irritated Tourgée 
picked them up with tongs and deposited them directly into the fireplace” (18).   
 Tourgée’s aversion to Dixon’s novel is hardly surprising, as The Leopard’s Spots spans 
more than thirty years, from the close of the Civil War to the dawn of the new century, and tells 
an extended story of black degeneracy, white superiority, and the threat of amalgamation that 
Dixon would narrate again and again in his fiction. The Leopard’s Spots and its sequel, The 
Clansman: An Historical Romance of the Ku Klux Klan (1905), provided the basis for Dixon’s 
later career in American cinema and the screenplay for D. W. Griffith’s The Birth of a Nation 
(1915). A respected orator at Wake Forest College and then, for a short time, a graduate student 
in history and politics at Johns Hopkins University, Dixon would try his hand at acting with a 
traveling company before becoming an ordained Baptist minister in 1886 (Gillespie and Hall 3-
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5). He also pursued relatively successful careers in politics and the law before embarking on an 
extremely lucrative literary career that would combine his earlier lessons and acquired skills in 
oratory, drama, and the Social Gospel. Dixon was not the first to romanticize the Ku Klux Klan, 
to represent a white supremacist ideology in fiction, or to exploit the racialized and sexualized 
figures of black men and of black and white women. He was, however, uniquely capable of 
mobilizing fiction to solidify his political agenda. Brundage traces Dixon’s immense and 
enduring popularity to his distinctive command of melodrama’s “moral transparency and 
urgency” which “enabled him to be heard over the cacophony of turn-of-the-century America, to 
reach, with unusual force, the divided minds of his generation” (“American Proteus” 32-33).
 Surprisingly, Tourgée’s fiction actually has more in common with the white nationalist 
reconciliation narratives of Chesnutt’s contemporary Thomas Dixon, Jr. than with Chesnutt’s 
own novels depicting experiences along the color line. Despite their mutual animosity and 
disparate politics, Tourgée’s autobiographical novel, in which he maintains that “the Civil War 
had set his country on a course of humanitarian enlightenment and moral progress,” 
demonstrates a narrative and ideological structure that both influenced Dixon’s writing and 
helped to make possible the inordinate success of Dixon’s white supremacist fiction twenty-three 
years later (Elliott 20). The novels’ similarities lie not in their overt political messages but in 
their more subtle ideological appeals to white fraternity. These appeals undercut the trope of 
cross-sectional romance, advance a rhetoric of white southern honor and counterrevolution, and 
promote paternalistic accounts of black history which ultimately limit their visions of a changed 
future for African Americans. These surface similarities are apparent even as Tourgée and Dixon 
differ in their narrative techniques—meta-narrative consciousness and omniscient narrator, 
respectively—and in their presentation of existing and potential social and political relationships 
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between blacks and whites. Tourgée maintains that the separation of political and social spheres 
is both possible and preferable, an “idea at the core of nineteenth-century American liberalism,” 
where Dixon sees the social and the political as interpenetrating (Dailey 89). Although different, 
each of these perspectives contributes to the authors’ understanding of national reunion as 
dependent upon the proper reconfiguration of white fraternity in the wake of national disunion. 
As David W. Blight observes, American reunion was “achievable in the end only through new 
regimes of racial subjugation, a fated and tragic struggle still only in its formative years. The 
sections needed one another, almost as polar opposites that made the center hold and kept both 
an industrial economy humming and a New South on the course of revival. Some of the war’s 
greatest results, the civil and political liberties of African Americans, were slowly becoming 
sacrificial offerings on the altar of reunion” (139). 
 As with the larger social order and cultural history that these two writers struggle to 
represent and ultimately to shape within their fiction, the underlying cultural framework becomes 
most clearly illuminated during moments of violence. Just as individual acts of violence and 
public violent events result from the rising to the surface of latent tensions within the cultural 
order, so too do scenes of violence in these postwar novels more readily and more clearly reveal 
the fundamental ideologies that shape the authors’ framing of cultural violence. Both texts 
compartmentalize and attempt to contain white violence, whether, in Tourgée’s novel, as a 
political evil that does not mar social goodness or, in Dixon’s, as self-regulation versus self-
degradation. In other words, both novels tacitly or explicitly advocate the use of violence to keep 
order but only when that violence is limited to the white men who see themselves exclusively as 
agents of an ideal representative democracy, thus conceptually limiting the right of collective 
action to white men.   
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 Tourgée’s narrative of unified white manhood is organic, disavowing action in favor of 
essence, while Dixon’s narrative of counter-revolution is constructed along the lines of 
alternately and complementary latent and patent expressions of white manhood. Tourgée, despite 
the projected wisdom of his meta-narrator, fails to fully understand structural racism and presents 
white violence against blacks as a regulating mechanism, the innate response of threatened white 
manhood that will relax its violence once the threat of black social equality is withdrawn. He 
sees this disorder as a temporary if undesirable deviation from a color-blind ideal he imagines as 
the natural, recoverable state of affairs. Dixon, on the other hand, understands the structural 
fragility of white supremacy all too well, and recognizes that violence is a necessary stabilizing 
mechanism. Dixon suggests that if the latent, essential whiteness to which Tourgée subscribes is 
to be maintained, it must be made visible through acts of violence, rituals that at once bind the 
actors to the fraternity and exclude both non-whites and white dissenters like Tourgée. 
Fundamentally, both writers present a cultural order in which white fraternity and white violence 
are both latent until some external threat necessitates a patent, collective response.  
 
Romancing Race and National Reunion 
 Both A Fool’s Errand and The Leopard’s Spots are racial romances, love stories by white 
men about the relationships between white men as well as those between white men and the 
implicitly white nation, written in fairy-tale format with the freedmen replacing the ogre as the 
principal obstacle to the consummation of democratic wholeness. Both novels depict an 
implicitly white nation in crisis and Reconstruction, in different degrees of retrospect, as a 
defining moment for their successive generations. Scott Romine’s assertion that “‘the genre of 
prose romance’ (among other genres) produces white identity—not as ‘racial message’ to be 
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transmitted, but as a racial fantasy to be played out” is as readily applicable to A Fool’s Errand 
as it is to Dixon’s The Leopard’s Spots (125). For each novel’s white protagonist, the source of 
crisis is determined by the perplexing presence of black Americans, whether, as in Tourgée’s 
novel, they are to be incorporated into the voting citizenry, or, as in Dixon’s, they are to be 
eliminated from the nation entirely. The stakes for Dixon are more readily visible, as The 
Leopard’s Spots espouses a now-familiar white southern rhetoric of counterrevolution and 
victory gleaned from defeat in which Dixon characterizes African American political gains as 
“social rape” (Gunning 7) and Reconstruction “in essence [as] a slave revolt” (Kantrowitz, “One 
Man’s Mob” 67). For Tourgée, the challenge is wrapped up, to borrow from Nina Silber, in “how 
the northern people interpreted the significance of their triumph and how they came to terms 
with a victory that necessarily entailed the defeat of fellow Americans” (3). The solution to their 
respective crises, however, lies not in the fate of black Americans but in the ability of white 
Americans to collectively agree on the best way to overcome their troublesome presence. This is 
partially achieved, symbolically, through the trope of cross-sectional romance and the literal 
marriage of North and South. 
 Women, black and white, are nearly entirely absent in A Fool’s Errand, until Comfort 
Servosse’s own daughter, Lily, steps in near novel’s end to dramatize the collapse of the Ku 
Klux Klan and the subsequent marriage of elite white families and the sectional interests they 
represent. Southerner Melville Gurney’s love for Lily, a carpetbagger’s daughter, can never be 
realized as long as he remains publicly unrepentant for his role in the aborted lynching of her 
father and Judge Denton. The devoted fathers of both lovers are necessarily opposed to the union 
when the relationship is first revealed, but each comes to realize he has done the other’s child an 
“injustice” when similarly honorable actions by both parties become known (351). Lily, for her 
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part, refused Melville’s proposal out of respect for General Gurney, who sent the warning which 
saved her father’s life, and Melville, for his, neglected to alert the other Klan members of Lily’s 
presence, thereby protecting her life as well as her father’s. Melville’s public repentance, along 
with Servosse’s and Gurney’s realization of their mutual misjudgments, ultimately opens the 
way for Lily and Melville’s relationship to proceed, a symbol of healed wounds and political 
differences reconciled to a common culture. Significantly, Lily and Melville are not married 
during the course of the novel; it is Servosse’s death in the penultimate chapter that brings both 
young people home to the South and signifies the passing of the old generation in preparation for 
the new. 
 Dixon also includes a cross-sectional and politically unifying romance in The Leopard’s 
Spots, and, as in Tourgée’s novel, the romance emerges from and overcomes a violent event. 
Sallie Worth, the daughter of venerable northern politician General Worth, secretly marries her 
father’s political rival, southerner Charlie Gaston, in the prison cell where Gaston is being held 
on charges of fraud and suspicion of murder in the wake of the “Revolution at Independence” 
(419). It is Sallie’s “great fear” that “she had not responded bravely to this powerful man’s 
singular devotion into which he had poured without reserve his deepest passion,” or, in other 
words, Gaston’s sexualized political prowess, that inspires Sallie to defy her father’s wishes, and 
to declare her love across party lines as well as across the Mason-Dixon line (423). That the 
subsequent public marriage of Gaston and Sallie is to occur on the same day as Gaston’s 
inauguration as governor merges the melodrama of the romance with the political purpose of the 
novel (461). White supremacy achieves visible solidarity and national reunion by literally 
crushing the opposition and then celebrating its victory with a cross-sectional wedding. Mason 
Stokes suggests that “the white nation is a homosocial nation. As long as it’s really Charlie and 
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General Worth who are married at novel’s end—not Charlie and Sallie—then whiteness can 
remain pure, since only male-male relations can avoid racial contamination” (154). In this way, 
the white woman’s romantic bond is both subjugated to and in service of political necessity and 
racial purity. 
 The outcomes achieved by these comparable scenes of intersectional romance emerging 
from within the chaos of racial violence, or the ways in which these two authors conceive of 
national reunion, appear to be fundamentally different. The romance between Lily Servosse and 
Melville Gurney results in the voluntary dissolution of the Klan, while the double marriage of 
Sallie Worth and Charlie Gaston results in the political victory of the riotous Red Shirt 
movement and the ascension of its symbolic leader to the Governor’s seat. Yet the cross-
sectional romances between northern white women and southern white men emerge in both 
novels as a kind of unifying achievement made possible only by and through the racial triumph 
of organized white violence. In Tourgée’s novel, whiteness overcomes its own demons and 
rights its own wrongs, thereby reasserting its paternalistic moral superiority, and in Dixon’s 
novel, white supremacy triumphs through sheer show of majority force and the literal 
extermination of the opposition.   
 The actual or potential marriages between Sallie and Charlie and between Lily and 
Melville reflect a trend emerging in popular literature of the 1860s and 1870s in which fictional 
narratives expressed the newness of the concept of national citizenship. Nowhere was this more 
apparent than in the “reconciliation romance culture,” as Sarah E. Gardner has dubbed it, of 
novels like John DeForest’s Miss Ravenel’s Conversion from Secession to Loyalty (1867) and M. 
A. Avery’s The Rebel General’s Loyal Bride: A True Picture of Scenes in the Late Civil War 
(1873) (57). These domestic dramas worked to reenvision the family’s relationship to the nation, 
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or, in other words, the nation as family. Prior to the war, individuals understood citizenship and 
the “national family” in terms of a post-Revolutionary rhetoric of parental, generational 
relationships and inheritance. In the wake of the Civil War, a rhetoric of gendered relations 
paralleling the national crisis began to emerge in Congressional debate as well as in the 
conventions of romantic literature. These novelistic romances encouraged change and choice. As 
Kathleen Diffley observes, “declaring love made characters more malleable than did kinship ties, 
more likely to preempt loyalties that were already in place, and thus more susceptible to the pull 
of national citizenship where their parents had privileged states’ rights. Instead of confirming 
Revolutionary inheritance, Romances helped transfer Reconstructive allegiance at the altar of 
civil responsibilities” (55). In this way the Constitutional Crisis of the late 1860s and 1870s and 
its literature worked to legally and conceptually limit the newfound freedom of women and of 
blacks often viewed as wards of the implicitly white male nation by reconceptualizing the 
national family in terms of romantic love and white male leadership.  
 In Dixon’s novel as in Tourgée’s, white women represent the fate of the new nation; in 
The Leopard’s Spots, however, white supremacy has reached a crisis point necessitating the 
violent regulation of white women’s “choices”.13 Tom Camp’s daughter Annie will be married to 
a white man of her own lower class and then immediately murdered by her father and husband 
when a gang of would-be black rapists threatens the burgeoning civilization represented by the 
exchange of her loyalties. The hail of bullets amid “a wild scramble” conveniently absolves any 
one man of her killing while simultaneously crediting Tom Camp, Hose Norman, and the other 
white men present with “sav[ing] her from them brutes” (127). “Annie’s martyrdom, which 
precipitates a rebirth of the Ku Klux Klan,” Stokes argues, “becomes the excuse for a new wave 
of white terrorism of blacks, and the clear signal to white women is that they must fear not only 
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the potential black rapist but the white mob that may find it necessary to sacrifice them in the 
name of racial purity” (144). Clearly Helen Lowell, daughter of “The Honourable [sic] Everett 
Lowell” (389), Northern orator and supporter of Negro rights, is meant to learn this violent 
lesson when the mulatto George Harris, Lowell’s protégé, declares his love for Helen and is 
brutally rebuked by his mentor (394). Other women in the novel—Charlie’s mother, Mrs. 
Gaston, and Tom Camp’s second murdered daughter, Flora—find themselves victims as well, of 
black men if not of white.   
 The sheer volume of dead and otherwise victimized women in Dixon’s The Leopard’s 
Spots indicates that even if white women could generally be counted on to make the “right” 
choices and uphold the racial purity of the new nation, others, particularly black men and Radical 
Republicans, could never be trusted to respect their decisions or the social and sexual boundaries 
presumably established as a result. Therefore, the fragility of feminine choice and the ostensibly 
inherent vulnerability of white women as primary guardians of sex and the national family point 
to the “necessity” of violence, or the masculine management of the instabilities of the norm. 
Sallie Worth’s independent, in fact defiant, choice of Charlie Gaston and the racial politics he 
epitomizes serves to obscure and somehow rectify these earlier conflicts in which white women 
present challenges to racial (and thus national) purity, and inevitably meet a violent and untimely 
death.   
 In Tourgée’s novel, however, the racial dynamic of sexual violence is reversed. Black 
victims of white rape represent the specter of miscegenation and the threat to racial purity that is 
eventually superseded by Lily’s relationship with Gurney. One of the few women present in the 
text is Bob Martin’s unnamed wife, representative of black feminine loyalty to her race, the 
devoted wife who prepares dinner for her husband, cleans up after the meal, and puts the children 
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to bed (186). Her marriage to Martin, an independent black artisan, is the perfect model for the 
conceptual separation of public and private spheres until the Martins’ home is raided and 
Martin’s wife and oldest daughter are brutally raped by members of the Ku Klux Klan. Martin is 
tied to a tree and forced to watch as the two women, who are never given names, are violated in a 
ritual that is clearly engineered to terrorize him (187). Upon hearing Martin’s tale, the Fool is 
overcome with “amazement, pity, and shame,” at least in part because the behavior of these 
white male rapists reflects badly upon all white men and corrupts the potential for the productive 
maintenance of separate spheres (188). Mrs. Martin’s rape is representative of what happens 
when the public bleeds into the private, and in this case, white men violently transgress this 
potentially stable boundary. Like Tom Camp’s murdered daughters, Martin’s wife is less a 
character in her own right than a symbol of a certain kind of white fraternal future, which, for 
Tourgée is tainted by the Klan’s distasteful methods. 
 These victimized and therefore compromised women, black and white, are part and 
parcel of the racial fantasies that Tourgée and Dixon play out during the course of the novels. 
Dixon’s pure white women who are either killed or raped by black “brutes” serve to further 
overtly white supremacist arguments that refused to address the legal rights of freedmen and 
women in any sphere, public or private. Despite Tourgée’s fiery rhetoric on behalf of African 
American legal and civil rights, his Fool continues to believe, if implicitly, that “the world could 
be divided into a public sphere of justice and equality and an associational private sphere that 
allowed discrimination. These two separate spheres were explicitly gendered and considered 
complementary: the public world of commerce and politics belonged to men, whereas to women 
was left the home and its occupants” (Dailey 89). The Martin family appears to be fantastic 
evidence of this parallel social structure in action, until the fragile equilibrium of this tacit 
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agreement between blacks and white Republicans is disrupted by white supremacist violence. 
Liberal ideology and adherence to the separate spheres doctrine allowed white “radicals” like 
Tourgée to champion black political rights while at the same time limiting social intercourse 
between the races. More conservative whites argued that this separation was impossible to 
maintain, rhetorically equating “black suffrage and interracial sex” (Dailey 96). The separate 
spheres doctrine, however, by design did not sufficiently erode white manhood privilege nor 
challenge the supremacy of white men. Instead, it reaffirmed white men’s self-appointed 
responsibility in conferring and limiting the citizenship privileges of black men, at the same time 
maintaining the rhetorical and physical separation of black men and white women.  
 In constructing fictional romances of reunion that displace white and black women and 
replace them with white male representatives of sectional politics, Tourgée and Dixon are 
reacting to and drawing on a crisis of white manhood fraternity that peaked during the fratricidal 
Civil War. In National Manhood: Capitalist Citizenship and the Imagined Fraternity of White 
Men, Dana D. Nelson establishes abstract white manhood as the cultural and political framework 
for civic engagement from the post-Revolutionary period onward: “It worked symbolically and 
legally to bring men together in an abstract but increasingly functional community that diverted 
their attention from differences between them—differences that had come alarmingly into focus 
in the post-Revolutionary era” (6). Whereas in the early years of the nation this imagined 
fraternity helped diverse groups of men to envision themselves as a new, coherent nation with 
like goals and interests, these differences between men were again exaggerated in the Civil War 
and post-war periods, this time by the intensity of intra-national battle—“fratricide,” as Steven 
Weisenburger has called it (184). The ensuing sociopolitical chaos of the Reconstruction period 
agitated desires not only for structural unification but for the immediate conceptual erasure of the 
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internal differences between men that led to the disunion of Civil War in the first place. “Among 
veterans on both sides,” Blight observes, “a ‘culture of character’ emerged as a core ideology. 
Old soldiers tended to measure each other as preservers of an older, more wholesome society, 
one uncorrupted by materialism” (201). Intersectional shared nostalgia for the imagined and 
inherited fraternity of white men in the post-Revolutionary period provided a rallying point and a 
ready, if complex, precedent for the potential abatement of the lingering embarrassment and 
uncertainty of fraternal civil conflict. 
 Uncertainty was paramount during the war, particularly in terms of the inability of 
authors and historians to fully determine the causes and the effects of the Civil War. Historian 
Thomas J. Pressly observes that differences in attitudes about the war and specific responses to 
the war were generally more significant between generations than within, relative to differences 
in political and moral perspectives. Pressly also suggests that many of the “primitives,” those 
who had experienced the onset and the war itself firsthand like Horace Greeley or E. A. Pollard, 
and who would, as a result, have had little distance from the war in their evaluation of its causes, 
“tended to explain the coming of war in terms of the actions of evil individuals motivated by 
personal ambition and greed, and frequently they pictured a small group of men banded in a 
conspiracy. They often emphasized a single cause for the war—personal ambition, the institution 
of slavery, section aggression, or some other one factor” (Pressly 145). In displacing 
responsibility for the war onto a particular and isolated institution or seditious group rather than 
on expanding fissures in dominant underlying ideologies, interpreters of this generation effected 
a bipartisan and cross-sectional internalization of an imagined national (white male) fraternity. 
While not necessarily in agreement about exactly who was responsible, a general consensus that 
the cause was isolatable and external indicates an early and pervasive belief (or desire to believe) 
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that the war was not the consequence of a rupture between democratic structure and ideals but 
rather the result of an external and excisable evil.   
 Historians writing in the late 1880s and 1890s, like James Ford Rhodes, Frederick 
Jackson Turner, Woodrow Wilson, and Edward Channing, told a somewhat more complex story, 
“singl[ing] out, as the forces which had ultimately produced sectional hostility, not ambitious 
and wicked politicians, but the spread of cotton cultivation, or the influence of physiographic and 
economic factors” and, most significantly, the institution of slavery (Pressly 222-223). From this 
later generation, many of whom were alive during and even fought in the Civil War, emerged a 
“nationalist tradition” in which are counted historians for whom the preservation of the Union 
was paramount and for whom the Civil War had produced positive results because it “had 
destroyed the institution of slavery and had preserved and strengthened the American nation” 
(Pressly 223). However, both the abolition of slavery and the formal perpetuation of national 
unity following Northern victory had unexpected and contradictory results. According to George 
M. Fredrickson, “the war was a triumph for conservative nationalism, not for the utopian view of 
American society for which some abolitionists thought they were fighting” (Inner Civil War 
188). In other words, the preservation of the Union was not a direct result of the abolition of 
slavery, or vice versa, and the abolition of slavery did not amount to a shared belief in or national 
dedication to a greater humanistic vision of equality.   
 The structure, the shell, of the Union remained intact while its stated democratic ideals 
continued to take substantial hits: “it was apparent in the years that followed [the Civil War] that 
the drive for radical reform had lost momentum. The fact was that the nation had turned a corner; 
the triumph of Unionism and nationalism had led to assumptions that obviated the anti-
institutional philosophy that had been the basis of abolitionism. It had turned the genuine 
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radicalism of the prewar period into an obvious anachronism” (Fredrickson 188). With the Civil 
War physically over and the slaves formally emancipated, continued agitation on the part of 
human and civil rights activists was at odds with emerging ideas of nationalism in that any 
continuing challenges to the structure of the reformed Union contested the unequivocal success 
of the North’s reunifying victory. As in the post-Revolutionary period, internal differences 
among citizens became amplified, and at the same time contained, within conceptual desires to 
(re)claim national wholeness. “Rooted in this ideology of manliness and an antimodern scorn for 
commerce and materialism, which many veterans ironically felt deeply ambivalent about,” 
Blight suggests, “the soldiers’ reunion, both metaphorically and in reality, had become by the 
1890s the dominant mode of Civil War memory” (209).  
 Ideas about the causes of the war would evolve over time, and reflections concerning the 
outcome and the meaning of the war necessarily occurred in retrospect, with implications read 
backward onto the pre-war and wartime periods. “Our Civil War,” Timothy Sweet observes, “is 
often said to have been fought entirely by ‘Americans,’ entirely on the soil of the ‘United States.’ 
But this conventional description of the war was itself one of the representational questions at 
issue—for it is only possible to say in retrospect that the Confederates were rebellious 
‘Americans’ because the Northern states won the war” (2). The concerns of influential Civil War 
critics Edmund Wilson and Daniel Aaron with the “unwritten war” and the absence of “an 
American masterpiece” (Aaron xv) would have been quite different if the South had been 
successful in leaving the Union. Wilson, in fact, emphasizes national disunion at the time of 
Southern secession: “The slave-owning Southern states and the rapidly industrializing North had 
by this time become so distinct from one another that they were virtually two different nations; 
they were as much two contending power units—each of which was trying to expand at the 
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other’s expense—as any two European countries” (xv). In hindsight, it seems absurd to wonder 
why canonical authors like those treated by Aaron and Wilson—Hawthorne, Melville, Emerson, 
Whitman, James, Howells, Cable—were unable to effect national unity through epic literature at 
a time when the nation was thus fractured into virtually two nations.   
 Late nineteenth and early twentieth-century Americans embraced “narratives of 
reconciliation, stories of healing,” like those penned by Tourgée and Dixon, because, Jennifer C. 
James asserts, they “enable[d] an endless deferral of a more painful engagement of history, one 
that necessarily would grapple with two defining and persistent facts of U. S. existence: its 
tactical reliance on violence for the development of the state and on the willful subjection of 
African Americans for its economic benefit” (58). Economic and political opportunities extended 
to black men during Reconstruction were the insincere gestures of a national white citizenry 
professing democratic “wholeness” while at the same time protecting their exclusivity by 
brutally reprimanding genuine attempts by black men to take advantage of and engage with the 
opportunities newly available to them. As historian Philip Dray observes, it was in the 
Reconstruction “era that black aspirations for economic independence and citizenship were both 
nurtured and thwarted, white resistance to the strivings of freed blacks began to assert itself, and 
a pattern of deadly violence as a means of repression emerged” (32). Lynching and ritualized 
racial violence served not only to “punish” implicitly guilty blacks but, more importantly, to 
provide a platform by which to reaffirm the “naturally democratic” impulses of white men of 
both sections while preserving a national structure of white supremacy.    
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Ideologies of White Fraternity and Regenerative Violence 
 Tourgée’s narrative assumes a homogenous and moral white unity that transcends 
temporal boundaries and works to negotiate apparently temporary inconsistencies within this 
organic fraternal bond. Dixon exploits these same contradictions to his political advantage. The 
very basis of Dixon’s popularity as an author, as Brundage, Romine, and others explain, is 
located in his knack for constructing stability out of instability, for enacting a collective and 
unified whiteness in his fiction, which he does most aggressively (and is perversely most 
successful) through depictions of white violence against blacks. As Romine observes, to 
“recognize that whiteness is both the traumatized object of melodrama and the heroic agent of 
epic adventure—that The Leopard’s Spots is both historical narrative and utopian fantasy—is to 
recognize that whiteness does not make sense” (125-126). “Dixon’s pernicious genius,” Romine 
concludes, “was to offer a compelling scenario of white identity—compelling not in spite of, but 
because of the unfixed, unstable identities he produces” (145). White anxieties over unstable 
white identities, which Trudier Harris, Stokes, and others have located at the root of ritualized 
racial violence and performed dehumanization, work for Dixon rather than against him. In The 
Leopard’s Spots, as in A Fool’s Errand, white manhood, unlike blackness or womanhood, can be 
redefined, recoded, and reborn through regenerative collective action. 
  Both novels mobilize this trope of regenerative violence via lynching scenes in which the 
white male protagonists stand up to other white men, but their reasons for opposing the lynching 
in the first place vary. In Dixon’s novel, Flora, Tom Camp’s second daughter to die over the 
course of the novel, is seen “talkin’ with that nigger,” and two days later she goes missing (369). 
A mob of “a thousand white people” operating under the guise of a search party is formed 
“within a half-hour” of the alarm, and the little girl’s body is found early the next morning with 
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“her clothes torn to shreds and stained with blood” and “a wound where her skull had been 
crushed” (375). The sexual nature of the crime is immediately clear to the searchers as well as to 
Flora’s father, and another search party is formed, this time with “no women and children among 
them, only grim-visaged, silent men and a pair of little mild-eyed, sharp-nosed bloodhounds” 
(376). When the searchers return, “a grim, swaying voiceless mob with one black figure amid 
them,” it is Charlie Gaston who “rushe[s] forward to prevent a lynching” (381). Gaston has 
already decided on this course of action when he recognizes the intended victim as his childhood 
playmate, Dick. Despite Gaston’s pleas for a “fair trial,” the crowd takes Dick down to the spring 
where Flora was apparently assaulted, douses him in oil and lights him on fire (383-384). 
Afterward, “ponder[ing] over the tragic events of that lynching,” Gaston concludes that “such 
crimes as Dick had committed” were nonexistent during slavery but “had increased with 
alarming rapidity” under the regime of white scalawag Allan McLeod (385). Gaston seems to 
recognize that the lynching ritual displaces true republican practice, but he is more concerned 
with blaming McLeod and other white liberals for creating a social structure in which black men 
possess the combined need and opportunity to rape white women. 
 Unlike Gaston, who is physically present at the lynching, Tourgée’s Comfort Servosse 
must experience secondhand the details of the lynching of Jerry Hunt, the novel’s prototypical 
wise and politically-savvy black man, with whom Servosse is personally friendly (311). Young 
Ralph Kirkwood is the first to give himself up after the foiled attempt on the lives of Servosse 
and Denton and John Burleson’s subsequent public defection from the Klan. Upon tendering his 
confession, Kirkwood tells a terrible tale of Hunt’s murder, in which Klan members enter Hunt’s 
home in the middle of the night to find “Uncle Jerry, laying there on the bed, sleeping as quiet 
and peaceful as a child. We waked him up, took the bed-cord out of the bed, and tied him on the 
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horse next to the one I rode. . . . He was praying all the way in, and never offered any resistance 
at all” (314). Kirkwood recalls “feeling mighty bad all the way” before he tells of seeing “the 
face of Uncle Jerry as he hung there on the limb” illuminated by the light of a match (314). 
Where Gaston assumes that Dick is guilty of raping Flora Camp, Servosse assumes that Hunt is 
innocent of any wrongdoing. In fact, the crime with which Hunt is charged is never explicitly 
stated; the only vague suggestion of any crime is Kirkwood’s recollection of “a decree from the 
Rockford Camp to visit the extreme penalty (that meant kill, always) on Jerry Hunt” (313). In 
Tourgée’s novel, the system seems to be working properly, as at least one lynching is prevented 
and the would-be lynchers are apparently made to answer for their crimes. 
 Tourgée detests the violence of the Klan, regardless of its motivations, and emphasizes 
his stance by constructing a lynching scene, the revelation of which leads directly to the 
dissolution of the Klan. The suggestion of rape, always present in Dixon’s novels, does not have 
a place in this scene from A Fool’s Errand. In fact, the intimate horror of the lynching and its 
confession, the evident contradictions in Kirkwood’s familiar references to “Uncle Jerry” even as 
he admits his role in Hunt’s murder, and Servosse’s personal connection to the victim are 
secondary to the very fact of Kirkwood’s confession and its role in the collapse of the local Klan 
as a unit. Gaston also expresses disapproval of the Klan’s actions, but his dissatisfaction is less 
with the Klan itself than with the improper use of its power in the ritual burning of his childhood 
friend. The relationship between Dick and Gaston is a detail important in itself as it establishes 
Gaston’s human desire to befriend blacks only to have his kindness betrayed. Because of 
Servosse’s dedication and success in bringing down the organization itself, in destroying its 
perceptible structure, he appears also to disapprove of the Klan’s underlying ideology of white 
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supremacy. However, Tourgée, like Dixon, is actually separating the visible violence of the Klan 
from the idealized white male fraternity it purports to serve. 
 For Tourgée, open renunciation of the Klan and its violence by its membership amounts 
to the collapse of the underlying principles behind its formation. Tourgée’s meta-narrator, who is 
purportedly wiser than the Fool whose story he tells, describes Judge Denton’s act of “taking the 
confessions of hundreds whose awakened fears laid bare the hidden mechanism of thousands of 
acts of violence,” yet he does not seem to grasp the irony in his own use of “hidden mechanism” 
to describe an organization that nearly all of the local white men (and therefore all the men in 
positions of power), save Servosse and his immediate company, seem to have known all about 
(316). That so many would make similar confessions belies the existence of a secret to be 
revealed in the first place, and the en masse and orderly method of submission points to the 
likelihood of conspiracy among the men to regulate the disclosures as well as to the disingenuity 
of the confessions themselves.   
 None of the men charged are jailed, but rather are held in the “custody” of some friendly 
private citizen, which indicates that the guilty had little to fear in the way of legal repercussions, 
regardless of the atrocities they might admit (315). This is confirmed in the wholesale pardoning 
enacted by “the Legislatures of the several states” which “immediately passed an act of amnesty 
and pardon for all who had committed acts of violence in disguise, or at the instigation of any 
secret organization” (317). Tourgée notes that the pardons were even extended to the victims, as 
well as to members of other societies, like the Union League, which “were not known to have 
counseled any unlawful acts” in the interest of presenting an image of uniform justice (317-318).  
Here Tourgée’s narrator registers some little sarcasm in the implication that the victims need to 
be pardoned for the offense of being black. The blanket conferring of amnesty, as Tourgée no 
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doubt suggests, unfairly indicts blacks as well as whites, along with radicals and conservatives 
alike, for the chaotic state of the Reconstruction South. In this case, society’s sympathy for its 
white brethren is reflected in the legal pardoning of its most prominent criminals. 
 As much about recovering an ideal, organic white manhood as it is about advocating for 
black rights, Tourgée’s autobiographical novel insists on a “color-blind” politics that fails to 
account for the historical advantages of white manhood at the same time as it promotes 
incongruent distinctions between the social and political beliefs and behaviors of white men. 
Servosse, self-proclaimed advocate for black political equality and fairness under the law, is 
prepared to openly condemn white Southerners for their despicable racial politics and overt acts 
of racial violence but finds them to be “good Southern gentlemen,” and honorable, nonetheless. 
Like the legislators with whom he is not entirely satisfied, Servosse rationalizes the behavior of 
the white supremacist Southerners. Implicitly, he also excuses intimidation and threats as means 
of depriving freedmen of their rights, only asserting strenuous objections to the “actual violence” 
which he imagines “was not at first intended” (324). 
 More surprisingly, though, Tourgée’s meta-narrator also celebrates “the indomitable 
spirit of this people” and not only accepts but romanticizes the rhetoric of counterrevolution and 
the Noble South (322). Furthermore, Servosse exalts Southern “bravery” in racial terms, 
declaring that “only a race of warlike instincts and regal pride could have conceived or executed” 
a counterrevolution “while thus bowing beneath the scourge of shame, [of] early apprehending 
the weak point in their enemy’s coat of mail, and steadily addressing themselves to planting 
therein a fatal stroke” (323). In this way, Tourgée constructs a rhetoric, under the guise of 
radicalism, that condones Southern retaliatory violence and places it within the realm of legally 
sanctioned behavior, particularly because it works stealthily from within the system, ostensibly 
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preserving the new Union at the same time it challenges the Union’s avowed principles and 
codified laws. His narrative becomes one of noble conflict, with whites on either side of the 
internal revolutionary divide virtuously defending their respective beliefs and, as Tourgée would 
have us believe, mutually respecting each other’s courage and determination. This, Tourgée 
seems to say, is American democracy in action. This particular approach to “democracy” 
requires an ongoing civil war of masculine character in which white men must continually assert 
their democratic impulses via mutually reinforced violent resistance to the “tyranny” of others. In 
Tourgée’s novel, democracy for white men is enacted at the expense of African American legal 
and civil rights. Despite the depths of degradation to which they have sunk, white men can be 
redeemed, pardoned, rehabilitated, and returned to responsible citizenship, but black men are still 
victims, still subjugated, still powerless. 
 Tourgée’s depictions of Klan violence and legal repercussions in A Fool’s Errand 
anticipate his later arguments on behalf of Homer Plessy and illustrate some of the more glaring 
inconsistencies in his signature doctrine. Bill Hardwig observes that “Tourgée’s view of 
Reconstruction politics seems to be idealistic, depending upon a ‘color-blind’ justice system in 
which ‘right reason’ will prevail over racist sentiment,” a view which neglects to consider the 
deeply structural nature of white supremacy at the same time as it distinguishes between the 
supposedly rational nature of justice and the sentimental or irrational nature of racism (5). In 
terms of Tourgée’s argument of the Plessy case and its ultimate outcome, Hardwig notes that 
while “Tourgée relies on the indeterminability of race and believes right reason will reward his 
argument, he does not account for or counteract the prevailing sentiment within the white 
community about absolute racial difference” (10). As with the Plessy case, Tourgée’s argument 
in A Fool’s Errand turns on the goodwill of the white community and is hampered by his 
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inability to see the paradox of placing his hope of justice for the freedmen in the hands of white 
men, Klan members and more liberal prominent white citizens. This is painfully evident in the 
Tourgée’s wholesale forgiveness of the “better class” of Southerners once they confess and 
apologize for their Klan involvement, regardless of the crimes in which they took part.   
 The same Klan that spontaneously dissolves in A Fool’s Errand develops just as 
spontaneously in The Leopard’s Spots as the decisive symbol of active, unified white manhood. 
Its first appearance is in response to black school commissioner Tim Shelby’s attempt to kiss a 
young white schoolteacher, Miss Mollie Graham (151). There is no pretext of organization, 
simply the appearance of “two hundred white-robed horses assembled around the old home of 
Mrs. Gaston, where Tim was sleeping” (151). Shelby is lynched, over the course of two brief but 
brutal paragraphs, by the “Law and Order League, which sprung up like magic in a night and 
nullified the programme [sic] of Congress . . . a spontaneous and resistless racial uprising of 
clansmen of highland origin living among the Appalachian Mountains and foothills of the South” 
(151). The narrative spontaneity of the Klan’s birth indicates the inherent, if dormant, visceral 
unity of white supremacy. However dissimilar Tourgée’s rebuke of Klan violence might appear 
to Dixon’s celebration of the Klan as the “Law and Order League,” the two novels are doing 
something very similar in their attempts to contain the visible, active manifestation of white 
supremacy in order to restore the ostensibly peaceful and orderly white fraternity underneath.  
 Where Tourgée accepts white fraternity as a given and explains away its functional 
inconsistencies as exceptional, Dixon’s The Leopard’s Spots turns on the action of white unity 
and the solidification of racial difference along the lines of what Mark M. Smith has termed “the 
historically conditioned, visceral, emotional aspect of racial construction and racism” (4). Smith 
demonstrates shifts in racial identification, beginning at least in the 1850s but becoming 
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especially pronounced after the Civil War, which he describes as “sensory racial stereotypes,” 
neither rational nor irrational but felt, and therefore virtually immune to evidentiary dispute (5). 
In the wake of Emancipation and the resultant changes in dominant structures governing 
interaction between the races, this perceived ability to sense racial difference served as the basis 
for self-identification with a specific racial group, particularly for “whites [who] derived their 
authority by defining when and where sensory intimacy was permitted” (Smith 50). If this 
sensory self-identification, this visceral racialization, is the thing that Tourgée is unable to fully 
recognize, rationalize, or explain away, it is also a structural inconsistency which Dixon is able 
to parlay into the consolidation of white masculinity across class lines. More aggressively 
blurring the social and the political, Dixon self-consciously defends the perceived right of white 
men to regulate sensory intimacy and social relations between the races as well as between the 
sexes. Building on long cherished cultural assumptions and those earlier advanced in Tourgée’s 
novel, “Dixon offers whiteness not as essence, but as action; not as purity, but as purification; 
not as fact, but as affect; not as noun, but as imperative verb—more precisely, he stages and 
restages a compelling drama between the latter, dynamic terms, and the former, static ones” 
(Romine 126). These static terms, accepted by Tourgée and other radical whites of his 
generation, despite their fervent resistance to the dynamic elements of white supremacy later 
championed by Dixon, essentially translate into and provide the substance for Dixon’s racist 
rhetoric.   
 Notwithstanding their lack of organized action prior to the spontaneous appearance of the 
Klan, white men have hitherto been aware of their own whiteness, Dixon suggests, particularly 
by their ability to perceive blackness in others “by smelling, touching, listening, and tasting, as 
well as by looking” (Smith 4). Tom Camp, disabled confederate veteran and poor white integrity 
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personified, is able to smell blackness: “At night when they’d detail me to help the ambulance 
corps carry off the dead and wounded, there was a strange smell on the field that came from the 
blood and night damp and burnt powder. It always smelled like a nigger to me” (29). This 
visceral ability to sense blackness, even when that blackness is not visible, is as natural to Camp 
as is his own physiological makeup: “I hate ‘em. I can’t help it any more than I can the colour 
[sic] of my skin or my hair” (29). Here Camp attests to the invisibility of whiteness as well as of 
blackness. While his skin and hair are visible markers of his race, they are, more than 
determining, the outward expression of his internal whiteness, which is established by his feeling 
white—his hatred of blacks—and his heightened sensory abilities, his aptitude for sensing 
blackness in others. Dixon assures his audience that even more than visible whiteness, these are 
the qualities that unite white men prior to their enactment of this previously latent commonality.  
 Dixon suggests that the sort of organic whiteness to which Tourgée subscribes is not only 
possible but unavoidably biologically ingrained. Therefore, while whiteness and its attendant 
claim to privilege cannot be accidentally lost or forcibly taken, and thus neither falsely 
replicated, one can actively deny or passively neglect one’s own whiteness. Accordingly, white 
manhood is exclusively political and requires concerted action in service of the counterrevolution 
and solution to “the race problem.” Romine observes that “white manhood is thus posited as 
dormant prior to the ‘Negro Uprising’ (100), just as it acquires a contingent dimension 
afterward—that is to say, not all men socially recognized as white will fulfill the imperatives of 
white manhood” (128). The “Negro Uprising” in The Leopard’s Spots is defined as “riot at 
Washington,” brought on by the combined terror of a “group of oath-bound secret societies, The 
Union League, The Heroes of America and The Red Strings dominating society, and marauding 
bands of Negroes armed to the teeth terrorising [sic] the country, stealing, burning and 
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murdering” (101). The declaration of a common political enemy, the mixed race Republican 
Congress of Radical Reconstruction, sets the stage for the unification of white manhood in 
common resistance, and thus virtuous whites in both sections of the country are reconceived as 
allies: “The abolitionists of the North, whose conscience was the fire that kindled the Civil War, 
rose in solemn protest against this insanity. Their protest was drowned by the roar of multitudes 
maddened by demagogues who were preparing for a political campaign” (102). Here Dixon also 
emphasizes that this is a new conflict, not a continuation of the old, as both Southern 
secessionists and Northern abolitionists are now purportedly of the same mind. 
 The Klan, as it forms in response to the violation of white women by black men (social 
rape), is enhanced by its purpose as well as by its impulsiveness, as it is the supposedly 
spontaneous and collective expression of white feeling. The logistical organization of the Klan 
is, like the internal mark of whiteness, unseen, and, by its invisibility, it transcends the rational, 
thereby providing an unanswerable claim to legitimacy: “This Invisible Empire of White Robed 
Anglo-Saxon Knights was simply the old answer of organized manhood to organized crime. Its 
purpose was to bring order out of chaos, protect the weak and defenseless, the widows and 
orphans of brave men who had died for their country” (152). When the Klan parades through the 
streets of Hambright, its organization is an open secret: “How the news was circulated, nobody 
knew, but it seemed everybody in the county knew of it” (153). As Susan Gillman observes, 
“while conjuring so much overwhelming evidence to the contrary, Dixon continually reenacts a 
white unity that proclaims itself as unseen, whether in the form of the Invisible Empire of the 
Klan, America’s empire overseas, or a united body politic at home” (108). The Klan in particular 
is hyper-organized and widespread, held together by active loyalty to white supremacy as well as 
by fear of consequences for deserters: “It was impossible for them to secure evidence against any 
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member of the Klan unless by the intimidation of some coward who could be made to confess.  
Not a disguise had ever been penetrated” (156). Whiteness goes to great lengths to ensure its 
invisibility while, at the same time, making itself as visible as possible in order to provoke the 
greatest potential terror and to establish its popular authority. 
 This earlier, invisible Klan is popularly sanctioned and effects “a sense of grateful 
security” (154) in the dominant white citizenry, as the “violat[ion] for a moment [of] a statutory 
law” in support of “a higher law” (163). That moment has purportedly come and gone by the 
time a new Klan led by members of a younger generation, scalawag Allan McLeod and Hose 
Norman, momentary husband of the tragically murdered Annie Camp, surfaces in the chapter 
entitled “The Danger of Playing with Fire.” Unlike their noble predecessors, this young Klan is 
identified as a “crowd of desperadoes” (169). McLeod and Norman are overheard during their 
meeting in the woods by “one of General Worth’s Negroes” (168), and Reverend Durham, upon 
hearing the news, tells young Charlie that “there’s a lot of drunken devils, masquerading as Ku 
Klux, going to kill a man to-night. If we can’t reach Major Dameron’s in time for him to get a lot 
of men and stop them there’ll be a terrible tragedy” (169). This new imposter Klan is operating 
outside of the “war” of Reconstruction in which its earlier incarnation “fought,” and it is now, 
come Redemption, fundamentally a terrorist group disobeying and dishonoring its parent 
organization through the use of reckless and gratuitous force (163). Especially telling is 
McLeod’s participation in the Klan, as he later becomes leader of the Republican party and 
Gaston’s chief antagonist in the novel (258).  
 This new imposter Klan is unexpectedly similar to the disbanded Klan of Tourgée’s A 
Fool’s Errand in that it is identified as separate from the underlying ideology it proposes to 
enforce and somehow represents a misunderstanding, a misinterpretation, of white fraternity. 
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Romine notes that “Dixon insists here . . . that the Klan be disbanded precisely because of its 
natural tendencies toward chaotic, unauthorized violence . . . the Klan can save civilization, but it 
can never be civilization itself” (133). In order to reaffirm the legitimacy of the earlier active 
Klan, as well as of its continued latent existence, Dixon must create a rogue faction and set the 
“real” Ku Klux as its opposition, still in defense of a “higher law.” In order to retain its popular 
sanction, Klan violence must always be noticeably responsive to a more violent, more 
devastating black threat. Any violations of law must be momentary, temporary, lasting only until 
the perceived wrongs are legally and politically “righted.”  
 Both Tourgée and Dixon draw on the history of the Klan in order to formulate their 
fictional accounts. The Ku Klux Klan, the ultimate symbol of masculine violence, was initially 
formed in December of 1865 by six young men who were reportedly more interested in 
irresponsible self-amusement than overt terror.14 Tourgée, in ancillary material attached to some 
editions of his novel, affirms the assertion that the Klan began as a “huge joke which certain 
pretended ghostly night-riders were playing upon the ignorant freedmen of the South, making 
them believe that they were the spirits of slain Confederates hailing from hell and slain in some 
great battle, which was almost always Shiloh” (Invisible Empire 397). While Tourgée dates these 
images to initial print accounts of Klan activity in 1868, the implication persists that the Klan 
initially developed from a series of immature pranks, finally becoming solidified as a terrorist 
organization in April of 1867 with a meeting of representatives in Nashville, Tennessee, where a 
constitution was drawn up and Confederate General Nathan Bedford Forrest was elected the first 
Grand Wizard (Chalmers 9).15 White southerners quickly capitalized on the regalia and ritual 
portended by the antics of the early Klan and its purportedly benign beginnings and instigated a 
widespread campaign of terror and social control shrouded in the trappings of a masculine 
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fraternal order. That many historians consistently minimize the activities of those first six 
Klansmen in Pulaski, Tennessee, as poorly conceived youthful mischief rather than predatory 
cruelty, exemplifies the ingrained cultural sense of white superiority, white privilege, and white 
fraternity of which the Ku Klux Klan is symptomatic.  
 In both novels the shadow society of the Ku Klux Klan and its racially motivated 
violence are the external symbols of internal fractures in the structure of national democracy. For 
Tourgée, the violent actions of the Klan represent a challenge to his white liberal idealism. The 
terrorist activities of the Klan minimize the import of the North’s victory and disrupt Tourgée’s 
conception of unity among white men of both sections as a pre-existing and thus recoverable 
abstraction. Therefore, the narrative dissolution of the Klan in A Fool’s Errand represents a 
white liberal understanding of white men as model citizens while minimizing the culturally 
splintering effects of the Civil War. Where Tourgée insists on the rallying possibilities inherent 
in the North’s victory and the attendant preservation of the Union despite the disappointment of 
Reconstruction, Dixon relies on the presence of the Klan to restage the war in terms of the 
North’s ultimate failure. Dixon emphasizes the social necessity of the Klan and underscores the 
urgency behind its formation in order to exploit the structural weaknesses in the North’s 
Reconstruction program and to propose an alternative scenario in which the conflict is not 
sectional but racial. Dixon’s counter-revolution pits “virtuous” whites of both sections against 
“evil individuals” involved in a “conspiracy” to displace the white race in favor of the black. In 
both novels, however, white men emerge as the consummate protectors and representatives of 
American “democracy,” and postwar extralegal white violence against blacks is effectively 
contained. 
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 That it expressly argues for the expansion of black civil and legal rights and that it was a 
championed Reconstruction novel of liberal white northerners makes Tourgée’s A Fool’s Errand 
an especially apt as well as an especially disturbing example of incoherent social structures 
operating under the guise of ideal democracy. Tourgée’s portrayal of the Reconstruction-era Ku 
Klux Klan is ostensibly a critical one in which he decries the Klan’s ritualized racial violence 
and organized subversion of Reconstruction laws, indeed provoking harsh rebuttal from 
conservative contemporaries who would characterize Tourgée’s novel as “a wilful [sic], 
deliberate, and malicious libel upon a noble and generous people” (Royall 3). Tourgée attempts 
to emphasize the political objectivity and benevolent intent of his novel by connecting A Fool’s 
Errand to direct social commentary in The Invisible Empire, a 136-page addendum to the novel 
explaining Tourgée’s methodology, expounding on his research, and including eyewitness 
testimony, excerpts from the Klan’s “Prescript” or constitution, and the text of Congressional 
reports. Tourgée’s attempt to provide detached historical and legal background in The Invisible 
Empire both highlights his good intentions in documenting and exposing a social evil and 
undermines his stated goals. In focusing his critique nearly exclusively on the Ku Klux Klan as 
an organization, Tourgée presents a clear, identifiable, and isolatable problem, a white racist 
presence, which veils the realities of systemic racial domination.   
 Tourgée’s neo-abolitionist rendering of the Klan purports to be self-conscious in its meta-
narrative disparaging of “the Fool’s” naïveté because the Fool underestimates the South’s 
devotion to antebellum social practices and because he misreads the apparent altruism of the 
Northern politicians in whom he places his faith. In short, he is a fool because he believes in the 
potential success of the project of Reconstruction, if only the two disparate (white) factions can 
find some space of agreement. What the meta-narrator seems to know and that the Fool doesn’t 
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is that Reconstruction is doomed because the politicians of the North are tired of a fight they 
were never fully invested in and because the greater South steadfastly refuses to give the 
freedmen “a white man’s chance.” However, even the narrator does not recognize that the Fool 
underestimates or misunderstands the depth and breadth of white manhood fraternity as a 
political system. Far from it, Tourgée’s protagonist and meta-narrator both assume a 
homogenous and recoverable white unity that has been temporarily disrupted by the now-defunct 
institution of slavery, the ensuing conflict of Reconstruction, and overt acts of white racism like 
those perpetrated by the Ku Klux Klan. The problem for Tourgée, then, is not exactly the 
incorporation of the freedmen into the voting populace, as he would like to suggest; instead the 
problem is the inability of imagined white unity to function as such. The genuine extension of 
civil and legal rights to the freedmen is simply, for Tourgée, a necessary result of the functional 
recovery of an organic white fraternity. It is, therefore, Servosse’s sincere belief in a 
homogenous and natural white unity that ultimately makes him a fool. 
 
Citizen Soldiers and the New Nation 
 Localized expressions of white “revolutionary” violence erupted in response to African 
American assertions of personhood and claims to citizenship in the postwar period. Often 
interpreted by participants, by historians, and by amateur social theorists like Tourgée and Dixon 
in terms of localized expressions of democratic dissensus, a natural civic response to, or check 
on, a centralized national government, these eruptions indicated rather a continuation of 
underlying conflicts which had not been settled by the Civil War. Nelson traces an insistence on 
the practice of local democracy to the post-Revolutionary period in which “face-to-face 
democracy, [sic] was amplified in the increasing phenomenon of the extragovernmental 
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organization of people, in county assemblies, watchdog committees, radical associations, and 
out-of-door actions. A clear spillover from Revolutionary practice, these groups, commonly 
remembered in the dystopic rhetoric of vigilantism, riot, and mob, were present in every major 
city and across the countryside” (32). In the postbellum period, a more romantic and nostalgic 
view of extralegal organizations emerged and became solidified in the context of fratricidal Civil 
War and pursuant attempts to reclaim a very real, if fundamentally abstracted, national 
subscription to an imagined white manhood fraternity. As Kantrowitz observes, in “that lost 
antebellum world,” prior to the Civil War, “armed collective action, with or without formal legal 
sanction, had been a crucial aspect of white men’s responsibilities as citizens. When confronted 
with a danger of sufficient seriousness, a true citizenry would arise spontaneously” (“One Man’s 
Mob” 67-68). The behavior of the white mob was perceived as both a democratic right and a 
sacred responsibility, in direct contrast to the riotous image of the African American soldier.   
 Dixon’s combined rewriting of the 1876 Hamburg, South Carolina, and 1898 
Wilmington, North Carolina, massacres, cooperatively identified in The Leopard’s Spots as 
“Revolution at Independence,” is gathered around the image of organized-yet-riotous black 
troops, who demonstrate a purportedly dystopic counterpoint to the orderly and normative armed 
collective action of white men (419). The Independence riot begins when “a Negro trooper 
passing along the street refuse[s] to give an inch of the sidewalk to a young lady and her escort 
who met him.” The white man “knocked him down instantly and beat him to death” which, in 
turn, aroused the “wildest passions of the Negro regiment.” Later that night, “a mob of five 
hundred Negroes attempted to force their way into the hotel” where Gaston, upon whom 
McLeod has placed the blame for the soldier’s death, is staying (414). This riot contains rather 
standard elements of white supremacist depictions of Reconstruction and post-Reconstruction era 
 101 
race riots. First, generally obstinate and aggressive “negroes” are engaged in some sort of bad 
behavior, whether the refusal to yield sidewalk space to whites, as in Hamburg, or the embrasure 
of the free press, as in Wilmington. The pattern dictates that there must be a black mob enraged 
by animalistic passion and a trigger-happy desire to possess and use firearms against whites; a 
specific threat to pure white womanhood, either in the form of physical assault or slander; and 
corrupt and ineffectual white political enemies of the inevitably victorious white supremacists. 
The most important element is an overwhelming contingency of white heroes who are stretched 
to the breaking point by a bevy of outrages and decide they must finally take a stand against their 
own government (fraudulently represented by black politicians and especially black soldiers) in 
defense of a higher law and order. 
 In contrast, Tourgée’s novel contains a much more orderly demonstration of black 
collective action during which no one dies—in fact, no one is visibly armed—and several white 
“Union” men, besides Servosse, are present (121). In keeping with his subscription to separate 
spheres liberalism, Tourgée suggests that he supports the freedmen’s claim to collective action as 
a civic duty. Servosse encourages Andy, his devoted black employee, to join the Verdenton 
Union League: “I do not see why it should not be a good thing for the colored people to do. It 
would teach them to organize and work together, and they would learn in it something about 
those public duties which are sure very soon to be cast upon them. Besides, it is by no means 
sure that they may not need it as a means of self-protection” (116). The meeting itself, officially 
led by the Verdenton League’s black president, follows a ceremonial order and is conducted 
around a “small table, draped with a Union flag, and surmounted by a Bible and the Constitution 
of the United States” (124). There are “religious exercises,” which Servosse is asked to lead, the 
induction of new members, the sharing of committee reports, and, of course, “the usual business 
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of a secret order” (125). The white men, who clearly approve of the proceedings, have an 
ongoing private conversation, which continues in whispers throughout the formal meeting, 
during which they discuss their own fitness for and potential need of an organized Union League 
in the South so as to offset the potential numbers of the Confederate “Red Strings” (123-126). 
 Tourgée’s agreeable depiction of a peaceful, organized, and potentially integrated black 
collective appears to contradict Dixon’s formulaic portrayal of black collective action as only 
and always riotous violence. However, the glaring problem with Tourgée’s collective is that it 
takes no action. This, in effect, is why he is able to characterize this expression of black 
citizenship as peaceable and orderly: because it is essentially passive. This passivity speaks to 
the concerns white men, even sympathetic white men, encountered when faced with the concept 
of independent black citizenship. “While black voters frightened white men, African American 
militias terrified them. . . . Black men could not constitute a legitimate body of ‘the people,’ 
fitted for public meetings, political rallies, or military service. When black men did take on these 
roles, whites portrayed them as comical and ignorant, or more often as impudent and riotous—as 
a mob” (Kantrowitz 69). Although promised liberties would be, to say the least, hard won, 
African Americans did assert their rights to vote or to engage in collective action, and they did so 
successfully without the guidance of white benefactors. Black men formed local militias and 
organized political societies independent of white rule, many of which included black women 
among their ranks.16 “Across the South in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,” as 
Leon F. Litwack observes, “blacks in increasing numbers mobilized to protect members of the 
community from arresting officers, abusive railroad and streetcar conductors, exploitative 
employers (who refused to pay promised wages or held workers in peonage), lynch mobs, and 
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police violence” (Trouble 424). These community groups, exploited in Dixon’s novel, are 
conspicuously absent, or, worse, rendered powerless, in Tourgée’s narrative. 
 In fact, Tourgée’s description of the Verdenton Union League is remarkably consistent 
with historical accounts of white wartime Union Leagues, in which benevolent white activists 
worked on behalf of African Americans, many of whom were still enslaved. Mark E. Neely Jr. 
suggests that wartime Union Leagues were overtly political and primarily limited to a bourgeois 
white elite, many of whom were New Englanders who could proudly trace their ancestry to the 
Mayflower (79-88). Wartime Union Leagues based in Boston, Philadelphia, New York, and New 
Jersey, for example, sent supplies and encouraged relief for Southern citizens who passed 
resolutions of loyalty to the Union, and they lobbied aggressively for African American rights in 
their own neighborhoods, especially on behalf of black soldiers and their families (92-93). 
According to Neely, the “legacy of the Union League Clubs, altogether forward-looking, was 
mixed. Because the clubs arose at a time when political opposition was suspect—during a war—
their members, some of them, were attracted also by an antiparty feeling. That impulse continued 
into urban good government campaigns and civil service reform, which were league programs 
from the start” (95).17 It is easy to see why Tourgée would have been attracted to the politics and 
prestige of these wartime Union Leagues, and also why freedmen would want to model their own 
collectives on this formula; however, it is also clear, in both Tourgée’s and Neely’s descriptions, 
that even radical whites would want to limit the participation of African Americans in such 
“grassroots” political action. 
 This is the sort of Union League on which Servosse imagines the Verdenton chapter will 
be modeled. He describes the earlier League, with a reverence anticipating Dixon’s descriptions 
of the Klan, as “a society of men who were determined never to give up the Union under any 
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hazard, but to uphold and sustain it with property and life if need be. It was a secret association; 
and its chief purpose was said to be to enable the loyal people of any neighborhood to muster the 
shortest possible notice, to resist invasion, put down riot, or enforce the law” (114). Tourgée’s 
black Union League is not really an independent black collective at all, but the reconstitution of a 
white political group which now incorporates blacks into its membership and purportedly its 
leadership. Black leadership, however, as Tourgée’s rendering of the Verdenton meeting 
illustrates, must be supervised by white men who, because of some obvious mark of dedication 
to the wartime version of Union, represent a heightened experience of citizenship. Servosse 
meets this qualification because of his prior service in the Union Army and his official 
designation as “Colonel.” Similarly, Mr. Walters, a dedicated Southerner, is dubbed “good 
enough material for a Union League” following the telling of a story in which Walters resists 
enlistment in the Confederate States Army by violently beating several “conscript hunters” with 
a cane, shooting one of them with his own pistol, and then walking away unhurt (122-123). 
These are the white men who really make up the Verdenton Union League’s leadership; the 
black president is a mere figurehead. 
 Tourgée’s characterization of the Verdenton Union League attests to his generation’s 
inability to conceive of black collective action independent of white leadership. In later white 
nationalist narratives like those penned by Dixon or Thomas Nelson Page, “any reading of the 
war as a site that changed the course of history, an unexpected moment of rupture producing 
citizen from slave, is quite inconceivable” (James 59). For Tourgée, the transition is incomplete; 
while he can, at the moment he is writing A Fool’s Errand, conceive of freedmen as citizens in 
the abstract, his conception is so limited that he cannot actually envision their acting upon that 
citizenship in the same manner as he might expect of a white man. As Hardwig observes, 
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“Tourgée’s notion of justice tends to rely on the progressive white community’s power to rescue 
the helpless black community. From this perspective, ‘real’ justice for the black community is 
defined, meted out, and regulated by the white liberal community in opposition to the 
conservative white community” (7). Black social and civil rights remain bargaining chips in a 
white political balancing act which is fundamentally upset by actual physical resistance on the 
part of black citizens. 
 Tourgée’s liberal rhetoric, then, can only be called “radical” in comparison to more 
“conservative” voices, like that of his contemporary William L. Royall. In his Reply to “A Fool’s 
Errand By One of the Fools” (1881), Royall bitterly condemns Tourgée as an “imposter” who 
maliciously constructs misleading depictions of “the life and manners of the Southern people” 
(6-7). In short, Royall’s political argument amounts to a regurgitation of antebellum disputes 
reduced to states’ rights in which he relegates the plight of the freedmen and women to a matter 
of white Southern character. His primary concern is the location of democratic power, the power 
of law and order, with local governments, rather than with the “General Government” which 
Tourgée endorses. “Law,” “order,” and “property” are Royall’s keywords, with which he 
attempts to eclipse Emancipation and with it African Americans’ transition from Southerners’ 
property to citizen of the nation. For Royall, federal checks on local government create 
dissension rather than balance and imply a distrust of white Southern morality and ability to self-
govern: “The Republican party claims that there is a constant and unending conflict in progress 
between the negroes and the white people of the Southern States, and that it is necessary that the 
General Government should have power to interfere in that conflict to protect the negro, 
otherwise the white man will make him the victim of the most diabolical oppression” (67). 
Royall nearly manages to altogether avoid discussing African American citizenship along with 
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equal protection under the law, whereas Tourgée’s willingness to speak on behalf of federal 
intervention and protection for African Americans would have seemed quite radical, at least for 
whites of both sections.   
 Where Tourgée’s and Royall’s generation saw a potentially transformative gesture 
toward the working out of these intersectional conflicts of representation between whites, by the 
time Dixon wrote The Leopard’s Spots, historians writing in the wake of Radical Reconstruction 
were promoting the image of a healed and reunited nation, more whole and solid for its triumph 
over troubles. “Our histories,” W. E. B. Du Bois writes, “tend to discuss American slavery so 
impartially, that in the end nobody seems to have done wrong and everybody was right. Slavery 
appears to have been thrust upon unwilling helpless America, while the South was blameless in 
becoming its center” (714). The conspicuous agreement he finds among “sixteen studies of 
Reconstruction in the Southern States” conducted between 1895 and 1935, tells a deeper story of 
how conceptual reunion was achieved, or at least agreed upon (719). African Americans, 
however, as Du Bois indicates, are noticeably absent from the historical happy-endings, as they 
must be in order for these narratives of national cultural reunion to make sense. If no one was 
wrong, then no one must have been wronged, either by the institution of chattel slavery or by 
postbellum incarnations of this system manifest in lynching, Black Codes, tenant farming, wage 
slavery, grandfather clauses, voter intimidation, laws against interracial marriage, and 
disfranchisement. 
 James’s observation that Dixon’s “white nationalist fantasies” both rely on and 
perpetuate “a lateral notion of black history in which slavery, the Civil War, and Reconstruction 
are understood as a continuum” is also true of Tourgée’s postwar vision (59). In white nationalist 
reconciliation narratives, African American history looks like this: “Blacks, finding themselves 
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in the New World friendless and backward, were nurtured in the benign civilizing paternity of 
slavery. Helpless and immature, they could not have fought with any intent or ‘manliness’ on 
their own behalf against the South. In the final, tragic phase, the civilizing process was abruptly 
halted, leaving them absolutely unfit to hold the franchise in freedom” (James 59). Although his 
vision of the future differs significantly, Tourgée hardly contradicts such paternalistic accounts 
of African American history. By subjugating African American lived experience to fraught 
national and sectional politics, Tourgée’s fiction engages in an extended political battle between 
white factions at the expense of African American subjectivity, therefore setting a perhaps 
unintended but very real narrative example for Dixon to follow. In the context of broader cultural 
instabilities, these battling white factions collectively eclipse and obscure white supremacy’s 
structural denial of black rights and the corresponding enforcement of that denial through 
violence.  
 Du Bois’s description of the 1863 New York draft riots in Black Reconstruction in 
America, 1860-1880 (1935) effectively foreshadows the distinct pattern of white violence that 
would become commonplace by the early twentieth century, solidified via the repetition of 
events like the Hamburg and Wilmington riots. Of the draft riots, Du Bois writes simply: “It was 
easy to transfer class hatred so that it fell upon the black worker” (103). By and large, the anger 
of the mob focused on African Americans: “They were the cause of the war, and hence the cause 
of the draft. They were bidding for the same jobs as white men. They were underbidding white 
workers in order to keep themselves from starving” (103). Similarly, animosity toward blacks in 
the post-war South often hinged on newly realized competition for work and wages and was 
mired in social and economic upheaval. According to Du Bois, “the poor white clung frantically 
to the planter and his ideals; and although ignorant and impoverished, maimed and discouraged, 
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victims of a war fought largely by the poor white for the benefit of the rich planter, they sought 
redress by demanding unity of white against black, and not unity of poor against rich, or of 
worker against exploiter” (130). In both the violence of the draft riots and the turning of the poor 
Southern white against blacks of similar economic positions, democratic practice turns back on 
itself. White supremacy prevails over class consolidation, at least in part, because of the 
opportunities apparent to poor whites as a result of joining their fates with the planter class rather 
than with the slaves.    
 A war that was and was not about emancipating the slaves had unexpected and 
unconsidered results for diverse classes of whites in both sections. Reactions by poor Southern 
whites to the end of the war and the emancipation of the slaves reflected more general feelings of 
fear, prompted by subsiding exhilaration and impending realizations of what Emancipation might 
functionally and practically mean for those who had championed its cause and those who had 
opposed it alike. Du Bois writes: “Back of all the enthusiasm and fervor of victory in the North 
came a wave of reflection that represented the sober after-thought of the nation. It harked back to 
a time when not one person in ten believed in Negroes, or in emancipation, or in any attempt to 
conquer the South. This feeling began to arise before the war closed, and after it ended it rose 
higher and higher into something like dismay” (131). Blacks had served as Union soldiers, 
despite their initial exclusion from the ranks and early concerns that their enlistment constituted 
“an incendiary act” (Litwack, Storm 66). They had essentially proven themselves as capable as 
white men on the battlefield, and, as Union soldiers, they had been actively as well as 
symbolically involved in the South’s crushing defeat (99). The military success of African 
Americans, like their proven capacity as free laborers, inspired in many Southerners as well as 
Northerners escalating feelings of hostility and aggression, as the freedmen increasingly posed a 
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serious social and economic threat to abstract as well as to functional white supremacy. Just as 
they were, in 1863, “the cause of the war, and hence the cause of the draft,” freedmen were, 
during the Reconstruction period, convenient scapegoats for everything from the South’s defeat 
to increased labor competition in the North. 
 Historical accounts of the 1876 Hamburg riot, on which Dixon’s fictional Independence 
riot is partially modeled, describe the evolution and consolidation of postwar white fear and 
ambivalence about the meaning of the war and of African Americans’ participation in their own 
emancipation. The historical narratives, like Dixon’s fictional narrative, begin with the white 
perception of a black threat to white sovereignty. Hamburg in 1876, like Wilmington in 1898, 
was a southern center of relative black political power. Despite the presence of a white rifle club 
led by prominent white supremacist Democrat Matthew C. Butler, many black men held official 
positions within the local Hamburg government, including trial justice Prince Rivers, a major 
general of the militia in which black activist and former Georgia politician Dock Adams served 
as commander (Kantrowitz 73). Both Rivers and Adams were veterans of the Union Army 
(Foner, Reconstruction 570). On 4 July, the black militia were drilling in celebration of the 
nation’s centennial on “a wide Hamburg street, overgrown with weeds except in its wagon ruts” 
when two local men, Thomas Butler and Henry Getzen, attempted to pass, claiming the right-of-
way and demanding the militia unit break ranks, to which Adams eventually acquiesced 
(Kantrowitz 73). Kantrowitz records “competing narratives of the July 4 confrontation,” in which 
“Adams, for his part, noted that there was plenty of room on either side of the company for the 
white men to pass” while “Thomas Butler and his father Robert . . . stressed that it was their 
wagon that had worn the ruts along the road. At first, they denied that the road was a public way” 
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(74). The white farmers took their claims to Prince Rivers’ court the following day, and he 
continued the hearing until 8 July.   
 As in Dixon’s novel, public record reveals a perception by white men that their actions 
were defensive as well as civically responsible and that the black citizen soldier constituted an 
external threat rather than a symbol of integrated citizenship. Various historical sources record 
the actual riot events differently, but Kantrowitz describes a show of legal force by Matthew 
Butler on behalf of the white farmers in which he demanded an apology as well as the surrender 
of the militia’s arms. Rivers found Adams, who, out of fear for his safety had “refused to appear 
in court,” in contempt and offered to take custody of the weapons himself until the matter could 
be settled (Kantrowitz 75).18 The whites refused offers of mediation and gathered in the streets of 
Hamburg wearing red shirts. Along with reinforcements from nearby Augusta, Georgia, Butler’s 
“red shirts” attacked the militia men who were barricaded in their drill room, “us[ing] a cannon 
brought from Augusta to break down the walls of the building” (76). Red shirts executed at least 
six black men whom they considered political threats before “they told the rest to run and then 
fired on them as they fled” (Kantrowitz 76). 
 Capitalizing on this particular historical context, Dixon mobilizes the contested black 
soldier in his fictionalized version of the Hamburg riot. Black soldiers, for Dixon, are the 
ultimate evidence of the paradox of black citizenship, at once evoking for whites terror and 
nostalgia for a bygone era. In Dixon’s novels, James observes, “African American men in 
military uniform, the iconic symbol of a black future, simply signify two alternatives of 
regressive black masculinity: slaves who had followed their masters to war or illegitimate 
soldiers masquerading as the masters of whites during the military rule of Radical 
Reconstruction—characterized as a topsy-turvy, nightmarish period of ‘nigger domination’” 
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(59). Thus James situates the contradictory image of the black soldier in historical terms. Lisa A. 
Long does so in psychological terms, characterizing “turn-of-the-century Negro Civil War 
Service [as] almost schizophrenically manifest[ing] both a subtext of rebellion and a rhetoric of 
restraint” (235). As Long further observes, “the image of the bestial black rapist/murderer lurks 
beneath the Negro soldier’s uniform” (234). The African American soldier is an unpleasant 
enigma for white reconciliationists and for whites in general, having proved his capacity to 
occupy the most representative of citizenship roles, that of the Union soldier, but remaining 
excluded from other responsibilities of citizenship in times of ostensible peace. Dixon virtually 
solves this paradox in his novels by constructing the black soldier as the very image of riot and 
disorder and therefore fit to be neither citizen nor soldier. 
 Building on and perverting the more benevolent paternalism that Tourgée projects, Dixon 
depicts white men as victimized by black misuse of the democratic authority bestowed upon or 
allotted to them by white liberals like Tourgée. Dixon portrays a dire situation and a usually 
peaceful white community for whom there was no other choice but to retaliate against black 
subversives and their corrupt white benefactors. “Negro insolence,” Dixon’s narrator asserts, 
“had reached a height that made it impossible for ladies to walk the streets without an armed 
escort, and white children were waylaid and beaten on their way to the public schools” (415). 
That social relations have allegedly reached this veritable point-of-no-return before the white 
supremacist mob springs into action further serves to rationalize the need for retaliatory white 
violence and purportedly explains its excess as well as its potentially traitorous anti-government 
actions. As Kantrowitz observes, “former slaveholders and Confederate officers re-established 
their political authority on a foundation of white men’s fears and expectations, convincing many 
white men that their armed struggle against a democratically elected government was legitimate, 
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and perhaps inevitable” (67). This is the line that Dixon takes, at once dramatizing the inherent 
fitness for democracy of “virtuous” and dedicated whites and the unfitness of blacks and white 
blood traitors for the demands of egalitarian government. If democratic practice is messy, 
according to Dixon, it is the fault of these Others, who have no legitimate place in self-
government. Dixon’s emphasis on the black soldiers as the impetus for the riot points self-
consciously to white men’s contrived willingness to offer democratic participation to the masses 
and to the necessarily violent rescinding of that offer when that participation becomes too 
threatening.   
 Again emphasizing the dominant cultural conflict in terms of white political 
disagreement, Dixon stresses the involvement of white Republican Allan McLeod and his party’s 
collusion with Negro farmers in instigating the Independence riot. The purported insolence of the 
black regiment is a secondary cause of the riot, a tool in the ongoing political battle between old 
personal and political rivals McLeod and Gaston. Gaston is personally identified as the “intended 
victim” of the riot, representative of white supremacy and the imagined white fraternity that is 
being undermined by McLeod and his Republican allies (418). Despite McLeod’s efforts, the riot 
is ultimately a win for Gaston and the white supremacist Democrats, both locally and nationally: 
“Negro refugees and their associates once more filled the ear of the national government with 
clamour for the return of the army to the South to uphold Negro power, but for the first time 
since 1867 it fell on deaf ears. The Anglo-Saxon race had been reunited. The Negro was no 
longer the ward of the Republic. Henceforth, he must stand or fall on his own worth and pass 
under the law of the survival of the fittest” (418). A victory for local government, Dixon 
characterizes the outcome of the Independence riot as equalizing rather than as oppressive, a 
truly democratic triumph. Gillman has argued, “thus do white power brokers, like Dixon, borrow 
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black victimization to make whites into victorious victims and enhance their own standing in the 
cultural struggle for the moral high ground waged in the context of lynching” (97). In Dixon’s 
novel, organized black resistance is the result of moral corruption and white liberal defection and 
serves as a necessary site of comparison. Dixon presents armed collective action by African 
Americans, then, as evidence of the inevitable failure of the liberal project of incorporating 
blacks into the voting citizenry.   
 African Americans, however, often viewed the Civil War and Reconstruction in terms of 
“the second American Revolution” (Blight 133). As Litwack notes, “from the mouths of 
grandparents and parents, as the first freeborn generations heard them, the stories of 
enslavement, the Civil War, and emancipation bore no resemblance to the popular histories and 
schoolbooks” (Trouble 72). For them, the Civil War was always about Emancipation, and the 
political differences between whites merely aided in bringing about the necessary conditions. 
“To Joseph Sutton, born in 1885, the son of former slaves, the simple version of the Civil War he 
imbibed subverted both white southern and northern interpretations. ‘The North couldn’t whip 
the South, that’s the way the slaves got free. And then, after that, they got the slaves in there, that 
made thousands and thousands more help for the North, and then the North could whip the 
South’” (72). Not only does this alternative version of history acknowledge the reluctance of the 
Union to make the Civil War about emancipating the slaves, it also positions African Americans 
as determined agents of their own freedom, despite resistance from both Northern and Southern 
whites. Litwack records the stories of Reconstruction-era black families who adorned their 
homes with “portraits of Frederick Douglass, Booker T. Washington, and Paul Laurence 
Dunbar” rather than with images of white figureheads of freedom and democracy like George 
Washington or William Lloyd Garrison (73). For black leaders like Douglass, according to 
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Blight, “emancipation and the Civil War were truly felt history, a moral and legal foundation 
upon which to demand citizenship and equality” (133). Many freedmen and their descendants 
embraced their rights as citizens as promised by the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth 
Amendments and were prepared to defend those rights with violence if need be, just as they had 
done as soldiers in the Civil War.   
 Thus, Tourgée, Dixon, and Reconstruction-era African Americans all seem to be defining 
citizenship and popular representation in a democratic society similarly in terms of a civic duty 
and a Constitutional right to engage in collective action. Both A Fool’s Errand and The 
Leopard’s Spots, however, reveal a fundamental disconnect between the avowed principles of 
ideal American democracy and the actual practices of white supremacy and hierarchical 
citizenship. As James suggests in her critique of “melodramatic sentiment” like that employed by 
Tourgée and Dixon as “fanaticism,” melodrama “is not a pedagogical tool pointing to right and 
wrong within a morally instructive universe; it merely appears to operate that way within a 
universe that is morally inert. There is neither ‘good’ nor ‘bad,’ no Union vs. Confederate, no 
abolitionist vs. slaveholder. There is only and always the ‘middle,’ which proves a dangerous 
space for black Americans” (87). In other words, Tourgée’s and Dixon’s melodramatic and 
sentimental novels elide the differences between white men in order to reassert white supremacy 
over blacks and to do so in a way that is a morally bankrupt and cowardly deferral of history’s 
demands. Tourgée’s tempered radicalism in A Fool’s Errand wallows in this alleged middle 
ground, refusing or unable to take sides, and therefore contributes to Dixon’s narrative 
solidification of absolute racial difference and his generation’s refocused efforts to stabilize an 
inherently unstable culture via public and prolific racial violence. The middle, then, portends 
riot, both for blacks whose resistance cannot otherwise be defined under this purportedly amoral 
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structure as well as for whites whose tentative supremacy and conceptual hegemony must be 
violently reestablished again and again.  
                                                
Notes to Chapter 2 
13 Class is a significant factor in determining the fate of women in The Leopard’s Spots: women of an elite 
socioeconomic class like Sallie Worth and Helen Lowell are married and/or escape punishment for their real and 
potential transgressions, while markedly lower class women like Tom Camp’s daughters meet violent ends and 
suffer the indignities of rape. Even upper class women who die during the course of the narrative, like Mrs. Gaston, 
are indirectly driven to a relatively peaceful death rather than physically assaulted by black men or white. In The 
Clansman, however, Elsie Stoneman’s voluntary leap to her death breaks this trend. 
14 David M. Chalmers offers an analysis of the Klan from its inception in 1865 to the late twentieth century, as does 
Wyn Craig Wade in The Fiery Cross: The Ku Klux Klan in America (Oxford UP, 1998). For studies which focus 
primarily on the Reconstruction-era Klan, see also Allen W. Trelease, White Terror: The Ku Klux Klan Conspiracy 
and Southern Reconstruction (Louisiana State UP, 1999), and J. Michael Martinez, Carpetbaggers, Cavalry, and the 
Ku Klux Klan: Exposing the Invisible Empire During Reconstruction (Rowman and Littlefield, 2007). For an 
analysis with an emphasis on African American resistance, see Kwando Mbiassi Kinshasa, Black Resistance to the 
Ku Klux Klan in the Wake of the Civil War (McFarland, 2006).  
15 Forrest had already led the massacre of captured black troops at Fort Pillow in Tennessee on 12 April 1864. When 
Confederate soldiers under Forrest’s command captured the Fort, black soldiers were lynched rather than allowed to 
surrender. Forrest’s deliberate defiance of military battle codes in the Fort Pillow Massacre would form the basis for 
a tradition of ritualized white violence against black troops and foreshadowed the 8 July 1876 Hamburg, South 
Carolina, Massacre and the 14 August 1906 “Brownsville Incident” in which a mob opened fire on a black regiment 
at Fort Brown, Texas, among others.  
16 For more on black women’s involvement in postwar politics, see Elsa Barkley Brown, “Negotiating and 
Transforming the Public Sphere: African American Political Life in the Transition from Slavery to Freedom” in 
Dailey, et al., Jumpin’ Jim Crow, p. 28-66. 
17 See Mark E. Neely, Jr., The Boundaries of American Political Culture in the Civil War Era, p.71-96, for a 
discussion of the complexity, uses, and purposes of white wartime Union Leagues. 
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18 Different sources list different reasons and different timelines for Rivers’ charge of contempt against Adams. 
Foner has Adams appearing in court on 5 July when the original warrants were sworn out and held in contempt at 
this meeting for chastising Rivers “for even entertaining the complaint” filed by Butler (571). Kantrowitz postpones 
the confrontation and the contempt charge until 8 July, the date of Prince Rivers’ scheduled hearing, and he records 
a contempt charge for “nonappearance” (75). Goff, in a fictional portrayal of the event, has Judge Rives hold 
Captain Doc in contempt for sitting down without permission (67). 
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Chapter 3. “Both Domestic and National”19: Three US Women’s Narrative Interventions in 
Masculine Histories of Collective Violence 
  
 Not coincidentally, the ratification of the nineteenth amendment in August of 1920, 
which finally and formally granted women the franchise, corresponds to the point at which 
literary critics note a rise in “overtly anti-lynching works of fiction by white women writers” 
which had, according to Sandra Gunning, up until this point “seem[ed] so few and far between” 
(111). Gunning further explains that black women’s explicit novelistic engagement with the 
politics of racial violence was also until recently overlooked, as in the case of Pauline Elizabeth 
Hopkins’s Contending Forces: A Romance of Negro Life North and South (1900), “a novel 
ostensibly designed to address issues of race, femininity, and domesticity” but in which scholars 
now identify the “explicit contrast of the promise of black domestic life in America with the 
crisis of lynching and rape” (111). Women novelists at the turn of the twentieth century, white 
and black, were not unconcerned with or disinterested in representing lynching or other 
manifestations of racial violence. Nonetheless, they did have to negotiate, in ways that male 
writers did not, a white masculine cultural narrative that most often cast them as passive or 
supporting participants in the masculine exchanges of war, revolution, resistance, and policy-
making, despite the prominent role their bodies often played in dominant male narratives of the 
same.   
 Because cultural violence in this period was primarily represented and discussed in terms 
of the male participants, who were most often directly responsible for both individual violent 
acts and for assigning meaning to those acts, women authors’ common experiences as women 
significantly shaped their narrative approaches to oppressive violence, organized resistance, and 
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purportedly collective memory of these events. Whereas the male authors included in this study, 
like Charles Chesnutt, Albion Tourgée, and Thomas Dixon, take on directly specific and 
contemporary race riots, lynchings, and methods of organized resistance like those represented 
by the Ku Klux Klan, and do so with overt, immediate, and instantly recognizable political 
agendas, their female contemporaries characteristically employed more indirect strategies by 
which to level contemporary cultural criticism. Reinterpreting more distant historical events in 
order to comment on the present, the women authors I study in this chapter use melodramatic 
“feminized” modes of writing fiction to create parallel worlds where women’s experiences are 
both paramount and reflective of a complex cultural dynamic in which gender and race are 
radically intertwined. Neither evasive nor uncomplicated, the representative novelistic strategies 
employed here by Pauline Carrington Bouvé, Mary Johnston, and Pauline Elizabeth Hopkins—
adolescent fiction, historical romance, and maternal melodrama, respectively—reveal not only 
underrepresented approaches to collective mob violence but also the subversive ways in which 
women authors engaged with masculine white supremacist cultures of violence on their own 
terms. 
 Biographically, Bouvé and Johnston have much in common with each other but share 
little with Hopkins. Bouvé was born in Little Rock, Arkansas, and raised in Luray, Page County, 
Virginia, by her mother, Anne Bouldin Cabell, after the death of her prominent father, Albert 
Rust (1818-1870), Democratic congressman for Arkansas and brigadier general in the 
Confederate States Army. Bouvé’s education by private tutors, as well as the relative social 
prominence of both the Cabell and Rust families, indicates the probability of an upbringing 
steeped in the nostalgic glory of the Old South and largely traditional Southern values.20 
However, Bouvé’s 1894 move to Boston and her subsequent 1898 marriage to Thomas Tracy 
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Bouvé mark her expatriation from the South.21 Similarly, Johnston was a well-read independent 
Southern white woman of means who was bound to a cultural heritage that she also criticized. 
Johnston spent her childhood plagued by illness and, unable to attend school outside of the home 
except for three months in 1887 at Mrs. Roy’s School for girls in Atlanta, she was largely self-
taught by virtue of unlimited access to her father’s extensive library (Cella 18-20). After her 
mother’s death, Johnston assumed a leadership role within her family. She never married and 
amassed considerable wealth on her own, remaining dedicated to her family and sharing her 
Virginia home with her unmarried siblings Walter, Eloise, and Elizabeth throughout her life 
(Cella 16).  
Hopkins, however, was born in Maine to free parents of color and raised and educated in 
Boston, a city with a large African American population and a prevalent tradition of radical 
activism. Her first literary achievement came at fifteen when she won a contest chaired by 
William Wells Brown with the best essay explicating “The Evils of Intemperance and Their 
Remedy” (Carby, Womanhood 122). Whereas Johnston and presumably Bouvé were able to 
make their livings primarily from the proceeds of their writing, Hopkins worked as a 
stenographer during the 1890s and at different times throughout her life. In 1899, when Hopkins 
was forty years old, she was instrumental in the founding of the Colored American Magazine, 
which she edited until 1904 when Booker T. Washington assumed editorial control. 
 From their variously liminal subject positions as women, Bouvé, Johnston, and Hopkins 
present the hypothesis that it takes an outsider to recognize structural racism. Like W. E. B. Du 
Bois, who describes “double-consciousness” as the “sense of always looking at one’s self 
through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in 
amused contempt and pity,” as an essential feeling of “two-ness,” these women authors suggest 
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that there is a kind of clarity in their marginal experiences in a way that both diverges from and 
complements Du Bois (Souls 11). Bouvé, Johnston, and Hopkins, to different degrees, promote 
an outsider consciousness via the characters in their novels while doubly presenting their 
authorial selves as outsiders capable of recognizing in unique ways, in ways that men cannot, the 
innate counterintuitiveness of white supremacist narratives of violence. Furthermore, each 
novelist’s conception of this outsider consciousness shapes her individual engagement and 
reinterpretation of the historical archive.  
 Significantly, the central historical events of Bouvé’s Their Shadows Before: A Story of 
the Southampton Insurrection (1899), Johnston’s Prisoners of Hope: A Tale of Colonial Virginia 
(1898), and Hopkins’s Winona: A Tale of Negro Life in the South and Southwest (1902) are 
genuine servile rebellions rather than overt acts of terrorism hidden beneath the language of race 
prestige and white supremacist self-preservation. Bouvé recreates Nat Turner’s notorious 1831 
Southampton Insurrection via the perspective of a sympathetic white child. Johnston’s text, 
which is based on the 1663 Gloucester County, Virginia, revolt known as the Servants’ Plot, 
treats a colonial, pre-Revolution slave revolt (or series of revolts) involving Native Americans, 
African Americans, and white political dissidents and those of lower socioeconomic classes, all 
of whom are enslaved or oppressed by a white planter elite. In Winona, Hopkins aligns her 
multiracial protagonists with white revolutionary John Brown at Pottawatomie, Kansas, in 1856, 
with a prospective glance toward the Harpers Ferry uprising of 1859. Unlike the Wilmington 
race riot or the concentrated violence of the Ku Klux Klan, which were only nominally illegal, 
ultimately in service of the white power structure, and often carried the explicit blessing of the 
law, the Servants’ Plot, the Southampton Insurrection, and the raid on Harpers Ferry each 
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represent fundamental challenges to the existing power structure by those who are not protected 
by complicated official narratives of justification. 
 As witnesses to and at times participants in the unfolding of an idealized masculine 
struggle documented within the contested terrain of popular novels like those penned by 
Chesnutt, Tourgée, and Dixon, the women novelists herein treated reinterpret a dominant 
sociopolitical narrative from which they are excluded and which is at the same time ultimately 
dependent on their acquiescence to a white male authority. As they work to navigate this 
contested terrain, these authors raise questions about their own personal and collective 
responsibility within a fundamentally fractured system of American democracy and about the 
ways American women exist within, cope with, react to, and, most significantly, resist this 
particularly incongruous culture. Representing Nat Turner and violent slave revolt via a 
sympathetic white child’s perspective, Bouvé takes a radical step in laying claim to an alternative 
voice for white women and therein an alternative narrative of positive black masculinity. This 
radical step is also problematic, because although Bouvé’s Penelope speaks on Turner’s behalf, 
she also speaks for him. Johnston is the most conservative and the most fatalistic of the three 
writers, more openly representing the chaos that results from trying to remake or escape the 
cultural order, the same chaos Bouvé works to smooth over. Representing a community that is 
formed on the elaborate contradictions that remain unreconciled in the other two novels, 
Hopkins’s Winona embraces the chaos of culture in “the disruliness” of her novels, to borrow a 
fitting term from Elizabeth Ammons (211). These novels, in working to find new ways to 
challenge white supremacist narratives and their implicit violence, also reveal the fundamental 
paradoxes of culture and the built-in barriers to their own engagement with this narrative that 
these women encounter along the way. 
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“White Lamb” for the “Black Sheep”: Pauline Bouvé’s Their Shadows Before 
 In more traditional narratives of racial history and white fraternity, like Tourgée’s A 
Fool’s Errand and Dixon’s The Leopard’s Spots, white women, and, significantly, the choices 
they make, represent the resolution of internal fractures within masculine cultures of violence. In 
this way, white supremacists developed a standard narrative that dually depended on alleged rape 
victims’ silence and held white women responsible for the need to lynch in the first place. Many 
white women, however, supported this narrative with their willingness to attend and to celebrate 
lynchings. Others publicly embraced the rhetoric of black rape and white rescue that located 
them at the center of “civilization.” In August of 1897, white temperance reformer Rebecca 
Latimer Felton gave a speech, “Woman on the Farm,” to the members of the Georgia State 
Agricultural Society at Tybee, in which she advocated the lynching of black men as a 
preventative for the rape of white women. As LeeAnn Whites observes, versions of the final line 
from Felton’s speech, the “one sentence—‘if it will save one white woman, I say lynch a 
thousand black men’—would be repeated endlessly in the press commentary, and by Rebecca 
Latimer Felton herself in the months and years that followed” (149). Felton’s speech was 
reprinted in the Wilmington Messenger during North Carolina’s statewide white supremacy 
campaign of 1898, and Alexander Manly’s editorial response, published in his own Daily Record 
in August of 1898, is consistently cited by historians in connection with the Wilmington race 
riot. Thus building upon Felton’s assertions that white men failed to protect white women, 
Glenda Elizabeth Gilmore contends, Manly “accused white men of failing to live up to the 
demands of patriarchy, an accusation that Felton might make with impunity but that Manly made 
at considerable peril” (106). Interestingly, the impunity granted to outspoken white women also 
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presupposes the cooperation of other white women like Bouvé, despite her novelistic refutation 
of these lynching narratives.   
 Set primarily in 1830 and 1831, Their Shadows Before is a radical revision of popular 
cautionary tales of inherent black savagery and the dangers of black citizenship in which Bouvé 
focuses instead on the tender relationship between Penelope Winston and Nathaniel, between the 
experiential woman and the masculine historical narrative. Writing at the close of the decade 
which saw the deplorable “height” of lynching, Bouvé challenges the conscious, cultural 
separation of the past from the present implied in the “happy darky” images of plantation 
mythology, emphasizing instead a distinct continuity between Turner’s 1831 insurrection and the 
politics of the post-Reconstruction South. In depicting the infamous Nat Turner as a conscious 
and conscientious actor, focused, driven, and vindicated in his mission if not his methods, Their 
Shadows Before offers an alternative narrative of positive black masculinity in defiance of post-
Reconstruction stereotypes which, as historian Grace Elizabeth Hale observes, limited African 
Americans to the minstrel figures of “the comic and contented slave” (51) or to the “flat and 
caricatured blacks of Reconstruction” in fiction “who had become the easily manipulated tool[s] 
of corrupt and scheming and often northern whites, granted either a dumb and petted loyalty or a 
beastlike agency to steal and rape and kill” (75). Significantly, Bouvé constructs this alternative 
image of Turner by historicizing Penelope’s experience as a white child (who will be revealed as 
a woman reflecting on her childhood in the novel’s “Finale”), thereby challenging not only the 
stereotypes themselves but their social construction through white masculine narratives of black 
violence against white women. 
 By privileging the voice of the white woman, who is customarily rendered merely a 
symbol of property or of progeny to be alternately raped or protected, Bouvé protests standard 
 124 
male narratives of extralegal violence and justification. It is noteworthy that Forum critic 
Benjamin W. Wells describes Their Shadows Before as “a story of the Southampton County 
insurrection of the Virginia negroes in 1831, combined with a very pretty idyll of girlish love and 
instinctive unsophisticated righteousness,” thereby rhetorically separating the gendered 
experience of Penelope from the historical memory of the insurrection itself (507). This is just 
the sort of raced and gendered distinction which Bouvé works to negate when she renders the 
insurrection a production of Penelope’s experience and recollection. Accordingly, Bouvé 
capitalizes on her articulate youthful protagonist who is doubly excluded from the masculine 
public sphere of politics and systemic violence by her age and sex and who is ideally positioned, 
in terms of age, race, and privileged socioeconomic status to privately identify with the black 
rebel leader in a desexualized context and to speak publicly on his behalf.   
 In their refusal to acknowledge the centrality of Bouvé’s prepubescent protagonist to this 
narrative of violent insurrection and equally violent retribution, contemporary readers either 
missed or willfully ignored Bouvé’s sharp divergence from other late-nineteenth century white 
writers’ narrative reshaping of the messy history of slavery and its legacy for the new century.   
Although historian Scot French has recently praised Their Shadows Before, calling it the “boldest 
challenge to the proslavery image of Nat Turner as a bloodthirsty religious fanatic who hated all 
whites” (160), contemporary reviews upon the novel’s release in December of 1899 were 
generally positive but politically noncommittal, merely anticipating “the future work of the 
author” (Wells 507). These marks of hesitation and the tenuous support in the language of early 
critical assessments imply an uneasiness about the unknown author’s politics, yet white critics 
overwhelmingly assumed that Their Shadows Before was yet another nostalgic tribute to the 
“faithful slaves” of the Civil War era. A publisher’s advertisement in the February 1900 
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Bookman describes the novel as “founded with great skill and delicacy on the story of Nat 
Turner’s insurrection, the servile rising which so terrified the planters of Virginia and the South 
seventy years ago” (833). This is a marketing strategy which both hints that an implicitly white, 
adult readership would find the novel’s outlook familiar and sympathetic and ignores the fact 
that the novel is stylistically designed for an adolescent audience. This is typical of contemporary 
reviews, which tended to misleadingly or mistakenly characterize Their Shadows Before as 
“vivid” local color, wherein the youthful narrator appears as merely a genre-specific technical 
necessity, a narrative device designed to allow the author and her readers entry into the slave 
quarters, a space both forbidden and fascinating to white adults.    
 Uniquely positioned to reframe the conflicts of men, Penelope represents a move away 
from masculine cultures of violence and toward more traditionally feminine, experiential, 
instinctual means of cultural organization. As a child in the process of acquiring adult knowledge 
of normal cultural behaviors, Penelope’s naïveté emphasizes the counter-intuitiveness of slavery 
as an institution and of underlying assumptions of essential racial difference. Her coming of age 
is central to her revisionist narrative as well. As Mary Kemp Davis observes, “the prepubescence 
of Penelope is an insistent theme in Their Shadows Before. Instead of focusing on Penelope’s 
transition from girlhood to womanhood, Bouvé depicts Penelope’s resistance to the ruling elite’s 
social indoctrination” (174). The paradoxical manner in which she becomes a slaveholder proper 
epitomizes Penelope’s relationship to slavery and her understanding of absolute racial difference 
as an education she is not prepared to receive. Her grandfather signs “Lame Jim” over to her 
after she steps between the disabled slave and the overseer’s lash, receiving Jim’s blow on her 
own shoulders (37). Penelope’s instinctual act of self-sacrifice, a split-second decision made 
ostensibly without cultural or social influence, overturns white supremacist discourses of slavery 
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as reflective of the “natural” order and instead posits white violence against blacks, particularly 
disabled individuals ostensibly under the care of white guardians, as unnatural. Twice marked as 
the “White Lamb” which will be sacrificed for the “Black Sheep” (25) and then with her own 
blood and by Turner’s own hand (30), a mark of cooperation and therefore immunity, the 
woman-child Penelope occupies a “liminal space,” to borrow the term from Davis, between 
innocence and knowledge, between authority and insurgent. 
 Bouvé’s decision to render Penelope a pre-sexual child and to subordinate Penelope’s 
sexual maturity to her cultural maturity is a central function of the novel’s subversion. 
Penelope’s indeterminate age and level of sexual maturity—she has a bit of a crush on Basil 
Mortimer, her tutor, but she still sees him in the childish terms of a fairytale prince—places her 
immediately within the “gray areas” of antebellum rape and statutory rape laws with respect to 
“widespread confusion about age, consent, and coerced sex” (Sommerville 45). As Diane Miller 
Sommerville observes, the legal age of consent in most antebellum Southern states was ten years, 
which Virginia had, by the time of the Civil War, raised to twelve (44). After having saved 
Penelope from death at the hands of his own men during the uprising, Turner takes her to his 
cavernous hideout in the swamps adjoining her grandparents’ plantation where he treats her only 
with tenderness, mercy, and respect. Upon realizing that she is in her nightgown, Penelope 
becomes embarrassed, recalling that she “dragged the rough blanket from my improvised bed, 
and drew it close about me.” Nathaniel’s response registers consciousness of Penelope’s subtle 
movement but renders the social implications therein uncertain: “‘I could not help it,’ he said in a 
quaintly apologetic tone. ‘Your life was in the balance: the men were mad’” (138). Despite her 
exaggerated helplessness and the isolation of the cave, Penelope perceives no threat, sexual or 
otherwise, and Nathaniel never gives her reason to be afraid.   
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 The much-anticipated rape never occurs, foregrounding the artificiality of “the image of 
the menacing black rapist,” which Sommerville, among others, concludes “did not become the 
obsession of the southern mind until sometime after emancipation” (21). Correspondingly, the 
image of “lawless, unrestrained lynch mobs bent on vigilante ‘justice’ and retribution” was 
largely absent in response to rape cases in the antebellum South (20). As Sommerville makes 
clear, antebellum cases in which white women accused black men of rape or attempted rape 
evoked varied responses from members of the local white communities, primarily dependent on 
the class status of the woman, with poorer white women and women without “male protectors” 
like husbands, fathers, or brothers receiving little or no community support. In many cases, 
community members, including other women, testified as character witnesses on behalf of the 
alleged rapist, even if he was a slave or free black, and against a white accuser if she was 
considered to be a woman of ill repute (or even if she was the daughter of a woman whose 
reputation had been somehow damaged).   
 While penalties for slaves and free blacks convicted of rape were undoubtedly more 
severe than they were for white men found guilty of similar charges, the overwhelming hysteria 
about black rapists that emerged after emancipation was not present in the antebellum South. 
Relative intimacy between black male house servants and white women and children was 
actually commonplace in the antebellum South, as Penelope’s relationship with Uncle Isham 
implies. Martha Hodes argues that the term “miscegenation” was not even coined until the 
presidential campaign of 1864, when it was first used by Democrats as a tactic for disparaging 
Lincoln and the Republican party, and it was not until Reconstruction that “white southern 
politicians beg[a]n to conflate the newly won political power of black men with the issue of 
black male sexuality” (230-231). This tactic was alive and well in the late 1890s, all the more 
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effective because of the circular ritual punishment of lynching and the oft-accompanying 
castration. At the same time, this shift in popular representation emphasizes the generational 
differences between the paternalism of the Old South and the racial separatism of the New South. 
 That Bouvé does conjure the white mob bent on retribution at any cost, significantly in 
response to a slave uprising rather than to an accusation of black rape, identifies the white 
perception of a common threat in antebellum slave revolt and in postbellum black social and 
political “violations” translated as black rape. While Turner remains at large in the aftermath of 
the revolt, Basil Mortimer, Penelope’s northern abolitionist tutor, is suspected of inciting the 
insurrection and is jailed by Sheriff Lawson, ostensibly for his own protection. Local whites 
“have done swore to swing Nat Turner or the young feller. It ‘pears like they don’t care so much 
which one it be, so it’s one” (158). The Sheriff’s strategy, which as he explains is to head off the 
mob—“Ef they find out he’s already been arrested, it may simmer ‘em down” (158-159)—
positions the law as moving in response to the mob, not the other way around. The backward 
nature of the legal machine nullifies any resistance on behalf of Mortimer, even by his powerful, 
conservative, Southern friend, Penelope’s grandfather Winston, rendering the white mob in 
complete control. The crushing force of the opposition to Mortimer’s divergence from cultural 
norms—his real crime is conducting Sunday afternoon Bible classes for Winston’s slaves—
underscores the need for radical, perhaps even violent, action if any measure of success is to be 
achieved and thereby lends credence to Turner’s insurrectionary tactics. In complicating the 
relationships between the lynch mob and the law, between the law and the private citizens it 
supposedly represents, and between the experiences of private citizens and the cultural norms by 
which they self-govern, Bouvé also stresses the contrived differentiation between the legal 
violence of executions and the insurrectionary violence of men like Turner. 
 129 
 Bouvé, in fact, recreates Turner not as an isolated insurgent but as a true prophet whose 
gallows declarations of future bloodshed turn out, in retrospect, to be accurate in predicting the 
Civil War and the eventual emancipation of the slaves. In the novel’s “Finale,” Penelope has 
aged “nearly three decades” and is now living at the North, the wife of her childhood tutor. The 
year is 1859, as Penelope recalls “Basil brought in a paper yesterday, containing a detailed 
account of John Brown’s raid at Harper’s [sic] Ferry” (200). This news both portends a “great 
national struggle” and reminds the couple of “that dreadful day in Southampton” when the two 
witnessed the hanging of Nat Turner for his role in the uprising (201). Penelope recalls not only 
Turner’s death but his final prophecy: “Three times ten years shall come to pass before the 
deliverance shall be. In a vision of the future, the Lord hath shown to me, Nathaniel, his prophet, 
a freed nation and a river of blood! White men, there shall arise one of your race in a far land, 
and blood shall be shed and the bonds shall be broken” (198). Bouvé’s contiguous timeline 
places Turner’s insurrection in the same moral category as John Brown’s white-led 1859 raid on 
Harpers Ferry and at the very least on a par with the “noble” bloodshed of the Civil War. In this 
way Bouvé identifies cooperative antislavery violence as a matter of modified masculinity rather 
than of race and renders Turner and Brown allies of an idealized Union rather than traitors of a 
white supremacist fraternity. 
 Instead of altogether condemning a masculine social structure, Bouvé alters conventional 
white supremacist narratives by reinscribing Turner’s violence in terms of a positive black 
masculinity. While Bouvé’s Turner is a murderer, she characterizes his crimes as deliberate, 
discerning, and, above all, divine, a direct refutation of standard narratives of black violence as 
predatory and bestial. Whether or not Nathaniel is truly a prophet of God, his conviction is 
repeatedly reaffirmed and respected by whites. Penelope declares before his trial that “Uncle Nat 
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will not tell a lie,” an assertion verified by her henceforth skeptical grandmother Winston (182-
183), and Mortimer assures Turner on the eve of his execution that “I believe you think what you 
say is true” (193). Discussing the enigmatic Nat Turner in the context of Thomas R. Gray’s 
Confessions of Nat Turner (1831), Franny Nudelman asserts that “if Turner’s fanaticism serves 
as an explanatory function for Gray as he tries to pathologize Turner’s uprising, it also allows 
Turner to lay claim to divine authority. Boasting a form of knowledge that cannot be verified—
knowledge of God’s will—Turner places himself beyond the reach of careful observation” (60). 
In refusing to undermine Nathaniel’s spiritual conviction and in accentuating the mystical 
qualities of the man through Penelope’s chance experiences with him—his inexplicable taming 
of Travis’s wild bull and his mesmeric influence over Penelope’s memory in the wake of the 
uprising—Bouvé corroborates Turner’s divine faith, stopping just short of the unknowable.   
 Bouvé links the Southampton insurrection and the raid on Harpers Ferry through 
Nathaniel’s prophesy, suggesting that Turner’s uprising both inspired and made possible 
Brown’s raid, which, in turn, was a deciding factor in instigating the Civil War. Following 
Bouvé’s logic, Turner’s revolt was therefore successful, as her Nathaniel claims, because it 
indirectly caused the Civil War and the eventual emancipation of the slaves. Nathaniel’s 
directives from God are never revealed, even though Bouvé refuses to either dispute or directly 
substantiate their existence. What she suggests, though, through her retrospective confirmation of 
Nathaniel’s prophesy, is that perhaps Turner knew all along that his mission would fail initially, 
that he was meant to be martyred, because his actions were part of a larger process of cultural 
revolution, that his work was, in fact, successful, specifically because of its relationship to John 
Brown (also martyred) and the future of antislavery resistance. 
 131 
 Bouvé was not the first to compare Turner and Brown. In the wake of Brown’s attack on 
Harpers Ferry, as French observes, “newspapers in at least five major cities—San Francisco, 
Louisville, Philadelphia, New York, and Boston—drew parallels between the Harpers Ferry raid 
and the Southampton insurrection of nearly three decades before,” alternately downplaying the 
potential repercussions of the event and emphasizing the widespread rebellion it portended (101). 
As Du Bois attests in his biography of John Brown (1909), Brown most certainly knew of 
Turner’s revolt by the time of his raid on Harpers Ferry, just as he surely knew of Gabriel 
Prosser’s “formidable uprising in Virginia” in 1800 and Denmark Vesey’s 1821 rebellion in 
South Carolina, which Du Bois describes as “one of the shrewdest Negro plots that ever 
frightened the South into hysterics” (37). Hannah Geffert also describes Brown’s detailed 
knowledge of the Turner and Vesey uprisings, of Toussaint L’Ouverture and the Haitian 
Revolution, of the Underground Railroad and resistance to the Fugitive Slave Act, and of co-
conspirator Harriet Tubman’s success in using “the Great Black Way” through the Appalachians 
and via Harpers Ferry in assisting escaping slaves (24).22 Geffert suggests that previous 
insurrections, Turner’s in particular, not only inspired Brown’s conviction in leading the raid on 
Harpers Ferry but also that he studied them in order to determine the best way to execute his 
attack and to gauge the potential success of multiple approaches. Yet “Brown made no mention 
of Nat Turner or the Southampton uprising in his public comments on the Harpers Ferry raid,” 
according to French, and, “if anything, he sought to avoid any association with slave 
conspiracies, past or present” (105). Brown’s relative silence on the issue, however, does not 
negate the influence of Turner and other black revolutionaries on Brown and his supporters, nor 
does it mean that Brown disapproved of Turner’s actions.23 Known as “a man who would never 
state more than it was necessary for him to do,” Brown’s silence was characteristic (Richard 
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Realf, qtd. in Du Bois). In fact, Brown biographer Benjamin Quarles notes that Brown held Nat 
Turner “as high in his admiration as George Washington” (64-65).24 
 Race, then, becomes secondary in Their Shadows Before to questions of morality and 
violence and corresponding distinctions between higher law and the laws of man. Bouvé remains 
steadfast in her support of abolitionism and anti-slavery measures yet concerned about the moral 
contradictions inherent in the use of violence to effect cultural change, even if she sees that 
cultural change as a moral necessity. Bouvé tentatively validates Turner’s methods as well as 
Brown’s by rendering more moderate approaches insufficient, yet she chastises Turner, through 
Penelope, for committing and sanctioning violent acts against individuals, particularly women, 
children, and the elderly. It is significant that Bouvé wants to defer judgment of Turner to a 
higher power, that her child narrator is at once bonded to the man and horrified by his deeds. 
Even as an adult, Penelope remains dedicated to her childish declaration that “if those people 
want to set the slaves free, why, I am an Abolitionist, too!” (96). However, as the child Penelope 
learns through her relationship with the fictional Nat Turner, determining right from wrong is not 
necessarily clear or easy. Bouvé’s retrospective vindication of Turner is supported by 
Nathaniel’s differentiation between the law of man and the higher law of God. When asked by 
Penelope after he has rescued her from the chaos of the revolt, “Don’t you know God says, 
‘Thou shalt not kill’?” Turner replies, “I fulfilled the Law. They will kill me, and it will be man’s 
law” (137). Turner is indeed killed; the child Penelope watches “a dark object sw[i]ng in mid-air 
from the cross-piece at the top” (198-199). Yet, Bouvé’s very retelling of his story, her insistence 
on a prophetic, merciful, and sympathetic Nat Turner, belies the futility of his aborted 
insurrection and his death at men’s hands.   
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 Nathaniel’s determination to entrust Penelope, “the white child,” with his “testimony” 
(192) before his execution explicitly links the purportedly private and apolitical experiences of 
white women and those of black men in fundamental opposition to a masculine culture of white 
supremacy. Penelope is the principal historical witness, and it is her testimony—rather than 
Turner’s, the text of which is never revealed—that stands as authoritative record of the event and 
its contexts. Bouvé, like her character Nathaniel, entrusts and calls on white women to counteract 
white supremacist violence by neutralizing the powerful narrative formula by which masculine 
cultures of violence self-replicate. By writing herself out of the role of victim and positioning 
herself instead as Turner’s ally, Penelope exposes the overt function of lynching as the masculine 
management of incongruent norms.   
 In this way, Bouvé emphasizes the mutually contingent identities, to borrow John 
Ernest’s term, of white women and black men. For John L. Grigsby, “Bouvé’s message to young 
women that they can control their lives and destinies,” as he reads her narrative purpose, and “the 
central role of Penelope as the possessor of Nat Turner’s story” negate the autonomy of black 
male characters like Uncle Isham and even Nathaniel (56). This argument assumes that 
Penelope’s voice cancels out Turner’s, that white women are fundamentally agents rather than 
victims of white supremacist violence, and therefore presupposes that black men and white 
women cannot be allied in opposition to white supremacy. Grigsby is particularly tough on 
Bouvé’s Uncle Isham, whom he compares to Stowe’s Uncle Tom, unfavorably convicting both 
fictional characters of setting a harmful and lasting example of corrupt black masculinity for both 
blacks and whites. In isolating particular Uncle Tom-like characters and judging their narrative 
construction as though it occurred in an asocial vacuum, Grigsby also condemns Bouvé’s Isham, 
G. P. R. James’s Old Zed, and Arna Bontemps’s Ben as feminine and sycophantic in much the 
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same one-dimensional way as white supremacist histories have condemned Nat Turner as brutal 
and bloodthirsty.   
 Both of these perspectives are faulty in that they adhere to a rigid and formulaic social 
order that defines blackness and womanhood in absolute terms. These Jesus (Uncle Tom), Judas 
(Ben), and Job (Isham) characters and their creators are herein accused of individual personal 
failure; Grigsby expects them to somehow make a clean break from an oppressive history and 
from culture in general in order to live up to his expectations of black masculine militancy. 
Significantly, Grigsby never acknowledges that his analysis of Uncle Tom-like black 
characters—by his definition, those who repeatedly sacrifice themselves for their white 
masters—occurs in the context of novels expressly concerned with violent insurrection: James’s 
The Old Dominion (1856), Bouvé’s Their Shadows Before, and Bontemps’s Black Thunder 
(1936).25 Grigsby posits ideal black masculinity as hyper-masculine in opposition to white 
femininity, while Bouvé positions the civil and social rights of white women and black men as 
neither historically fixed nor independent of one another. There is nothing fundamentally 
opposed about the behaviors of Uncle Isham and Nathaniel in Bouvé’s novel. In fact, the 
accommodationist choices of characters like Isham, when read in the context of the more radical, 
violent choices of literary and historical characters like Nathaniel and Gabriel, present an 
extremely complex picture of the kinds of cultural and personal negotiations inspired and 
required by an inherently contradictory social order.   
 Bouvé posits the white woman-child as speaking on behalf of the black man, who is, 
significantly, a black prophet rather than a black rapist. However, the white woman is still 
speaking for the black man, who has no voice other than the one she gives to him. Here Bouvé’s 
radical purpose is nearly thwarted, because she does not know how to let Nathaniel speak for 
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himself or what to do with his voice. An interview she conducted with Charles Chesnutt in 
August of 1899 for the Boston Evening Transcript offers interesting insight into Bouvé’s 
conflicted relationship with race at this time. Even as she insists on characterizing Chesnutt as 
variously marked by his “aboriginal ancest[ry]” and on describing The Conjure Woman (1899) 
as displaying “distinctly negro humor,” Bouvé celebrates Chesnutt’s writing as “genius” and 
counts his work, along with Booker T. Washington’s The Future of the American Negro (1899) 
as important “signs of the times” (100-103). Her almost defensive repeated mention of 
Chesnutt’s “bitterness” toward the white people of the South also implies an ingrained 
paternalism as well as a limited, even uncomfortable, respect for Chesnutt’s politics.  
Even as she critiques a masculine culture that appropriates white women’s voices in 
service of white supremacy, Bouvé cannot overcome the more seemingly benign elements of this 
culture. She cannot see beyond a reinterpretation of the past, or mobilize her vision of positive 
black masculinity for anything much beyond the prevention of violence in her post-
Reconstruction present. Neither can the liminally positioned Penelope. In some ways, Bouvé’s 
redeployment of the trope of the white woman’s choice remains within the frame of the narrative 
established by white men like Tourgée and Dixon, because the white woman simply makes a 
different kind of choice. At novel’s end, Penelope, the privileged white Southerner, is married to 
her Northern abolitionist tutor, and she lives at the North, reading about the ongoing violent 
struggle against slavery from an appropriately safe distance. 
 
“With but a change of masters”: Mary Johnston’s Prisoners of Hope 
 If Bouvé’s Their Shadows Before falls short in its effort to reinscribe social codes and 
open a continuous line of communication between white women and black men, Johnston’s 
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Prisoners of Hope succeeds in depicting the utter chaos that results from similar failed attempts 
to subvert the existing social order. Johnston’s critique of masculine cultures of violence via the 
genre of historical romance is perhaps the most conservative, in terms of ideas about the 
relationships between race, class, and gender, and it is certainly the most fatalistic of the three 
novels. Critic Lawrence G. Nelson rather haughtily characterizes Johnston, as a woman and a 
writer, as “patrician, conservative, and traditional to the core of her being,” yet he is perhaps 
more accurate than even he might have imagined when he observes that “her themes arise out of 
the passions of men in time and history, out of their ambitions, jealousies, rivalries, and the 
havoc and desolation they cause” (78). Of course, Nelson fails to place appropriate emphasis on 
the fact that it is specifically men, and not women, even in his estimation, who are wreaking 
havoc and destruction throughout the histories of Mary Johnston’s imagination.    
 Prisoners of Hope follows two parallel conflicts that ultimately converge at novel’s end 
with little, if anything, having been accomplished, other than the reaffirmation of white male 
authority and the displacement of class allegiance by race. Godfrey Landless, a wrongly-
convicted indentured felon from London, is the novel’s white male protagonist, purportedly 
possessed of an outsider’s perspective primarily because of his national identity and his status as 
a slave on the Verney plantation. Johnston stresses, however, Landless’s political sophistication 
as the reason for his fraudulent incarceration, which positions him apart from the “real” criminals 
and the people of color held in race-based slavery. Despite his class allegiance, he is, at bottom, a 
white man, an identity at the root of both of the novel’s parallel conflicts. Accordingly, people of 
color and white women, all of whom shape the novel’s unfolding plot in important and 
irreversible ways, nonetheless occupy secondary positions determined by their relationships to 
and with the novel’s white male characters.   
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 Landless oscillates back and forth between privileging his star-crossed romance with 
Patricia Verney, his master’s daughter, and his leadership role in a colonial servants’ revolt 
against the local planters, including Colonel Verney, Patricia’s father. Landless’s dual identities 
as republican revolutionary and as Patricia’s friend and lover are ultimately incompatible, less 
due, apparently, to any internal fault of his own than to his fixed subject position in a rigidly 
hierarchical culture of oppression regulated through violence. Landless’s two passions—love and 
liberty—are not in and of themselves irreconcilable; in fact, they are complementary. Yet the 
inharmonious way in which Landless goes about seeking freedom and a more humanitarian 
democracy through violent revolution squashes the possibility of his achieving either. Landless’s 
inability to negotiate his conflicting responsibilities to Patricia and to his fellow revolutionaries 
simultaneously marks this conceptual distinction as unnatural and counterintuitive. In this way 
Johnston positions the masculine world of the public-political and the feminine world of the 
private-emotional as inextricably intertwined, at the same time making clear that the contrivance 
of white masculine dominance is directly responsible for Landless’s doubly-wrought failure. 
Because the masculine is irrevocably marred by artificiality, structural inconsistencies, and the 
circular and self-replicating violence of revolution required to maintain the social and political 
control of white men, Johnston’s narrative subtly privileges the feminine, which is marked 
instead by sincerity, intuition, and compassion. 
 Johnston’s late nineteenth-century adaptation of the 1663 Servants’ Plot begins with the 
hopeful suggestion that inter-racial cooperation among the servant classes is both possible and 
likely, if not yet realized. When Landless arrives in Gloucester County, Virginia, from London 
via Jamestown in the first chapter, a well-organized insurrection is already in the works, 
engineered by white slaves, indentures and felons from Newgate prison, victims of England’s 
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Act of Uniformity, “Oliverians” and “Roundheads” who are out of favor with the current 
government because of their political loyalties, and “fanatics” of the “Muggletonian” persuasion. 
All of the leading conspirators are white, and, despite profound political and religious 
differences, all purportedly desire “a way to recover [their] liberty, and with it, the liberty of a 
downtrodden brethren” (67); in short, the formation of “a republic” (68). The formation of this 
republic, of course, requires the displacement of the current ruling class, Governor William 
Berkeley and Royalists loyal to Charles II. Landless, who identifies himself as having been “a 
Commonwealth’s man,” is induced to join the conspiracy by its then-leader, Robert Godwyn, 
humble mender of nets and former Oliverian soldier who knew and fought beside Landless’s 
father in Europe. Godwyn proposes a slave insurrection as the way to attain the functional 
republic of which they speak and for which they have ostensibly, as Cromwell supporters, been 
fighting for years in England (70). Unfortunately, Godwyn and his fellows have not taken into 
consideration the agency or the desires of the black slaves whom they intend to lead in revolt, 
needing their numbers but simply counting on the fact that when the time comes to rise, the 
slaves and the majority of the servants, generally unaware of the plan beforehand, will rise with 
them (73).  
 Johnston identifies this idealized republic as desirable and those who would implement it 
as honorable, yet she is wary of the overtly contradictory means by which they intend to achieve 
it. She characterizes the potential inherent in a multi-racial alliance among the servant classes in 
terms similar to those by which historian T. H. Breen compares the unique and common 
circumstances of the 1660s and the 1890s. In the latter half of the seventeenth century, Breen 
affirms, “it had been possible to overlook racial differences, a time when a common experience 
of desperate poverty and broken dreams brought some whites and blacks together. Such 
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conditions were present in the American South during the 1890s, and it is not unlikely that they 
will appear again” (18). Laura F. Edwards offers some support for Breen’s claim in her 
contention that the “burden of the Confederacy’s war policies fell heavily on yeoman and poor 
white families, some of whom had opposed the war in the first place.” Edwards writes: 
“Locating the problem in a political system that appeared to respond only to the interests of the 
wealthy, they resorted to extralegal activity. Even those from solid yeoman families often 
collaborated with propertyless whites, free blacks, and slaves, finding common ground in their 
opposition to the Confederacy’s leaders and their policies” (188).   
 While Edwards’s claims apply to the immediate postwar period and Breen’s explicitly to 
the 1890s, both establish that a cultural hierarchy in which race trumps class is neither inherent 
nor stable and must be maintained via complex social systems. If and when economic conditions 
for the poor and lower-middle classes become strained beyond a certain point, loyalties 
inevitably shift as do alliances and the resulting majorities. It is also important to note that class 
has never been “obliterated” as a means of social stratification, as some suggest, but that it is 
instead complicated by notions of race as a separate identifying category. Race, as Theodore W. 
Allen convincingly argues, is, in fact, a means of regulating both labor and capital: “it was only 
because ‘race’ consciousness superseded class-consciousness that the continental plantation 
bourgeoisie was able to achieve and maintain the degree of social control necessary for 
proceeding with capital accumulation on the basis of chattel bond-labor” (240). In such a culture, 
race and class can never be fully estranged.   
 The class-conscious alliance between white servants and enslaved people of color in 
Prisoners of Hope represents a missed, perhaps botched, opportunity. At once anticipating and 
reflecting on the Fusion politics of the 1890s, Johnston dramatizes the coalition in such a way as 
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to critique its failure in complex ideological and methodological terms, disavowing the 
masculine violence of white supremacy as a useful political system and acknowledging its 
cultural presence even within significantly oppositional political movements. Originally 
conceived as the Farmer’s Alliance in the 1880s, Populism surfaced as a “political force” in the 
mid-1890s (Perman 31). Populists seeking aggressive “federal intervention in the agricultural 
economy,” according to Kantrowitz, “sought to break down the racial hierarchy that the 
Democrats had worked so hard to reinforce” (“Two Faces of Domination” 105). Joining forces 
with the largely black Republican party, these farmers engineered Fusion politics, a coalition 
which was considerably if briefly successful in many Southern states, including North Carolina 
and Louisiana (Perman 32). The rather quick and dramatic success of the Fusion movement 
inspired a backlash of Democratic manipulations, including voter intimidation and grandfather 
clauses. Ultimately, the defeat of Fusion politics occurred from within as well as from without, 
just as the republican revolution in Johnston’s novel is unsuccessful in large part because it, too, 
self-destructs. In both cases, internal disagreements, perceptions of divergent interests, and an 
inability to overlook culturally constructed racial differences worked to weaken the movements 
from the inside. Many white Fusionists, while willing to collude with blacks, perhaps 
temporarily, in order to achieve common political and economic goals, were not immune to the 
hysterical racial and sexual rhetoric deployed by Southern white supremacists and Democrats in 
response to the specific challenge a Populist-Republican coalition posed for “the white man’s 
republic” as Mary P. Ryan suggests (138). 
 Johnston capitalizes on the internal strife common to such “radical” movements that 
gallantly privilege class over race without fully admitting black or otherwise “raced” men into 
the fraternity when she dramatizes the internal collapse of Landless’s republican revolution on 
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just these terms. Godwyn’s misguided plan to use a slave uprising to institute a republican 
government is obviously in jeopardy when Luiz Sebastian, the novel’s one predominant 
“mulatto” character—and not coincidentally, its most vicious villain—warns Landless, the 
ascendant leader of the rebellion after Godwyn’s murder, that he and other servants with 
knowledge of the insurrection are displeased with the plan: “The servants have no say in the 
matter; they are to follow like sheep where these others lead. The slaves are not even to know of 
it until the last moment. A handful of us who have white blood in our veins are let in on the 
secret, that we may incite the blacks when the time is come; but are we consulted?” (132). 
Sebastian’s warning that “the insurrection may arrive, and the planters be put down, and next 
year may find us slaves still, with but a change of masters!” (132) is not heeded by Landless, 
who contends that Sebastian “must accept the conspiracy as it is. In liberating themselves, these 
men will of necessity free you even as they will free me, who am not, as you know, of their class. 
I shall take my chance, as I think you will take yours” (133).   
 Violent resistance, particularly divisive violent resistance, serves to fortify masculine 
white supremacy rather than weaken it either culturally or structurally, although it does so at 
great cost to the ideal democratic principles which white supremacy proposes to endorse. If 
Johnston’s narrative is, as Joseph A. Young asserts, “a scripting of the racial/master discourse, a 
conscious fashioning of the racial other in the most influential domain, fictionality, in which the 
postbellum reconquest of the black other is achieved,” Johnston’s question remains: to what 
ends? (72). Johnston depicts Landless and his fellow white revolutionaries as loyal and their 
cause as generally honorable, yet she is ultimately critical of their methods, particularly the 
political idealism which blinds them to the social reality of their situation. That they intend to use 
a slave uprising to overthrow an oppressive regime and institute a republic is in and of itself 
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contradictory. Their fatal mistake is that they continue to think of slaves as slaves, and this stems 
from their misconception (or conscious denial) of what a republican government entails. 
Johnston’s depiction of the failed revolt and its splintering from within emphasizes that the 
oppressed are a stronger force to be reckoned with when they are banded together as a majority 
rather than divided amongst themselves. What Landless and his cohorts want to do is not 
necessarily displace the planter elite and upset the system entirely but to replace the planter elite 
with a new, differently oriented elite. Such a new leadership will still need to be able to manage 
the lower-class majority, and so oppression will not cease, despite glorified claims of revolution. 
 Landless optimistically wants to conflate race and class and anticipate future prospects 
accordingly, yet Sebastian recognizes a distinct racial divide among the lower classes. It is this 
glaring iniquity and Landless’s unwillingness to either acknowledge or counteract this imbalance 
that leads Sebastian to form an alternate insurrectionary conspiracy—along with unscrupulous 
convicts “the Turk” and Roach, a red-haired implicitly Irish murderer—in which they will 
employ the Chickahominies and Ricahecrians, particularly brutal Native Americans, and “most 
of the slaves” in a veritable bloodbath set to end with the murder of all the planter men and the 
capture and concubinage of the white women (249-250). 
 This moment where her fictional uprising breaks in two is also the point at which 
Johnston most sharply breaks from the scant recorded facts of the Servants’ Plot, a servile 
rebellion which (nearly) took place in Gloucester County, Virginia, along the Chesapeake Bay, 
in September of 1663. Robert Beverley, in The History and Present State of Virginia (1705), 
describes the 1663 rebellion as beginning when “the poor People becoming thereby very uneasie, 
their Murmurings were watch’d and fed, by several mutinous and rebellious Oliverian Soldiers, 
that were sent thither as Servants. These depending upon the discontented People of all sorts, 
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form’d a villanous Plot to destroy their Masters, and afterwards to set up for themselves” (59-
60). Breen and Allen disagree about whether or not the plotters were indeed Cromwellian 
veterans, but agree that the conspiracy was discovered “the very Night before the design'd 
Execution . . . by the Relenting of one of their Accomplices, whose Name was Birkenhead” 
(Beverley 60), and was therefore subverted. At least four of the conspiracy’s suspected leaders 
were hanged, and nine “Laborers” were accused by a Gloucester court “of conspiring to arm 30 
persons to overthrow the government of Virginia” (Breen 8). The servant who had betrayed his 
comrades reportedly received a pardon and ₤ 200, and 13 September, the day the uprising was to 
have taken place, was dedicated a commemorative holiday by local officials (Beverley 60).26 
Nonetheless, the aborted revolt terrified the planter classes, inspired increased vigilance and the 
passage of new laws curtailing the mobility of servants, and led to orders from the king that a 
fortress should be built to protect the governor and Jamestown from future insurrections (Breen 
9).    
 In recreating the moment of revelation, Johnston has Landless stand in for Birkenhead.  
During a meeting of the principal conspirators at a tobacco house on Verney’s plantation, they 
are discovered initially not because of an insider’s betrayal but by “Mad Margery,” an indigent 
white woman who lives on the plantation grounds and whose whims Patricia indulges when she 
is in the mood. Margery overhears and repeats to Patricia enough of the conversation among the 
“seven men in the tobacco house” for Patricia to deem it necessary to send Margery to the main 
house for help (228). Patricia, who remains behind to wait for Verney and Carew, hears more of 
the plan, including the group’s intent to arm themselves, steal horses and boats, and return to the 
“this appointed place” where they will, thus assembled, entreat the slaves to join them in 
“oppos[ing] any force sent against us” (231). Discovering Patricia eavesdropping on their secret 
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meeting, the men pull her into the tobacco house where Landless fights to protect her from the 
murderous rage of the others. Finally, “half a dozen blacks, the two overseers and Sir Charles 
Carew” arrive with pistols and swords, killing most of the conspirators in the ensuing struggle 
and taking Landless and Trail prisoner (235). What is most significant here is not Johnston’s 
insertion of Patricia into the discovery scene but the element of dissent among the conspirators 
that her presence reveals. Landless and Havisham, a fellow Oliverian soldier lately arrived in the 
colonies, are the only two in the group who refuse to murder Patricia to save themselves and who 
see that such a cowardly act would be the undoing of their long-term goals.   
 It is important, for the plot of Johnston’s novel and for her commentary on race and class 
relations in the nineteenth century as well as in the seventeenth, that Johnston draw upon an 
historical uprising that betrays itself from within, and that Patricia, the privileged white woman, 
be the reason Landless turns traitor. In this way, the active and willful consolidation of race over 
class appears to be a function of protection rather than dishonor, revealing a deeper sense of 
loyalty within the white political dissident who would abandon his cause in order to preserve a 
specific form of white masculine civilization in which Patricia will be protected at all costs. The 
novel’s two parallel conflicts are inextricably joined when the insurgents threaten Patricia’s life, 
and Landless must choose between the pursuit of his political ideals and his love for the master’s 
daughter. Either way, Landless is sentenced to death in this moment. His betrayal, however, 
allows him to exchange his life for Patricia’s and to make his death somehow meaningful. The 
price of his deliverance, and Patricia’s, is his willful sacrifice of the black slaves and servants of 
color whose independence he had previously championed. The black slaves become scapegoats 
onto which the violence of class and political difference between white men is necessarily 
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deflected in order to maintain a cultural hierarchy in which white women represent the threshold 
of civilization. 
 When the once comparatively united revolt splits in two and the second uprising, led by 
Luiz Sebastian, begins to take shape, terminology and allegiances abruptly shift and essentialist 
racial characteristics more or less suggested in the earlier parts of the novel become solidified. 
Landless and what is left of his men somewhat unexpectedly jump ship, choosing to fight with 
the planters rather than against them, as had been the initial plan, and effectively sacrificing their 
own revolution to defend those with whom they racially identify against those with whom they 
have shared oppression at the hands of the same, despite the fact that Landless still faces the 
gallows for his role in the aborted scheme. Whereas Landless and the idealized foundation of his 
now-defunct revolution maintain an air of nobility and honor, despite utter failure, Sebastian’s 
contingency is conversely described as brutal and bloodthirsty. At the moment of revelation, the 
“dusky mass of slaves” whom Sebastian commands significantly “sway[s] forward with one low, 
deep, bestial growl” and the servants in the crowd form a “phalanx of villainous white faces—the 
dissolute, the convict, the refuse of the plantation” (262). This second wave of “raced” 
conspirators is far from honorable, even downright merciless in their indiscriminate slaughter of 
the planter families and all who would get in their way.   
 How we read Johnston’s application of essentialist characteristics on the basis of both 
race and class affects how we interpret Johnston’s commentary on the legitimacy of organized 
violent resistance and on the maintenance of a white supremacist culture. Johnston’s apparently 
gratuitous use of common nineteenth-century discriminatory stereotypes does not necessarily 
indicate that she set out to write a novel, as Young claims, predating the “extremist forms” of the 
plantation tradition represented by Dixon’s The Leopard’s Spots and The Clansman and 
 146 
“designed to rationalize a return to white privilege after civil war and reconstruction, a 
reentitlement of whites that condones using exclusionary tactics (83). On the contrary, Johnston 
seems to assert that no one, is fundamentally entitled to anything if it is to be gotten or kept by 
violence and exclusion, including otherwise virtuous white men. Significantly, Johnston’s white 
insurgents, despite a distinctly honorable purpose and leaders with pretty pedigrees, are no more 
successful in their idealized republican revolution than are the black slave rebels, driven to 
desperation by deepening structural inequalities. Both revolutions essentially undermine a 
democratic ideal, because, despite all the bloodshed, nothing is accomplished and nothing 
fundamentally changes. The wealthy white planters remain wealthy white planters, the 
insurgents are all either dead or exiled, and those servants and slaves who renounce their 
participation and escape the gallows remain in the same degraded positions that they occupied at 
the beginning of the novel.   
 Johnston’s depiction of the Oliverians’ “revolution” as the consolidation of race over 
class is a critical one, even as it reinforces brutal nineteenth-century racial stereotypes. Although 
he is characterized as opportunistic and cruel in his pursuit of freedom, Sebastian’s reservations 
about the Oliverians’ plot are retrospectively confirmed when Landless, after having been caught 
in the act of finalizing his plan and captured, devises a complex scheme to distinguish the 
(racially) “loyal” from the rebels among the “white and black, servant and slave, rustic, convict, 
Jew, Turk, Indian, mulatto, quadroon, coal black, [and] untamed African” (256). From “the 
motley crowd” Landless apparently points out “every man concerned in the plot discovered this 
morning,” when in actuality he is calling forth those he knows not to have been involved in 
Sebastian’s counter-plot, including slaves and servants not privy to Landless’s own scheme 
(257). Landless has made a deal with Colonel Verney which ensures that Landless alone will “be 
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the scapegoat for the rest of you” and that no one else will be punished in any way for their 
knowledge of the planned political revolt (262). Landless literally calls out by name those whom 
he believes can be counted on as loyal to fight with the whites against Sebastian’s multi-racial 
cohort. Those he calls forth include Win-Grace Porringer, the Muggletonian, John Robert, “a 
Baptist preacher suffering under the Act of Uniformity,” “then a Fifth Monarchy man, then a 
veteran of Cromwell’s, then the plantation miller and the carpenter, then two more Oliverians, 
then more peasants” (258-259). In this way, political allegiance becomes racial allegiance and 
whiteness becomes equated with revolution.  
 While Johnston readily levels this critique against the white Oliverian plotters and the 
culture they represent, she, like Bouvé, is unable to realize a viable alternative including non-
white leadership. Luiz Sebastian and his doubly rebellious contingency are characterized as 
racially indeterminate—mulatto, Turk, Irish—and therefore dangerous to any prospective or 
actual civilization. Neither African American and therefore ostensibly natural slaves, nor white 
and so ostensibly natural leaders, Sebastian, Trail, and Roach are inevitably on the outside of 
traditionally classed or raced identities and function as a specifically criminal element. Like the 
landed gentry, Landless and his soldiers show no loyalty to this excluded population in terms of 
the outcome of the revolt, and so inspire no loyalty in return. Realizing that there is a definitive 
hierarchy even within the resistance movement and that only the white elite will reap the 
potential benefits of the revolution, Sebastian decides to take his chances with the unruly Native 
Americans, at one point declaring that “they promise me a wigwam in their village in the Blue 
Mountains” (331). Despite the implied fragility of Sebastian’s future with the Ricahecrians, he 
sees this as his only chance to be a part of a society, albeit a rebellious, victimized, and 
ostracized society. Sebastian’s choice illustrates his limited options as well as those of the Native 
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Americans. Both must remain or venture outside of white society in order to engage in any form 
of social mobility. Their fixed positions as outlaws and “savages” do not change even though 
Johnston makes clear that they are, in fact, driven to this savagery by the lack of social 
opportunities available to them.   
 This is the legacy of Landless’s “noble” sacrifice to his race—the violent and purportedly 
revolutionary reenactment of race over class as the dominant organizing structure of American 
culture and politics. Johnston’s collapsing of elements of two historical events—the lesser-
known Servants’ Plot and the widely-recognized Bacon’s Rebellion of 1676—into one fictional 
moment suggests that she anticipated the findings of later historians who more directly 
recognized the transition from indentured servitude to black slavery in the late seventeenth 
century.27 “Just as the overthrow of tenantry in the 1620s had cleared the ground for the 
institution of chattel bond-servitude,” Allen observes, “the defeat of Bacon’s Rebellion cleared 
the way for the establishment of the system of lifetime hereditary chattel bond-servitude” (239). 
Furthermore, Breen aptly suggests that “the seventeenth-century Virginians exchanged white 
servants for Negro slaves, and in so doing, exchanged a fear of the ‘giddy multitude’ for a fear of 
slave rebellion” (17-18). This type of substitutive transition suggests that while relationships and 
positionality may evolve, the general nature of oppression and the fixed existence of oppressed 
groups remain fundamental to a white masculine social order both regulated and rejuvenated by 
revolutionary violence. In her dramatization of the complex dynamics among the conspirators of 
the uprisings, Johnston looks forward to “the subordination of class by ‘race’ at the beginning of 
the eighteenth century [as] the key to the emergence of the republic at the end of it,” enacting the 
shift from class solidarity to race-based allegiance through the doubled act of revolution and 
revolt (Allen 240). Johnston seems to recognize as well the subsequent continuity between 
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colonial revolts, the Revolution of 1776, and the American Civil War, as evidenced by her 
reinscription of nineteenth century racial codes onto the seventeenth century. 
 Johnston’s ambivalence toward violent revolution as her nation’s foundational legacy, 
evident in Prisoners of Hope, contributes to the innate futility of war in general and civil war in 
particular as a central theme in her later novels. Despite, and also because of, her devotion to her 
Confederate veteran father and to the cause for which he sacrificed so much, Johnston found 
herself at odds with popular white masculine narratives of the Southern past which glorified war 
and the noble sacrifices of dead and disabled soldiers. As Sarah E. Gardner has recently pointed 
out, “no matter how compelling postwar white southerners found the Confederate claim to 
independence, no matter how seductive the idea of secession, according to Johnston, the war qua 
war had been a disaster for the South” (10). Interestingly, as Elizabeth Young observes, Johnston 
has been compared to Ellen Glasgow and Mary Noailles Murfree as a Southern woman novelist 
who depicted actual Civil War battles in her fiction while other women writers of her generation 
like Grace King and Kate Chopin “filtered the war through the Creole Culture of Louisiana” (4). 
“Johnston,” Gardner writes, “sought to break from the romantic, even celebratory nature of the 
southern Civil War novel and fought a three year battle with her editor over the iconoclastic 
content of her work” (190).   
 The work in question would become The Long Roll (1911), the first novel of Johnston’s 
planned war trilogy on which she had been working since 1908. With this novel, Johnston 
followed in the footsteps of her literary predecessors, drawing “heavily on the dominant trope in 
Southern fiction—the myth of the Lost Cause,” but she also veered from the expected course 
when she “expressed what she believed to be the futility of war.” For Johnston, “these two aims . 
. . reinforced each other while demonstrating the power of the Lost Cause myth over southern 
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consciousness. No matter how noble, virtuous, and loyal to the Constitution were the 
Confederates, they were doomed to failure” (Gardner 196). The Long Roll met with harsh 
criticism from many Southerners, particularly those who objected to Johnston’s characterization 
of Stonewall Jackson as profane and vulgar (Gardner 201), yet the second novel of her 
uncompleted trilogy, Cease Firing (1912) was more kindly received among critics and popular 
audiences in the South who found its “starkness” transcendent (Gardner 205). Johnston’s 
struggle with her editor and with her audience over the nature of her Civil War novels is 
representative of Johnston’s personal and literary negotiations of her own experiences with and 
memories of the war and its aftermath and the collective nostalgic Southern memories. Gardner’s 
observations about Cease Firing and Johnston’s dual consciousnesses, when considered in the 
context of Prisoners of Hope, point to a larger pattern of structural criticism in Johnston’s work 
and suggest ways in which Johnston’s seemingly conflicted representations of race, rebellion, 
and revolution might instead “reinforce each other” in her first novel as well. 
 Critique though it is, Prisoners of Hope stops short of recommending specific methods of 
social reform. Johnston leaves her characters hopelessly bound by proscribed social status. Even 
Landless, the novel’s most internally developed character, is left to die at novel’s end, suggesting 
that any claims to social status and potential social mobility are essentially false as long as one 
exists within culture without changing culture itself. The only glimmer of hope lies in the 
genuine romantic attachment between Landless and Patricia Verney, which resists the dominant 
masculine culture. This hope, too, is dashed, when white masculine civilization, in the form of 
Colonel Verney and Charles Carew, a cousin to whom Patricia is informally betrothed, 
encroaches upon their hideout in the cave above the forest. Strangely enough, although the 
Gloucester gentry and their search party appear just in time to rescue the lovers from the 
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Ricahecrians, they, too, threaten the couple as they would also take Landless’s life and, in effect, 
capture Patricia. Patricia, although ostensibly rescued, is actually forced back into the role of 
“republican mother” by both her father and her lover, in the tradition of Reconstruction-era 
conceptions of nationhood and of the white woman as Columbia, an icon which Shirley Samuels 
describes as “a national housekeeper who assists with domesticity and racial violence” and who 
“guards the entrance to the national home, protecting and disbarring” (44).    
 As for Landless, he remains bound for the gallows at Jamestown despite the great 
personal risk he has assumed in doggedly pursuing Patricia’s captors through the wilderness 
even when Verney and Carew could or would not. Insisting that they are “not ungrateful” and 
that their “hands are tied,” the best Verney can offer Landless is his “choice of deaths” (369-
371). Verney will leave Landless alone and wounded in the wilderness with winter approaching, 
because there is no chance of pardon and no place for Landless, a convict, an insurrectionist, and 
worst of all, lover of his daughter, in their supposedly civilized settlement. Having valiantly 
defended the white patriarchy, in the form of Verney Manor, and thereby proven his whiteness, 
Landless is no longer fit to resume the role of servant. However, as both a political rebel and one 
who has counted himself among the oppressed servant class, Landless can neither be integrated 
into the world of the white elite nor accepted into the Verney family as Patricia’s husband. Both 
Verney and Johnston must make an example of him; otherwise they risk advocating violent 
insurrection as a means of social mobility. Worse, they risk suggesting that social designations 
like race and class are not fixed or permanent but can be reasonably transcended.   
 The implication in Landless’s presumed death at novel’s end is twofold. First, in order to 
effect true revolution, one must not only breach but ultimately break down the structure of an 
incongruent and oppressive society, and, second, this can only be accomplished by cultural 
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rejection of a masculine social order and not by the violent reassertion of white supremacy. The 
novel presents the idea that US culture is static if not stagnant but never stable. Biographer C. 
Ronald Cella remarks of Prisoners of Hope that “one’s impression is that the Cavalier 
aristocracy is an artificial civilization, genteel but fragile, in constant danger from the props 
which hold it up” (35-36). Such a characterization is equally applicable to the former 
Confederacy as well as to the contrived social and legal hierarchy of the late nineteenth century. 
In fact, Cella’s observation is necessarily relevant to any civilization built upon race or class-
based hierarchies and supposedly empirical systems of democracy. When the masses are 
oppressed there is discontent, and where there is discontent there is a constant threat to the ruling 
elite. Like Luiz Sebastian, who fears a mere “change of masters” will occur in the absence of 
true revolution, Johnston’s novel etches out a complex social structure in which masculine 
civilization is always artificial and always built upon a volatile and unstable foundation of 
contingency and oppression which must be maintained by force in order to remain viable.   
 Johnston’s internal doubling of the event as she imagines it, her revisionist splitting of 
one uprising into two parts, essentially two revolts, is symbolic of the split between ideal 
democracy and functional, structural, masculine white supremacy. Such a grossly incongruent 
social structure maintains along with a tremulous sense of false stability a complementary and 
ubiquitous riotous presence. In rendering violent resistance to governing authority ultimately 
futile, Johnston suggests that insurrection will always fail to effect meaningful social change 
because the riotous presence exists even within the insurrectionary movement and will inevitably 
carry over into the social fabric of the culture it portends. As with Bouvé’s Their Shadows 
Before, early reviewers of Johnston’s first novel were both cautious and torn in their responses to 
her unique narrative approach to contemporary cultural criticism. One anonymous critic for The 
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Literary World remarked in October of 1898 that “the narrative in Prisoners of Hope is so 
interesting that the reader is disappointed at its ‘melancholy and inconclusive finale,’” while 
another perhaps more prescient reviewer for The Critic commented in December that “the 
conclusion reveals the ‘full scope of the author’s talent.’”28   
 
“I will carry the war into Africa”: Pauline Hopkins’s Winona29 
 As both Bouvé’s and Johnston’s narratives illustrate, women of color were virtually 
excluded from white narratives of lynching and racial violence that triangulated the relationships 
between white men, black men, and white women in a fraught battle over the contested terrain of 
white women’s bodies. These post-Reconstruction era narratives, penned by white women as 
well as by white men, depended on the silencing and subjugation of black women, building on a 
pattern established during the Civil War era, when popular literature argued instead that “slave 
women’s very identity was founded on their closeness to whites,” particularly their masters, and 
they appeared primarily as the nurturing figures of “Dinah” or “Mammy,” according to Alice 
Fahs (189). Pauline Hopkins’s depiction of her title character, Winona, as a cross-dresser, a 
prison nurse, and a soldier, although altered to adhere to the historical record of “Bleeding 
Kansas” and Pottawatomie rather than to the events of the Civil War, highlights the absence of 
women of color and mulattas in particular in Civil War literature depicting white women in new 
roles subverting traditional gender binaries. As Samuels argues, the “near invisibility [of African 
American women] in the published accounts of the heroism of cross-dressing soldiers and the 
long-suffering patience of Civil War nurses found partial compensation in the narratives 
published later” by authors like Hopkins and Frances Harper, who “retell the story of the war in 
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neogothic narratives anticipating those produced later in the twentieth century by Toni Morrison 
and Gayl Jones” (94).   
 By rewriting these feminized narrative histories of the Civil War in terms of black female 
subjectivity and the traversal of race and gender boundaries by women of color, Hopkins 
reclaims for her mulatta character and for post-Reconstruction women of color a cross-racial 
history of gender subversion and active resistance in defiance of overtly sexualized historical 
stereotypes. The mulatta, in particular, was absent in Confederate literature which “worked to 
mystify the power relations of slavery by maintaining the fiction that no such sexual or social 
relations existed” between men and women of different races (Fahs 190). Conversely, in 
Northern Civil War literature mulatta women served as “sexualized boundary markers” (Fahs 
190). These narratives contributed to the evolution of later post-Reconstruction ideas about “true 
womanhood” as defined “by qualities that were increasingly raced white,” according to Teresa 
C. Zackodnik, and dependent on images of “black fallen womanhood” (78-80). Standard white 
supremacist narratives constructed race in terms of gender and gender in terms of race, leaving 
women of color doubly constrained by racialized and sexualized stereotypes depicting black 
women as licentious, promiscuous, and ultimately responsible for “the ostensible ‘immorality of 
the black race’” (Paula Giddings, qtd. in Zackodnik 80). 
 In Winona, the lawlessness of prewar frontier Kansas and Missouri stands in for the 
chaos of the post-Reconstruction nation, wherein Pauline Hopkins reenvisions ostensibly fixed 
race and gender binaries by inserting Winona into this specific historical moment and 
constructing her as a veritable savior of the races by virtue of her ability to transgress race and 
gender boundaries. Winona, therefore, is not expectedly tragic but representative of the 
collective inability of Hopkins’s postbellum audiences, and of her white female contemporaries 
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like Bouvé and Johnston, to reconcile the nation’s racially and politically fractured past with the 
equalizing promises of Reconstruction. Winona’s active support of organized anti-slavery 
resistance and her direct involvement in the violent conflict spearheaded by white revolutionary 
John Brown reposition women, especially women of color, explicitly as victims of white 
supremacist violence and simultaneously as agents of concentrated struggle against white 
supremacy and the disorder it maintains. 
 Hopkins’s creation of a mulatta character who does not conform to type effects a 
decentering of the tragic mulatta tradition, because Winona is rendered a political agent, an 
active participant in the anti-slavery agitation of her novel and therefore an active participant in 
history itself. Hanna Wallinger has argued that Winona enacts “a decentering of the plot of the 
tragic mulatta,” achieved through the removal of Winona from the role of protagonist: “Winona 
is not really the main character in the story. She does not have to die, and her tragedy is avoided; 
the political action of antislavery agitation is seen to be more important” (192). In Wallinger’s 
formulation, Winona’s very survival and refusal to succumb to tragedy causes her to be eclipsed 
by the historical memory of white masculine violence, suggesting that the mulatta character is 
most culturally valuable when she is trapped between multiple and fundamentally irreconcilable 
racial identities. This conclusion misses the fact that Winona, doubly constrained by a masculine 
white supremacist culture of oppression, is an even more transcendent figure as a woman of 
color with a reasonable measure of control over her own destiny.   
 Combining elements of what Susan Gillman has termed the “two basic, relational plots” 
of the post-Emancipation maternal melodrama: “the maternal-familial plot of reuniting the 
dispersed family and, alternately, the maternal-passing plot of the invisible dispersal of ‘black 
blood’ into the national mainstream,” Winona places the family, and thus the feminine, at the 
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center of masculine confrontations over race and power (36). In the novel’s opening scenes, 
Winona and Judah are children yet, living a peaceful, almost utopian, life as brother and sister on 
a small island near Lake Erie until the murder of their father, White Eagle, by Colonel Titus and 
overseer Bill Thomson. Winona is the biological child of White Eagle, a white man living as a 
Senaca [sic], and an escaped slave woman who adopted Judah as her own after his mother died 
during their flight north. Kidnapped and remanded into slavery by Titus and Thomson, Judah and 
Winona are removed to Titus’s Kansas City plantation. Here Winona finds herself thrust into a 
world of masculine violence by border ruffians who represent the spread of slavery and the 
destruction of families, including their own. Subsequently, as members of Brown’s camp, 
Winona, Judah, and Warren literally engage in battle against the proslavery forces represented by 
Titus and Thomson. The laws of the land turn family upon family in mortal violence. Hopkins 
demonstrates, through the complex genealogical mystery of Winona and Winona’s central 
relationship to the dominant conflict both of nation and of family, that the national conflict is 
also explicitly divisive on fundamental personal levels. Winona is Hopkins’s novelistic protest 
against dominant postbellum white supremacist narratives that situate slavery securely in the 
nation’s public-political past, denying the genealogical legacy of institutionalized white 
supremacy and its consequences for future generations and for women of color in particular.   
 Hopkins connects this public, masculine violence with the more private violence women 
and children endured. While Hopkins does not specifically dramatize in Winona the Margaret 
Garner case which was contemporary to the action of her novel, Hopkins’s emphasis on the 
destruction of families, black and white, through legal practices like the Fugitive Slave Law 
which explicitly enables Titus’s capture of Judah and Winona, evokes the memory of one 
family’s unforgettable plight. One of the most dramatic instances of black resistance to slavery 
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and of the national conflict over the Fugitive Slave Law began in January 1856 with the flight of 
the Garner family from their captivity on a northern Kentucky plantation, a mere five months 
before Brown’s men would execute proslavery rivals at Pottawatomie. On the morning of 28 
January 1856, Margaret Garner, a pregnant twenty-two year old mother of four, facing capture 
and reenslavement, “nearly decapitated” her two-year-old daughter Mary with a butcher knife 
inside a surrounded Cincinnati home (Weisenburger 72-75). Garner’s desperate attempt to 
prevent her other young children from being returned to slavery was interrupted by slave 
catchers who “burst in and subdued her” (5). As Steven Weisenburger documents in Modern 
Medea: A Family Story of Slavery and Child-Murder from the Old South, Margaret Garner’s trial 
raised key questions concerning the constitutionality of the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act and integral 
issues of states’ rights.   
 Indictable under Ohio statutes for the murder of her daughter, Margaret Garner’s 
conflicting legal identities as property to be returned to her owner and as culpable actor ordered 
to stand trial for her child-murder epitomized the legal contradictions inherent in both the 
Fugitive Slave Law and the dehumanizing institution of slavery itself. Weisenburger locates in 
the rhetoric “of fraternal strife” and the sectional “differences over Margaret Garner’s case the 
roots of civil war” (6). For Garner, who was returned to slavery after much legal wrangling, the 
issue was clearly less national than experiential, even as it was symbolic for many. Sometime 
during the night of Friday, 7 March 1856, a steamboat bound for New Orleans, on which Garner 
was a captive passenger, collided with another boat. In the melee that followed, Garner was 
either thrown or jumped into the icy Ohio River with her ten-month-old daughter Cilla in her 
arms. While Garner was rescued, Cilla drowned, prompting speculation that Garner had tried to 
drown them both, again preferring her own death and the death of her child to a life of bondage 
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(221-225). As Weisenburger rightly concludes, “Margaret Garner’s infanticide spotlighted the 
plight of women slaves and symbolized slavery’s awful, violent power over and within slave 
families—issues once at the very heart of anti- and proslavery arguments but waylaid for 
generations in the grand narratives about slavery’s constitutional challenges leading to disunion” 
(8). 
Garner’s story is significant, because it places Winona in dialogue not only with 
antebellum narratives of spectacular fugitive slave rescues but also with earlier “pre-
Emancipation race melodramas (by, e.g. Harriet Beecher Stowe and William Wells Brown), 
which are driven by the urgency of the issue of abolition” (Gillman 36). Stowe dramatizes 
Garner’s case in Dred: A Tale of the Great Dismal Swamp (1856), published later the same year, 
through the character of Cora Gordon, Tom and Nina Gordon’s half sister. Like Winona, Cora 
Gordon is legally free, having been taken to Ohio, specifically Cincinnati, and emancipated by 
her former owner, who then married her. After her husband’s death, Tom contrives to defraud 
Cora and her two legally free children of the estate left them by her husband and to that end has 
Cora and her children remanded into slavery (Stowe 437). With a nod to Margaret Garner, Stowe 
has Cora Gordon murder her two children the day before she is to be “sent off in a coffle” (438). 
Unlike the Garners, whose silence reflected the declination of insurrectionist slave rebels Nat 
Turner and Gabriel Prosser “to acknowledge their revolutionary deeds as actionable ‘crimes’ 
because they had already rejected as tyrannical the entire legal machinery that whites had used 
first to oppress and then to indict them” (Weisenburger 77), Cora Gordon stands up in court and 
declares loudly that she was “not excited” and “not in a frenzy” but that she killed her children 
because she “loved them so well that I was willing to give up my soul to save theirs!” (Stowe 
439).   
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 Winona’s complex genealogical mystery, wherein Winona is finally revealed to be the 
daughter of White Eagle and legitimate heir to the Carlingford estate, points to the intimate 
family politics of enslaved women of color and their white masters. Garner’s sensational child-
murder, for example, provoked speculation that little Mary’s father was actually Margaret’s 
owner, John Gaines, a conclusion which, as Weisenburger suggests, would mean that Garner 
“destroyed her master’s property with the same knife stroke that destroyed his progeny” (77-78). 
Viewed in this way, Weisenburger notes, “Margaret’s child-murder was a masterstroke of 
rebellion against the whole patriarchal system of American slavery,” an observation which was 
certainly not lost on Hopkins or on Stowe (78). As a crucial event in a then-undeclared war for 
abolition and against the spread of slavery virtually mandated by the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act, 
Margaret Garner’s infanticide literally connected intimate family affairs and blood ties with the 
inconsistencies of fraught national politics.   
 In Winona, women are victims of white supremacist violence and are, therefore, just as 
likely to be involved (and justified) in the perpetuation of violent resistance, and families are 
positioned as at the center of public cultures of resistance. Winona’s multiple instances of 
passing in the novel, both conscious and unconscious, effect a rhetoric of reconciliation, not 
necessarily in terms of nation but in terms of family and personal relationships across 
transmutable racial lines. Significantly, Winona’s most dramatic act of passing is one in which 
she crosses the gender divide as Allen Pinks, a mulatto youth who nurses Maxwell through his 
illness, the result of his attempted lynching by Thomson and a white mob (383-386). Passing as a 
boy allows Winona to insert herself into the intertwined masculine narratives of legal and 
extralegal violence, yet even in disguise Winona/Allen retains inherently feminine 
characteristics. Maxwell’s description of Winona/Allen as “the prettiest specimen of boyhood he 
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had ever met” with “delicate brown features” and hair “like velvet” allows Winona to retain her 
identity even while passing and reveals the complementary race and gender barriers which 
necessitate her act of passing as both contrived and absurd (388). Interestingly, Winona darkens 
her skin to pass as Allen, an act designed both to conceal her feminine beauty, which is 
consequently defined in terms of her light skin, and to render her features more masculine by 
making them darker.   
 Winona’s dual reversal of passing traditions undercuts white supremacist constructions of 
racialized masculinity and femininity at the same time as it plays into predominant conceptions 
of idealized womanhood. As Zackodnik has argued of Hopkins’s novels, “the mulatta, far from 
being tragic, becomes a subversive character who signifies on the color line by effectively 
passing for a ‘true woman’” in terms of nineteenth century discourses of pious, pure, domestic 
white womanhood (76-78). This is not to say that Winona ever passes as white; she does not. 
Instead, Winona, maintains the desirable raced-white feminine characteristics of “true 
womanhood” even while she darkens her skin and engages in decidedly masculine behavior.  
Winona, who commands the “homeguard” made up of the women of John Brown’s camp, every 
one of whom “carried a rifle in her hand and was prepared to use it,” effectively represents the 
marriage of feminine restraint and masculine power in a positive and decidedly fluid 
reinterpretation of masculinized black women and accordingly feminized black men (409).   
 As the multiple instances of passing in the novel illustrate, the policing of the color line 
“takes place on both sides of the color line, underscoring that the mulatta and passing challenge 
both ‘blackness’ and ‘whiteness’” and implicitly raced constructions of gender binaries 
(Zackodnik xiv). Maxwell also symbolically crosses the color line, if inadvertently, when he is 
nearly lynched by Thomson and the white mob (Hopkins 367). Bound to a stake with a fire 
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blazing at his feet, Maxwell is described in the hyper-masculinized terms applied to black men 
accused of raping white women in the late nineteenth century, yet his whiteness is also 
exaggerated: “His shirt was open at the throat, showing the ivory firmness of his chest and the 
beating pulse in the white brawn” (370). As Martha H. Patterson has argued, Maxwell “is made 
here a physically disempowered Christ. Judah now takes on the paternal role” (450) when he and 
John Brown, with Winona’s help, rescue Maxwell from his prison and Judah must carry 
Maxwell “in his strong arms . . . out to the waiting vehicle” (Hopkins 396). These instances of 
traditional role reversal across race and gender lines are consistent throughout the novel and 
support Hazel V. Carby’s assertion that “the tale concentrated on organized and individual acts 
of resistance and self-defense against oppression” (155).   
 Hopkins’s act of swapping Maxwell’s expected role as rescuer for Judah’s role as lynch 
victim emphasizes individual behavior as situational and dependent on culture and context, a 
strategic move which heightens expectations for both in the war against structural and ingrained 
practices of white supremacy. When Wallinger writes that “apart from Judah, the followers of 
John Brown and the fighters in his camp are white, and thus the agency and responsibility for 
what happens is placed on them,” she suggests that Judah “is denied access to power because of 
his race” (191). This is an assumption and a problematic one at that, not least of all because it 
overlooks the vital role women play within the camp as combat support. It also assumes that 
whites like Brown have an innate ability to usurp power from black men, not just on a cultural 
level but on a spiritual and emotional level as well. Judah is powerful; so powerful, in fact, that 
he must be restrained by Winona and Maxwell, as Patterson notes, to keep him from firing the 
fatal shot into Thomson. That “he needs such restraint . . . invokes the very racist rationale for 
Jim Crow culture [Hopkins] seeks to refute,” Patterson argues (451). Yet the fact that Judah 
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ultimately proves himself capable of the requisite self-possession again reverses the stereotype. 
The agency assigned to whites in Winona is not necessarily a gift, as Brown’s inevitable death 
portends, and it does not necessarily imply a corresponding lack of agency for blacks or for black 
men in particular.   
  Accordingly, Hopkins gives credence to arguments for a more pacifistic and faith-based 
resistance at the same time as she advocates for violence and action when necessary. Winona 
combines faith and violence in the tradition of David Walker’s Appeal (1829) or Martin Delany’s 
Blake: Or, The Huts of America (1859-1862), asserting that slavery and oppression are the true 
affronts to God rather than violence in defense of one’s soul (or the souls of one’s children). The 
real ethical code, as combatant Ebeneezer Maybee explains, is to “trust in the Lord and keep yer 
powder dry, as our friend Brown’d say,” or, in other words, to work toward a peaceful resolution 
but to always be prepared for a fight (401). As Patterson notes, Hopkins carefully differentiates 
between personal vengeance of the kind Judah would enact in killing Thomson and the 
disinterested “altruistic wrath” of Brown’s murder of the five proslavery Rangers (451). 
Although she refuses to consider Brown a fanatic, presenting his violence as sanctioned by God, 
Hopkins’s presentation of violent resistance remains problematic. Winona, Judah, Maxwell, 
Maybee and the novel’s other antislavery protagonists are presented as combatants in an 
undeclared war, and therefore justified in their actions; however, war in itself is not an ideal or 
even desirable state of affairs. Rather, any violence or need for violence is a lamentable evil, and 
only those who would use it minimally and most effectively toward an end to the conflict 
approach righteousness. 
 If the shedding of fraternal blood is the necessary result of arbitrary social systems that 
would insist upon separating families along capricious racial lines, as Hopkins suggests, then 
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blood is also the key to national and familial reunification. John Brown’s ultimate sacrifice at 
Harpers Ferry and his gallows declaration that “the crimes of this guilty land: will never be 
purged away; but with blood” (qtd. in Quarles 124) constitute a call not only for the shedding of 
blood but specifically for the blood of those who could or would claim white privilege at the 
expense of others. Nudelman describes Brown’s gallows declaration as “one of the most 
powerful, and incendiary, arguments made by antislavery radicals in the prewar years: if white 
Americans did not repent, and reform, they would suffer retributive violence at the hands of 
black insurgents, or of an angry God acting on behalf of the enslaved” (9). As Hopkins’s post-
Reconstruction recreation of Brown’s martyrdom indicates, the tremendous loss of life and 
terrible bloodshed of the Civil War is in vain if racial discord continues to tear apart families and 
to demand retribution by and on behalf of the oppressed. Blood, as Hopkins insists, can be both 
divisive and healing, and it is when blood ties ultimately bring together combatants on either side 
of the racial divide that it has the potential not only to expose the artificiality and incongruence 
of such cultural rifts but, as in the maternal melodrama, to begin the process of healing deep 
wounds. 
 Hopkins renders Brown representative of his environment, particularly of the national 
struggle against slavery and of the underlying and incongruent principles on which it thrived. In 
Winona, as in the other two novels of this chapter, it takes an outsider (either an Englishman, a 
“savage,” or a pre-cultural child) to recognize the outstanding disjunctions between American 
cultural and structural principles and the ideal democracy they purport to proclaim. Warren 
Maxwell, the English protagonist, comes to the conclusion that he is “in the heart of a hostile 
country although supposed to advocate and champion the most advanced ideas of liberty and 
human rights. What a travesty the American government was on the noblest principles!  Bah!” 
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(381). Maxwell is just discovering what African Americans have long-since recognized, 
according to Quarles: “The whole pattern of black-white relations in antebellum America was to 
blacks a form of violence, often concealed under familiar, institutional forms, but pervasive and 
ever on the march” (35). Like Hopkins, Scott John Hammond connects John Brown’s 
characteristic personal idiosyncrasies and seeming inconsistencies, particularly his controversial 
actions at Pottawatomie Creek, with his cultural and sociopolitical environment. According to 
Hammond, “Brown’s fractured self is an embodiment of the tangled forces of light and darkness 
that grappled for the republic’s soul; his character and actions demonstrate this, and in doing so, 
make him no different from the ruptured essence of our collective political self-consciousness. 
The Pottawatomie slaughter represents a symptom of the deeper malady, just as the abuse of any 
slave by an overseer represents the same type of symptomatic manifestation” (63).   
 Hopkins’s choice of Pottawatomie over Harpers Ferry is indicative of her assessment of 
post-Reconstruction America as in the throes of an undeclared race war, a story, unlike Harpers 
Ferry, which everyone does not already know. John Brown’s martyrdom at Harpers Ferry has 
come to be linked to the Civil War, significantly a declared war with identifiable battles, wins, 
and losses and fought over a definitive period of time, and, just as significantly, is apparently 
representative of the Union’s unequivocally righteous victory. His actions at Pottawatomie are 
more comparable to the undeclared war being fought during the post-Reconstruction period. 
Lynching, disfranchisement, segregation, wage slavery, and convict leasing, to name only a few, 
were, like the attempted capture of escaped slaves on free soil or warrants sworn out against 
Brown and his men by the proslavery contingency in Kansas, ostensibly legal practices 
functioning within the bounds of peacetime laws and codes of behavior. The righteousness of 
resistance in post-Reconstruction America, after the Civil War has been fought and ended and 
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slavery has been abolished, after African Americans and former slaves have been formally 
granted by constitutional amendments citizenship, due process, and, for black men at least, 
access to the franchise, is rendered questionable, ambiguous, uncertain, by the dominant 
masculine culture, which chooses to insist upon images of order where chaos actually reigns. An 
antislavery martyr like Brown is ostensibly no longer needed, and those who would continue his 
work after emancipation are not celebrated but relegated to insurgent status, as were Turner, 
Prosser, Vesey, and other slave rebels before history vindicated their sacrifices.   
 Winona bridges the historical space between the prewar frontier, where her character is 
literally situated, and the more conceptual than geographical postwar frontier of Hopkins’s post-
Reconstruction present. Carby’s observation of Hopkins’s first novel, Contending Forces, that 
the “actions and destinies of Hopkins’s characters were carefully related to the condition and 
actions of their ancestors” and that “the consequences of events initiated at some specific 
moment in history constituted a significant aspect of Hopkins’s fictional strategy” is equally 
applicable to Winona (128). Presenting a more subversive view of the Pottawatomie shootings as 
one incident within the indeterminate span of a “holy war,” Hopkins more directly links the 
chaotic violence of postbellum America to early manifestations of the then-undeclared Civil War 
in frontier Kansas (419). Quarles observes of Brown’s role in the Pottawatomie killings that the 
“murders would constitute a stain on Brown’s career, particularly when his own grim role in the 
incident became fully substantiated some years afterward,” yet Quarles goes on to emphasize 
that Brown’s black supporters “viewed the incident from a wider perspective of aberrant 
behavior in their country, from a greater familiarity with the climate of violence, both legitimate 
and extra-legal, in the land of their birth” (35). The Fugitive Slave Law, passed in 1850, had 
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indeed sparked an undeclared war of sorts to be fought out on a national scale in the years 
leading up to Brown’s foray into Kansas. 
 Hopkins’s contemporary Du Bois also places Brown’s actions at Pottawatomie in the 
context of an ongoing struggle, noting that the murders of five proslavery “Rangers” were a 
direct response to the sacking of Lawrence and to the obvious failure of more passive forms of 
resistance. “Two thousand Missourians,” Du Bois writes in his biography of Brown, “surrounded 
Lawrence and while the hesitating free state men were striving to keep the peace, sacked and half 
burned the town on the day before Brooks broke Sumner’s head in the Senate chamber, for 
telling the truth about Kansas” (66). Du Bois’s description of Brown’s reaction is worth quoting 
at length: 
  The deed was done. Kansas was a slave territory. The free state program had  
  been repudiated by the United States government and had broken like a reed  
  before the assaults of the pro-slavery party. . . . Then suddenly there came the  
  flash of an awful stroke—a deed of retaliation from the free state side so bloody,  
  relentless and cruel that it sent a shudder through all Kansas and Missouri, and  
  aroused the nation. In one black night, John Brown, four of his sons, a son-in- 
  law, and two others, the chosen executors of the boldest free state leaders, seized  
  and killed five of the worst border ruffians who were harrying the free state  
  settlers. . . . The rank and file of the free state men themselves recoiled at first in  
  consternation and loudly, then faintly, disclaimed the deed. Suddenly, they saw  
  and laid the lie aside, and seized their Sharps rifles. (66) 
Rather than a merciless criminal act, Du Bois sees the Pottawatomie killings as a much-needed 
and ultimately inspirational show of violence in response to violence. Paul Finkelman also 
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evokes the chaos and lawlessness of a territory up for grabs when he notes that in “Kansas the 
sword and the gun, not the ballot and the printing press, had become the method of determining 
what kind of government the territory and future state would have” (xxv). Du Bois, however, 
connects the disorder in Kansas to contemporary goings-on at Washington, rendering the nation 
rather than just the territory the location of an ongoing and undeclared war. 
 Hopkins does with her fictional recreation in Winona what Du Bois does more directly 
and with a more aggressive political agenda. That is, she equates the lawlessness and chaos of 
the American frontier with the lawlessness and chaos at the root of American politics and 
culture. Slavery, Jim Crow, lynching, fratricide, family, race, gender—all of these things meet on 
the frontier where they are, as in the colonial period of which Johnston writes, still undeclared 
elements in an ongoing battle. Ammons convincingly argues that Winona’s “efforts to recuperate 
right-minded white men, including the abolitionist John Brown, and thus write into its own 
revolutionary plot representatives of the power structure who have denounced that structure 
radically conflicts with its reliance on the western, by definition an imperialist form” (216). 
Ammons further suggests that the western form of Winona “cannot be reconciled with the slave 
narrative or to the racialized protest novel, the other two genres most important to Hopkins in 
Winona” and that this situates Winona as “trapped into profound contradiction by its generic 
participation in the western” (215-216). However, this “profound contradiction,” the 
incongruence of novelistic forms and of the roles and characters necessary to complete their 
stories, seems to be, rather than an indication of Hopkins’s limitations, precisely her point. Or, in 
other words, Hopkins’s reconfiguration of these generic limitations situate Winona both as 
accurate representation of a chaotic culture and as transformative force, protesting that culture by 
manipulating the forms by which it purports to bind Hopkins and her history. 
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 Winona is a transformative force, as she represents a multiracial community that emerges 
from within the chaos of white supremacy, from within the frontier of American culture. Her 
character suggests that race is more than black and white, and that the politics of resistance 
involve more than debates for or against violence. On the frontier, aligned with John Brown, 
representative of both the white power structure itself and of internal resistance to the white 
power structure, Winona inserts herself into the white masculine rhetoric of revolution. It is here, 
on the frontier—or in a colonial wilderness, or in the fields of Southampton County—that 
revolution remains possible, that reconfigurations of race and class and gender are possible, that 
a renegotiation of the structures that necessitate the violence of control and the complementary 
violence of resistance is possible. In Prisoners of Hope, Johnston suggests that revolution is 
really just white men fighting with other white men for political control. In Their Shadows 
Before, Bouvé posits revolution as a battle between the races, although she is unable to imagine 
what it might look like if black insurrection succeeds. Hopkins, then, avoids these binary 
definitions and embraces the chaos of the frontier, because the frontier is everywhere and 
everywhere is the frontier.   
 
A Violent Past in the Present 
 The ease with which these authors translate the cultural politics of the present into events 
of the past reveals an overarching continuity among seemingly distinct historical periods and 
corresponding systems of oppression. Bouvé, Johnston, and Hopkins blur the supposedly fixed 
temporal boundaries so painstakingly established by white male authors like Tourgée and Dixon 
by exploring the peripheral causes and effects of the historical events. These novels consider the 
roles of historically non-central actors, specifically white women, women and men of color, and 
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children, fundamental to the historical experience and memory of these particular events and 
their contexts. They also consider the roles of historically central white men from different 
angles, therein revealing the historical privileges essential to the maintenance of collective 
cultural memories. In so doing, Bouvé, Johnston, and Hopkins explore continuities of experience 
across ostensible temporal and legal divides and between and among members of apparently 
fixed identity groups. While all three authors represent specific instances of violent resistance 
within the historical context of their novels, they also represent less pronounced and less obvious 
forms of cultural noncompliance within the everyday social and personal lives of their 
characters. The specific historical contexts change over time, but the moments of personal 
triumph and despair, as well as the need for individual struggle against incongruent social 
systems, remain consistent and consistently relevant to post-Reconstruction era audiences. This 
is not to say that human experience is ahistorical but to illuminate, as these writers do in blurring 
the politics of slavery and emancipation, the artificial and deceptive boundaries between defined 
historical periods and the corresponding claims to actual political and social change.   
 Together, these authors significantly illuminate the accumulative effect of resistant acts, 
whether that effect is to reinforce the white power structure through the consolidation of class 
over race, to link the struggle for freedom during slavery with the struggle for citizenship amid 
the violence of Jim Crow, or to suggest that chaos and war are the natural state of affairs in a 
white supremacist culture, even when the war is undeclared. Hopkins also warns us not to be 
fooled by the rhetoric of “noble” sacrifice, especially when that sacrifice is in service of one’s 
race, as is Landless’s in Prisoners of Hope or Nathaniel’s in Their Shadows Before, because 
nobility suggests a clear division between right and wrong. In her discussion of Contending 
Forces, Laura Doyle emphasizes Hopkins’s complication of the term noble, “which exposes a 
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universalist nativism’s fundamental incoherence within an Atlantic history of rape and diaspora” 
(380). It is useful to think of Doyle’s commentary in terms of Bouvé’s and Johnston’s 
universalist appeals to “noble” revolutionary violence and in terms of Hopkins’s resistance to 
such appeals in Winona. Bouvé’s novel reveals its own naiveté in its suggestion that violent 
revolution can, eventually, lead to lasting peace, while Johnston’s novel highlights the futility of 
violence or resistance of any kind, wherein she overlooks the plight of the truly oppressed, like 
Bouvé’s Nathaniel. Hopkins, however, establishes that violence is more than a potentially 
necessary form of resistance, that it is the norm within a social system of culturally created and 
inherently unstable racial hierarchies. For her protagonists, who are victims of culturally 
sanctioned violence on a daily basis, it is the more pacifistic and faith-based means of resistance 
that are essentially futile and, moreover, linked to the tainted teachings of the white slaveholding 
elite. 
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of his anti-slavery paper The Liberator (1831-1866), denied charges of inciting the rebellion, claiming Christian 
pacifism, according to historian Louis P. Masur (152). According to Masur, the “work of liberation and retribution 
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Chapter 4. “A Riot is At Bottom the Language of the Unheard”30: Riot and Rumor in the 
Works of Sutton Griggs and Mark Twain 
 
The colored race has historians, lecturers, ministers, poets, judges, and lawyers,—men of 
brilliant intellects who have arrested the favorable attention of this busy, energetic nation. But, 
after all, it is the simple, homely tale, unassumingly told, which cements the bond of brotherhood 
among all classes and all complexions. 
—Pauline Elizabeth Hopkins, Preface to Contending Forces: A Romance Illustrative of Negro 
Life North and South (13) 
 
 In her biographies written for the readers of The Colored American Magazine, Pauline 
Hopkins appropriates an Emersonian discourse of “history [as] firmly embedded in individual 
narratives” (Doreski 5). Working in “the shadow of compromised citizenship cast by Plessy v. 
Ferguson,” as C. K. Doreski observes, Hopkins adapts “the New England regional tradition of 
biography as the spiritually or ideologically informed presentation of exemplary lives” for the 
explicit purpose of challenging the collective historical narrative by which Anglo-American 
subjectivity has been both created and nurtured over the course of more than three centuries (4-
5). However, as Hopkins herself makes clear, her fictional counternarratives of American history 
generally and of African American slavery more particularly serve similar purposes of 
retrospectively recording an alternative historical narrative that both privileges black experience 
and exposes the dependency of traditional Anglo-American success stories on the proceeds of 
African American labor. With her biographies, as with her fiction, Hopkins stakes a vital claim 
to the string of stories—biographies of individual lives, public records of climactic events, 
cultural anecdotes, oral histories, and, not least of all, rumors—which combine to define a 
collective narrative of what it means to be an “American” socially, culturally, legally, and 
politically.   
 175 
 Like Hopkins, the other writers I have treated in this study employ retrospective 
rewritings of the racial past as a means of intercepting and potentially shifting the course of 
history, or of our understanding of history. I have argued that Chesnutt focuses on racial tensions 
in the present in order to engender a reconsideration of the past and therefore alter the trajectory 
of the future by expanding the scope of history and its narrative. Chesnutt elevates the dynamics 
of day to day relationships to the same level of relevance as catastrophic events and thereby 
forces a more complex discussion of history as multi-layered and multi-leveled. Similarly, 
Tourgée and Dixon are interpreting the past so as to influence our understanding of events in the 
present. Dixon outlines a distinctly white supremacist history in order to encourage the 
proliferation of that history through a defensive sense of pride and entitlement, stirring up 
emotions directly linked to historical inheritance myths. Tourgée also looks to white supremacist 
inheritance myths, but he does so in order to provoke a sense of social responsibility and to 
promote his activist agenda among the nation’s most privileged citizens. Johnston and Bouvé 
apply contemporary political concerns and racial configurations to specific historical moments 
wherein racial authority is openly challenged, reinforced, and changed in order to mobilize their 
own marginal authority to reinterpret the past. Hopkins, too, in her fiction, approaches an 
arguably static narrative of history with the goal of revising our understanding of the past so that 
we can move forward, toward a different future.   
 The authors I’ve considered in previous chapters have all interpreted the racial tensions 
of the day and the pursuant violence retrospectively, examining the development of the riotous 
presence in American history and culture. Alternately, in A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur’s 
Court (1879) and in Imperium in Imperio (1899), Mark Twain and Sutton Elbert Griggs 
approach these tensions prospectively, imagining a world that extends from the riotous presence. 
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Looking back so as to look forward, both of these writers explore in fictional terms the greater 
processes by which these stories of “exemplary lives” and social progress come to represent the 
paradigm of American citizenship by looking instead to the underside of the standard narrative—
to rumor and to riot. Rather than simply commenting on the riotous presence, Twain represents it 
in action when he has his protagonist Hank Morgan confuse standard narratives of progress and 
technological advancement with real republican process. Connecticut Yankee is therefore a novel 
in which the structural principles of the American social order, along with its enabling ideology, 
are put into place only to lead to mass destruction. Griggs deals with the same parasitical 
relationship between structure and ideology in the form of the co-dependence of black resistance 
and the false consciousness of white freedom. White freedom has, Griggs suggests, become our 
only understanding of freedom, which virtually eliminates the possibility of true revolution. In 
depicting the political divisions created by the pressures of developing a black collective within a 
white supremacist culture, Griggs does indeed offer a vision of imperium in imperio, a nation 
within a nation, a riotous presence within a riotous presence. 
 Most of the writers I have examined so far are certainly aware of racial tensions and of 
sharp discrepancies between the ideal and actual nation or between official and unofficial 
histories, yet they are relatively unaware of the more insidious relationships between the political 
order and its maintenance via terror that I have termed the “riotous presence.” Indeed, the other 
authors included in this study have tried to frame those discrepancies, Dixon included, in specific 
ways—which has led them to portray different manifestations of the riotous presence in their 
fiction. Where these authors focus on specific contemporary and historical eruptions of violence 
and then work their way outward, in order to contextualize and situate these moments, and 
therefore consciously or subconsciously reveal the existence and the rhythms of the riotous 
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presence, Twain and Griggs approach their critiques from a somewhat different angle and 
suggest a more complicated sense of the problems they address. Twain and Griggs are writers 
who explore the discrepancies (ideal and actual) not as the falling away or corruption of 
republican ideals of equality and popular representation but as two opposite poles of the US 
cultural order. As Andy Doolen argues, “these racial fictions—taking the form of the official 
discourse of law, policy, proclamation, and public ritual—constitute the logic of U.S. 
imperialism in the late colonial and early national periods, transforming the terror of white 
supremacy into a rational and permanent presence” (xxi). The logic of Jim Crow in the post-
Reconstruction period depends upon a continuation of these racial fictions, and the terror of 
white supremacy, both at home and abroad, remains the predominant method of cultural control. 
Both Twain and Griggs are writers who are influenced significantly by this presence, which has 
now become more explicit than in the time Doolen studies, and by the kinds of cultural processes 
and forces I have explored in previous chapters. If their understanding of the riotous presence is 
incomplete, Twain and Griggs significantly investigate riot and the attendant cultural 
discrepancies not as rupture but as the very terms of the culture. 
 
 
Two Americas 
The Person Sitting in Darkness is almost sure to say: “There is something curious about this—
curious and unaccountable. There must be two Americas: one that sets the captive free, and one 
that takes a once-captive’s new freedom away from him, and picks a quarrel with him with 
nothing to found it on; then kills him to get his land.” 
--Mark Twain, “To the Person Sitting in Darkness” (1901) 
 
In order to understand how Twain and Griggs are looking to the underside of the standard 
national narrative and grappling with the complex tensions they find there, it is necessary to 
understand the interconnected elements of standard public narratives of providential progress and 
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American exceptionalism at this particular racial moment. The terror of white supremacy is not 
only embedded in the official language of laws and public policies; it is threaded throughout the 
fabric of our national literature, present in the texture of daily life and personal interactions, 
carried through into the unspoken and the unheard. Officially sanctioned racial fictions, at odds 
with the idealized narratives of white freedom and universal equality whose structure they 
uphold, are flawed, divisive, and unstable, requiring constant reaffirmation and reorganization 
effected via the terror of white supremacy. As Twain and Griggs suggest, this terror is less 
autonomous than reciprocal, shaping and shaped by the onward march of American history.  
Twain and Griggs are writing in an era in which highly-visible white supremacists, like 
Dixon, Benjamin R. Tillman of South Carolina, and James K. Vardaman of Mississippi, for 
example, are working to gather the racial past into nationalist fear so as to justify an imperialistic 
agenda. Although their names have become virtually synonymous with white supremacy and 
racial terrorism, these men did not independently conjure their rhetoric from thin air, nor were 
these Southerners alone in their efforts. As Edward J. Blum argues, the post-Civil War “decline 
in race relations, and the rise of a militarized, imperialistic nation were permitted, and even 
encouraged, by northern whites, who abandoned the hopes for equality and brotherhood” that 
many had championed briefly in the immediate postwar period (3). Dixon’s popular fiction and 
the political strategies of Tillman and Vardaman also build on and complement contemporary 
racist and anti-immigration agendas advanced by prominent political leaders like Benjamin 
Harrison and William McKinley, labor leaders like Terence V. Powderley and Samuel Gompers, 
sociologists like E. A. Ross, and novelists like Jack London and Harold Frederic, among 
others.31 “It was McKinley,” Frederickson observes, “who made the most direct connection 
between the deportation of the blacks and the erection of the barriers to immigration. Noting that 
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President Harrison had said in his speech accepting the Republican nomination that the nation 
had a duty to exclude alien races that could not be assimilated, McKinley concluded that ‘our 
duty to expel alien races is as clear as the duty to exclude them’” (Black Image 265). As Thomas 
F. Gossett points out, “we find the racist argument in anti-immigration agitation not merely 
among the defenders of the status quo, but also among men who were to become famous for their 
concern for the welfare of the masses,” like Woodrow Wilson and Frederick Jackson Turner 
(292-293).  
These sorts of appeals to the language of race, white anxiety, and the suggested violence 
of expulsion points to white America’s ongoing obsession with securing its simultaneously 
permeable and impenetrable geographical, national, and racial borders. Race histories based on 
popular knowledge and discussing the purported inferiority of non-whites in scientific terms 
were popular during the 1880s and 1890s, and these texts anticipate later alarmist anti-
miscegenation and anti-immigration works like Madison Grant’s The Passing of the Great Race 
(1916) and T. Lothrop Stoddard’s The Rising Tide of Color Against White World-Supremacy 
(1920). These race histories, like Frederick L. Hoffman’s Race Traits and Tendencies of the 
American Negro (1896), which argues “that the high incidence of tuberculosis, syphilis, 
gonorrhea, scrofula, and other diseases would lead to their extinction as a race,” were “widely 
read and quoted in the South” (Gossett 281). Arguments like Hoffman’s helped to substantiate 
later assertions, like those made by historian James Ford Rhodes in History of the United States 
from the Compromise of 1850 to the Final Restoration of Home Rule at the South in 1877 
(1906), “that the Negroes were innately inferior and incapable of citizenship” (Gossett 284). 
Thus, these same “scientific” rationales translated into racial appeals for the exclusion and 
expulsion of non-white immigrants like the Chinese from California and the Irish and Italians 
 180 
from New York in the 1870s and beyond on the grounds that they were unfit for the duties of 
republican citizenship. In the same vein, anti-imperialist arguments citing contamination and 
declining “stock” emerged from the same racist foundations as arguments advocating the forcible 
deportation of African Americans from the nation. As Frederickson argues, “an understanding of 
the turn-of-the-century debates on America’s proper relationship with ‘inferior races’ abroad 
requires a recognition of the extent to which racism had been a barrier to imperialism before 
1898” (305).  
The underside of the standard narrative reveals the perceived threat of immigration, the 
desire to control other people, and the racial components of class and economic issues. These 
internal tensions are most evident in the efforts of white supremacists in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries to craft a kind of heroic narrative of bringing order to a world that is 
threatened by the disorder of the non-white presence, while at the same time ensuring the 
maintenance of white racial purity. Increased contact and expansionism in this period served to 
further complicate this already convoluted racist discourse, for those who opposed and who 
supported imperialism alike. “Not only were most of the antiimperialists believers in racial 
inequality,” Frederickson observes, “but the extreme racists in Congress and elsewhere, 
including Senator Benjamin R. Tillman and most of his Southern colleagues, also tended to 
oppose Philippine annexation, because, as Tillman put it, ‘we understand what it is to have two 
races side by side that cannot mix or mingle, without deterioration and injury to both and the 
ultimate destruction of the civilization of the higher” (Black Image 306). Arguments like 
Tillman’s represent divergent interests among the apparently unified white race, particularly in 
terms of class. The economic interests of the white elite, which depend on contact and 
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annexation, threaten the racial security of the white working class, which is no longer predicated 
on overt distinctions between slave and free. 
This internal debate within white supremacy places Twain in necessarily conflicted 
territory. A relative latecomer to anti-imperialism, Twain satirized America’s disingenuous and 
dystopic vision of freedom in the context of the 1898 Cuban War for Independence and the 
subsequent Philippine-American War (1899-1902) in “To the Person Sitting in Darkness” 
(1901).32 Couching America’s self-proclaimed civilizing mission in economic terms, Twain 
lampooned “The brand” as “strictly for Export—apparently,” although such was “merely an 
outside cover, gay and pretty and attractive, displaying the special patterns of our Civilization 
which we reserve for Home Consumption, which inside the bale is the Actual Thing that the 
Customer Sitting in Darkness buys with his blood and tears and land and liberty” (206-207). In 
other words, the sort of civilization American imperialists advertise is only available to a select 
few; all others will receive a cheap and faulty imitation nonetheless clad in the same attractive 
packaging and, significantly, carrying the same hefty price tag. With this juxtaposition of 
ideology and economics, Twain reveals the cultural rhetoric of “the white man’s burden” to be a 
self-serving marketing strategy deployed by the white elites of the “Blessings-of-Civilization 
Trust,” which, as Peter Schmidt has observed, “functions more as a corporation operating for 
profit than government policy created by the consent of the governed” (142). While Twain does 
not advocate racial separatism, his economic ideology suggests that the bulk of the burden falls 
on the white working class, at once similarly outside of the white elite Trust and in a position of 
competition with other non-white “customers.” In this way Twain’s aggressively anti-imperialist 
and potentially anti-racist argument is aligned with the extreme racism of Tillman’s.  
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Twain does not fit neatly within a white political spectrum that includes Dixon and 
Tourgée, but that is precisely the point. There was no linear continuum, no sliding scale, no clear 
means of accounting for internal differences between whites and the roles those differences 
played in the maintenance and proliferation of white supremacy. As Frederickson suggests, “it 
may even strike modern readers as an exercise in hairsplitting to distinguish the moderates from 
the militant racists with whom they professed to disagree” (285). What is most interesting is that 
whites used the same rhetoric to disfranchise and debase African Americans and non-whites as to 
condemn white violence against them. In the wake of the 1906 Atlanta race riot, according to 
Frederickson, white civic leader Charles T. Hopkins deployed the rhetoric of paternalism to 
condemn the white mob: “‘The Negro race,’ Hopkins admonished the purveyors of fear and 
defenders of violence, ‘is a child race. We are a strong race, their guardians. We have boasted of 
our superiority and we have now sunk to this level—we have shed the blood of our helpless 
wards. Christianity and humanity demand that we treat the Negro fairly. He is here, and here to 
stay’” (287).33 Similarly, Twain’s anti-imperialist argument in “To the Person Sitting in 
Darkness” appeals to an idealistic notion of fairness and of white America’s ability to bestow 
that fairness upon others when they cannot seem to reach agreement even among themselves. 
Twain, however, seems to recognize, even if he is unable to resolve, the inherent disorder of the 
US social order. Differentiating between the “Actual Thing”—a qualified race and class-based 
hierarchy—and the version of “Civilization which we reserve for Home Consumption”—
exceptionalism and entitlement—Twain muses: “Is there a difference between the two brands? In 
some of the details, yes” (207). 
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Ordering Disorder in Connecticut Yankee  
 Mark Twain wrote Connecticut Yankee in the years between his legendary success with 
The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn (1884) and his subsequent work on an uncompleted 
“Sandwich Islands Novel,” the latter which was directly inspired by and attempted to capture 
Twain’s nostalgic vision of his life-changing six-month trip to Hawaii in 1866. Upon his return 
from Hawaii, Twain embarked on a lecture tour which “thus positioned him in an implicitly 
racialized discourse of national identity where he could perform as a civilized white American by 
virtue of his travels among primitive peoples” (Kaplan 60). “Mark Twain,” Amy Kaplan asserts, 
“became audible as an ‘authentic’ American voice while speaking as an authority about those 
whom he called ‘Our Fellow Savages’” (59). In this way, despite “express[ing] ambivalence and 
irony about his own participation in the imperial project,” Twain nonetheless perpetuated 
national assumptions about history while defying his own working class status by claiming for 
himself a position among the white majority (61). By the early 1900s, however, Twain had 
become a leader in Boston’s elite Anti-Imperialist League (Schmidt 135). Schmidt suggests that 
Twain’s ideological transition was neither a quick nor an easy one. “To the Person Sitting in 
Darkness,” Schmidt observes, “seethes with Twain’s fresh sense of betrayal,” as he was a “rather 
late convert to anti-imperialism. As recently as 1898, despite doubts about colonialism expressed 
in Following the Equator, Twain admitted to a friend that he believed the United States’ war 
with Spain was exceptional” (142). John Carlos Rowe observes that Connecticut Yankee is often 
critically neglected in terms of its value as anti-imperialist discourse, because, “published in 
1889, [it] belongs to the decade preceding Twain’s overt ‘change of mind’ about the dangers of 
colonialism and imperialism” (123). Connecticut Yankee, then, can be read in the context of 
Twain’s working out of this imperial ambivalence, wherein Twain does not resolve 
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contradictions or ideological paradoxes but rather is adept at representing these contradictions in 
action.   
 Hank Morgan, Twain’s idealistic protagonist in Connecticut Yankee, fundamentally 
misunderstands republican process, in many ways replicating the sort of imperialist project that 
Twain critiques in “To the Person Sitting in Darkness.” This is first revealed through the 
“miracles” he enacts, engendering both fear and awe in the gentry and the commoners alike. 
Catapulted from nineteenth century Connecticut into sixth century England, Morgan initially 
manipulates his captors with his foreknowledge of the solar eclipse, convincing King Arthur and 
his would-be executioners that he commands even the sun. Recognizing in Morgan a fellow 
charlatan, the fabled Merlin is suspicious of him from the start. What begins with an act of self-
preservation quickly becomes a deceptive contest for power and status between Morgan and 
Merlin. When, soon after the eclipse, the “multitudes presently began to agitate for another 
miracle,” Morgan contrives to blow up Merlin’s tower with some blasting-powder, a lightening 
rod, and some wires (55-56). His technological savvy again proves successful, and Morgan 
concludes that the “miracle” was “effective.” Moreover, the “great bothersome temporary 
population had vanished. There were a good many thousand tracks in the mud the next morning, 
but they were all outward bound. If I had advertised another miracle I couldn’t have raised an 
audience with a sheriff” (59). Early on Morgan establishes a discourse of consumerism with the 
use of terms like “advertised” to indicate his conception of his miracles as product and of the 
people as consumers of that product. Morgan further observes that in the wake of his victory 
over Merlin that “Merlin’s stock was flat,” suggesting that the power to awe is indeed the power 
to rule and that Morgan has effectively bankrupted Merlin’s authority (59).   
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 Morgan’s feud with Merlin illustrates the cultural importance of the appearance of 
authority as well an underlying and often conflicting ideology of authenticity. Both magicians 
are vying for the sanction of the king as well as for popular favor, yet both are simultaneously 
working to expose the other for the fraud that he is. Morgan sees Merlin as unscrupulously 
influencing the people and the king with his “parlor-magic” in order to secure for himself a place 
among the privileged, but Morgan fails to see how he is replicating the same process with his 
“superior” technological prowess (59). Morgan initially sees his own manipulations as noble, 
despite the fact that he, too, is merely creating fantastic illusions to increase his value both as an 
entrepreneur and as a dignitary. By the time the Yankee performs his miracle at the Abbott’s 
well, he has become both arrogant and disaffected, criticizing Merlin for being “an old 
numbskull; a magician who believed in his own magic; and no magician can thrive who is 
handicapped with a superstition like that” (209). At this point, the Yankee has reached a 
somewhat more sophisticated understanding of his own misdirection, but he still sees the ends as 
justifying the means. Morgan goes on, along with his team of privately trained experts, to stop 
the leak via simple masonry techniques: “My boys were experts in all sorts of things, from the 
stoning up of a well to the constructing of a mathematical instrument. An hour before sunrise, we 
had that leak mended in a ship-shape fashion, and the water began to rise” (218). Of course, the 
absurd ritual and the pyrotechnics display that follow are quite another matter. Engineered not to 
reveal but to hide the actual method of fixing the well, the Yankee’s grand performance is more 
spectacular but also more calculatedly dishonest than Merlin’s.   
 In place of true republican practice, Twain suggests, Morgan has become a master of 
crowd control. This involves not only the ritual of violence but the sale of his underlying 
ideology to the pilgrims and the unwashed masses he terrorizes with his pyrotechnics and 
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explosives. If Morgan had simply fixed the well, using what he considers to be common 
knowledge in the nineteenth century, he would likely have been jailed and perhaps executed for 
heresy in the sixth century, as the people believe that the holy well has been struck dry by the 
divine hand of God. In order to communicate with the pilgrims who revere the well as sacred, 
Morgan must reach them on their own level. The old Abbot advises Morgan that he must bring 
the water back “with enchantments that be holy, for the Church will not endure that work in her 
cause be done by devil’s magic” (205). There must be a discursive agreement among Morgan 
and the Abbot as to the nature of Morgan’s enchantments, but even this is part of the show. The 
crowd is also complicit. They want to see a miracle, not a mason. 
 Morgan is using deception to engineer a people’s revolution—without the express 
consent of the actual people. The Yankee’s secret team of experts, his “teacher-factor[ies],” his 
“West Point,” and his “naval academy” all beg the question of why this education, this onset of 
nineteenth-century civilization, must be carefully dispensed to a chosen few rather than spread 
among the masses, theoretically enabling the serfs and the peons to participate in if not to 
orchestrate their own uprising (81-83). In fomenting his underground revolution in the name of 
the masses, the Yankee represents a mode of understanding in many ways similar to that of 
Tourgée’s Fool. Morgan sees himself as the answer, the savior, and the embodiment of 
republicanism, and, above all, he thinks he can bring about a people’s revolution without 
violence. Conversely, he sees the masses, implicitly or explicitly, as backward and in need of his 
protection and guidance. He fancies himself singularly capable of creating a republican society 
within the framework of a feudal one: “My works showed what a despot could do, with the 
resources of a kingdom at his command. Unsuspected in this dark land, I had the civilization of 
the nineteenth century booming under its very nose!” (82). However, Morgan does not seem to 
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understand the depth of his self-deception, his own disgust for and distrust of the masses, or the 
ideological consequences of the elaborate charade by which he is undermining rather than 
encouraging true republican process. To encourage the masses to participate in their own 
revolution would be to engender violence and riot, and therefore the Yankee pronounces himself 
“the despot” in the name of peace. 
 The Yankee’s distrust of the masses is seemingly confirmed when he witnesses the work 
of a riotous mob. In the wake of a devastating manor house fire, the baron is found murdered, 
bound and stabbed, and the locals form a mob intent on avenging the crime. Despite, or rather 
because of, the fact that “suspicion fell on a humble family of the neighborhood who had been 
treated with peculiar harshness by the baron,” the final tally is “eighteen persons hanged or 
butchered; and two yeoman and thirteen prisoners lost in the fire” (295-296). Horrified less by 
the absence of what he considers to be rational procedure than by the resultant gratuitous 
violence, Morgan is most surprised by the people’s ability to turn against their neighbors: “The 
painful thing observable about all this business was, the alacrity with which this oppressed 
community had turned their cruel hands against their own class in the interest of the common 
oppressor” (297). Furthermore, Morgan cannot understand why, when there was ample time to 
save the family from the burning manor house, no one thought to release the locks on the 
prisoners’ cells. “Would one unlock the vaults at such a time? Marry, some would have 
escaped,” is the reply when Morgan questions his yeoman hosts about the fatalities. Morgan fails 
to see that the peasants are complicit in the feudal narrative that constructs the prisoners as 
situated differently than themselves, but he, in turn buying into the same narrative, sees the 
peasants and the prisoners both as ideologically if not essentially beneath his own status.  
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 Accordingly, Morgan wants to see the peasants and the prisoners—all the people save the 
nobles—as a community bound by their common oppression. His precious little faith in their 
capacity for resistance is rocked by what he sees as internal discord. Morgan’s contrived 
people’s revolution is both predicated on and undermined by his belief that the sixth-century 
peasants must be coached and cajoled by the Yankee and his secret contingency to want, 
demand, or even to be able to conceive of a world in which they are propertied citizens, a world 
in which birthright is not all-important. According to Morgan, “Arthur’s people were of course 
poor material for a republic, because they had been debased so long by monarchy” (242). This 
explanation reaffirms Morgan’s inability to see beyond the surface of the situation, to see the 
complexity of and cultural constraints imposed upon the daily lives of the “debased” people in 
question. The Yankee’s yeoman host explains his motivation and his participation in the riot: “I 
helped to hang my neighbors for that it were peril to my own life to show lack of zeal in the 
master’s cause; the others helped for none other reason. All rejoice to-day that he is dead, but all 
do go about seemingly sorrowing, and shedding the hypocrite’s tear, for in that lies safety” (299).  
The yeomen are at once victims of the oppressive feudal monarchy, terrorized into submission, 
and complicit in inflicting terror upon others. The arguably botched riot is for Morgan both 
evidence of the people’s innate capacity for violence and that the potential for building a republic 
exists within them. The requisite qualities are one and the same. 
 Looking forward to the nineteenth century, Morgan identifies poor southern whites, who 
were nearly as degraded by the presence of slavery as the slaves, as exemplary of this 
phenomenon in their willingness to side with, and even to fight for, the continuation of slavery, 
by which they directly profited neither politically nor economically. Twain satirizes Morgan’s 
philosophy of assisted redemption when he places it within the context of the antebellum South: 
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“And there was only one redeeming feature connected with that pitiful piece of history; and that 
was, that secretly the ‘poor white’ did detest the slave lord, and did feel his own shame. That 
feeling was not brought to the surface, but the fact that it was there and could have been brought 
out, under favoring circumstance, was something—in fact it was enough; for it showed that a 
man is at bottom a man, after all, even if it doesn’t show on the outside” (297). Who, exactly, 
does Morgan imagine is supposed to bring this potential out of the contemporary poor white? 
With no time-traveling explosives-toting Yankee presently available for the job, this latent 
potential remains moot, which begs the question: how is a man truly “a man” if he doesn’t act 
upon his convictions? Twain reveals mechanisms in place that at once revere and contain the 
insurrectionary potential of the white working class until it can be mobilized by an empowered 
elite in service of some greater purpose, yet he is also critical of the mob who would rise in 
service of their oppressors but not in defiance of them.      
 By the time of the manor house riot, Morgan has begun to develop a growing respect for 
the king and for the natural aristocracy he represents. That Morgan sympathizes with the king, 
and sees the king’s relative goodwill as exceptional with respect to overtly cruel nobles like the 
dastardly Madame le Fay and presumably the recently deceased baron of the manor house, is 
evident in the details of his long-term revolutionary plan. Morgan predicts “a modified 
monarchy, till Arthur’s days were done, then the destruction of the throne, nobility abolished, 
every member of it bound out to some useful trade, and the whole government placed in the 
hands of the men and women of the nation there to remain” (300). His subconscious recognition 
that a people’s revolution necessarily entails the defeat and displacement not only of the existing 
abstract monarchy but also of his new friend Arthur contributes to Morgan’s more gradual 
proposal. Despite the fact that he sees Arthur as exceptional, as somehow disconnected from the 
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larger corrupt aristocracy he represents, Morgan attributes the same redeeming qualities he sees 
in the king to other nobles, ultimately to his detriment. When the Yankee and the king alienate a 
group of peasants with their strange behavior and are subsequently treed by yet another 
clamoring local mob, Morgan expresses relief upon hearing the voice of an approaching 
horseman: “How good it sounded! The owner of the voice bore all the marks of a gentleman: 
picturesque and costly raiment, the aspect of command, a hard countenance, with complexion 
and features marred by dissipation” (343). This man’s voice and appearance identify him as a 
gentleman, and Morgan, immediately expecting an ally, feels comforted by his presence. 
However, after violently driving off the mob of peasants, the gentleman gives the king and the 
Yankee a night of respite in familiar surroundings befitting their proclaimed stature before 
selling them, to their astonishment, at a slave market.    
 This sequence of events evokes the specter of white slavery in the nineteenth century, 
wherein countless verdicts hinged on the observable whiteness of the person, whose slave or free 
status was in question. In such trials, as legal historian Ariela J. Gross has argued, “racial identity 
became a question of performance, reputation, and common sense,” in other words, “a 
complicated system of contradictory clues, something that respectable white people were 
nevertheless supposed to recognize at first sight” (31). The overwhelming problem for the 
Yankee and the king is that there appears to be no such system in place in feudal England. The 
king, disguised to facilitate his ability to travel among the commoners, is not easily recognizable 
as one who is, by rights, not a slave. Initially it strikes Morgan as “unaccountably strange and 
odd, that the king of England and his chief minister, marching manacled and fettered and yoked, 
in a slave convoy, could move by all manner of idle men and women” and “never provoke a 
single remark” (347). At first Morgan concludes that this “only shows that there is nothing 
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diviner about a king than there is about a tramp, after all,” but this hypothesis cannot stand (347). 
Morgan’s real moment of epiphany comes, after the king has fetched a disgracefully low price at 
sale, when Morgan exclaims: “it was natural. For this reason: a king is a mere artificiality, and so 
a king’s feelings, like the impulses of an automatic doll, are mere artificialities; but as a man, he 
is a reality, and his feelings, as a man, are real, not phantasms” (351). Although Morgan makes 
this statement in response to the king’s whining over his insultingly low sale price, he 
simultaneously suggests that even if the king is not immediately recognizable as the king 
(disguises notwithstanding), he should be recognizable as a noble personage suitable for royalty. 
There should be some innate and innately free something about the king that the people can 
easily identify. 
 Morgan ultimately tries to shift his sense of a natural aristocracy to represent republican 
theory. This process involves violently replacing the standing aristocracy with a contingency of 
men who should rule not by birthright but by virtue of some proven merit. At the same time, the 
peasants remain peasants and the slaves remain slaves, their own latent revolutionary tendencies 
romanticized in the terms of Morgan’s flawed ideology and desirable only as long as these 
inclinations remain latent. Regardless, one ruling class is displaced by another, and the stakes of 
the requisite merit are never entirely clear. Twain makes the futility of this abstraction apparent 
in the conversation between Clarence and the Yankee, wherein they debate the concept of 
republican theory. Clarence’s “idea was a Republic, without privileged orders, but with a 
hereditary royal family at the head of it instead of an elective chief magistrate. He believed that 
no nation that had ever known the joy of worshipping a royal family could ever be robbed of it 
and not fade away and die of melancholy.” When Morgan cautions Clarence that “kings [a]re 
dangerous,” Clarence responds: “Then have cats.” Clarence insists that cats “would be as useful 
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as any other royal family, they would know as much, they would have the same virtues and the 
same vices, the same fidelities and the same treacheries, the same disposition to get up shindies 
with other royal cats, they would be laughably vain and absurd and never know it, and they 
would be wholly inexpensive” (399). Contained in Clarence’s suggestion is Twain’s commentary 
not on the dysfunction of the system but on the danger of the human element. The problem with 
kings is that they hold the power of kings, and this danger is present whether or not that power is 
wrought by heredity or by popular vote. As the disingenuous enthusiasm of the peasants’ mob 
illustrates, popular vote does not necessarily represent the independent will of the people but, 
rather, their collective bid for survival in the face of dominant expectations. 
 In trying to replicate a people’s revolution via the familiar blueprint of American 
narratives of romanticized individualism and collective independence, Morgan instead represents 
the riotous presence in action. Morgan successfully enacts the structural principles of the 
American social order, along with its enabling ideology, and instead of the “peaceful revolution” 
he desires, his machinations ultimately lead to mass destruction (183). Morgan’s conceptual 
revolution is tragically flawed, because he brings with him from the nineteenth century, along 
with thirteen centuries’ worth of technological advancement, thirteen centuries’ worth of 
strategic domination that has been actively cultivated and perversely perfected over time. Rowe 
notes that the “knowledge of astronomy” on which Morgan depends “to predict the life-saving 
solar eclipse . . . is just the sort of scientific knowledge early European explorers used to gain 
authority over local, less technologically advanced peoples” (136). Such comparisons extended 
over the course of the novel support Rowe’s claim that “Twain organizes Connecticut Yankee 
around a general critique of slavery’s historical persistence from feudalism to capitalism” (134). 
However, slavery’s trajectory is less linear than circular in Twain’s rendering, and the fact that a 
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“superior” race of people have labored for centuries to rationalize rather than to eradicate this 
blight on human existence is central to Twain’s observations. 
 The Sand Belt finale emphasizes the depth and breadth of destruction made possible by 
nineteenth-century technological advancement and mechanized warfare, and it also accentuates 
the reliance of American narratives of progress and independence on the presence of an 
essentially unfree racial other. Morgan’s self-identification as American in the racialized terms 
of Anglo-Saxon Providentialism echoes the objections of many antebellum opponents of 
Manifest Destiny and immediate expansion to “the use of overt force” rather than to “the view 
that Americans were a distinct race” (Horsman 253-254). In fact, many antebellum Americans 
defined their superiority, their “chosen” status, in terms of “the necessity for restrained conduct 
befitting their high station. Superiority did not confer the right to wage aggressive war” 
(Horsman 257). This is Morgan’s attitude at the start of the novel, that the sixth century British, 
nobility and peasantry alike, are barbaric, while he, Morgan, is set apart by his refined character. 
“Imperialist nostalgia,” Kaplan suggests, “disavows the history of violence that yokes the past to 
the present, as in Hank Morgan’s longing for the ‘Lost Land’ of Camelot, which he destroys at 
the end of Connecticut Yankee” (56). In the Battle of the Sand Belt, Morgan’s progressive 
technology is revealed to be just as barbaric as the feudal methods he seeks to displace and 
superior only in its ability to wreak havoc on a grander scale. Although Rowe’s suggestion that 
“Twain’s generalization of slavery across the ages risks trivializing its modern consequences” is 
not without merit, Twain’s retrospective imposition on the sixth century of race as the basis for 
economic exploitation is less a risky generalization than an adept illustration of the hubris of 
white supremacists and the degree to which modern notions of racial superiority have infiltrated 
human consciousness. Race as an ordering principle has become so prevalent within American 
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culture that the “Yankee”—a term which “was itself shifting geographically at the time, referring 
not only to Northerners in relation to Southerners but also to the nation as a whole to 
international locations of imperial intervention” (Kaplan 88)—is prepared to rewrite his own 
history, to destroy his past and his forebears if necessary, in order to render that superiority 
absolute.   
Morgan’s experience gives the lie to white working class men’s sense of entitlement, by 
virtue of race and gender, to the full privileges of republican culture. As Henry Nash Smith has 
observed, “Hank Morgan belongs to the working class; he has risen from the ranks of workers to 
the position of superintendent in the Colt arms factory in Hartford” (38-39). Morgan’s class 
status positions him simultaneously as the idealized embodiment of the American work ethic and 
as firmly entrenched within the subjugated white working class. Regardless of his industrious 
and self-motivated climb to management status, Morgan cannot transcend his birth or his history; 
he is and will always be a worker rather than a noble. Smith’s further observation that “Unlike 
Huck Finn, who is not at ease with concepts, the Yankee is passionately devoted to general ideas 
such as progress, civilization, justice, equality before the law, universal suffrage, representative 
government, free trade, and separation of church and state” (68), points to Morgan’s conflicting 
belief in these principles as ideology and his own class-based exclusion from full participation in 
their practice. Morgan’s paradoxical status within the standard narrative contributes to his 
inability to differentiate between true republican practice and its imposter. Consequently, he 
cannot see the danger of misjudging “the degree to which republican aims and their 
emancipatory struggles can be distinguished from the tiresome business of conquest by kings, 
priests, and tycoons” (Rowe 125). Morgan fails to realize that revolution is by nature circular, or 
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that the freedom of some necessitates the unfreedom of others, those who might be the next to 
agitate for their liberty from new forms of oppression.  
 
The Circus of Riot 
 I have argued that Mark Twain sees beyond the logic of a neat discrepancy to the chaotic 
heart of the riotous presence, but he could only see so far, particularly while immersed within the 
very culture he works to critique. Accordingly, Hank Morgan is trapped within the same 
conspicuously white and markedly violent version of history as are Tom and Huck in Twain’s 
later novel, Huck Finn. This history cannot be overcome or even derailed by the mere 
recognition of humanity across race or class lines, as Huck’s relationships with Jim and with 
Tom illustrate. Standing in for “the (un)reconstructed South,” as Jocelyn Chadwick-Joshua 
observes, Tom “relies on and perverts every concept on which the South presumably structured 
its mythic persona: pride, rightness, filial loyalty, honesty, and salvation.” Chadwick-Joshua is 
more disturbed by “Huck’s faith in Tom’s sincerity” than by Tom’s contrived game to free the 
already-free Jim (120). Huck, despite his earnest friendship with Jim and the “lessons” he has 
learned via their common adventure, nonetheless accepts Tom’s game and allows it to proceed to 
a point at which the novel becomes nearly unbearable to read. Because Huck admires Tom’s 
superior education and penchant for reading, he defers to Tom’s insistence on performing Jim’s 
escape from slavery in accordance with the “rules” of a supposedly standard narrative. Huck, 
however, is unable to understand that Jim’s experience of incarceration is very real and that Jim 
is forced to comply with Tom’s increasingly absurd demands not just because Jim is a slave and 
Tom is a white man but because Jim’s role in Tom’s master narrative is to supplement the white 
boy’s adventure.   
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 Both Tom and Huck assume a white narrative of American history suggested in the 
appropriately named wrecked and plundered boat in Chapter XIII, the Walter Scott. The name of 
the vessel evokes the narratives of English writer Sir Walter Scott, whose Waverly novels, 
particularly Ivanhoe (1819), were exponentially popular in the antebellum United States and 
especially in the South. As Reginald Horsman argues, “Scott’s impact generally was to bind 
Americans firmly to their English roots and to reinforce them in the idea that America, a country 
which in reality increasingly consisted of a blending of races, was the new bastion of an old and 
successful English people” (161). Huck and Jim alight only briefly on the Walter Scott’s decks, 
but they cannot escape the cultural framework defined by this particular historical narrative, just 
as Twain cannot stand entirely outside of his own cultural history in order to level his sharp 
critique of the imperial politics and capitalist agenda that Horsman and Kaplan describe. 
 In Connecticut Yankee, Twain conjures the specter of a different past, one contrary to the 
celebrated democratic ideals of rugged individualism and moral triumph on which novels like 
Huck Finn, wherein the white male nation purportedly comes of age with the novels’ main 
characters, are predicated. The white male’s cognizance of what he is not—a slave—is central to 
this process. Toni Morrison argues that the Africanist presence in white literature enables white 
thinking about the grand metaphorical questions. Of Huck Finn, Morrison writes: “Thus the fatal 
ending becomes the elaborate deferment of a necessary and necessarily unfree Africanist 
character’s escape, because freedom has no meaning to Huck or to the text without the specter of 
enslavement, the anodyne to individualism; the yardstick of absolute power over the life of 
another; the signed, marked, informing and mutating presence of a black slave” (56). Jim’s 
presence and the very real consequences of his capture make the adventure authentic for Huck; at 
the same time, Jim stands in as a “yardstick” by which to measure Huck’s own freedom, to 
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qualify Huck’s fugitive status, to encourage Huck’s individualist moral development within the 
immoral world of slaveholders, abusive parents, murderers, thieves, and “rapscallions.” The 
Africanist presence, then, provides a necessary foil to white American tales of moral and social 
progress, of democratic wholeness, of Manifest Destiny and capitalist opportunity. 
 The highly-contested ending of Huck Finn is less about Jim’s freedom—Tom Sawyer 
knows, if we do not, that Jim has already been legally freed—than it is about his place in Tom’s 
master narrative. As Morrison suggests, “it is not what Jim seems that warrants inquiry, but what 
Mark Twain, Huck, and especially Tom need from him that should solicit our attention. In that 
sense the book may indeed be ‘great’ because in its structure, in the hell it puts its readers 
through at the end, the frontal debate it forces, it simulates and describes the parasitical nature of 
white freedom” (57). Importantly, Tom and Huck need more than Jim’s mere presence to 
solidify their own adventure. Indeed, they need Jim’s resistance, his counter to the cherished 
narratives of white civil society. Jim’s qualified and cooperative resistance under Tom’s tutelage 
simultaneously serves to reaffirm these narratives and allows Huck to repeat the process again 
and again. At novel’s end, Huck decides that he should “light out for the territory ahead of the 
rest, because Aunt Sally she’s going to adopt me and sivilize me, and I can’t stand it” (293). 
Huck’s final words are “I been there before” (293), and he has. Jim’s slave presence 
counterbalances Huck’s fugitive status during their travels on the Mississippi, and then Jim’s 
abstract freedom, rather than its cost, grants Huck the liberty to embrace his own Manifest 
Destiny as a rebel child but an independent American explorer nonetheless. In other words, Jim’s 
illegal and unsanctioned personal rebellion reaffirms Huck’s normative defiance of social codes.   
 Tom and Huck’s need for Jim’s “resistance,” which will later be deemed moot, gestures 
toward the relentless underlying rumors of violent protest which are the private doppelgangers of 
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fabled public narratives of cultural development and social education. Many of these rumors, 
asserting “that blacks will rise up in rebellion,” as academic folklorists Gary Alan Fine and 
Patricia A. Turner observe, “recognize the oppression that blacks have suffered and, as a result, 
they have a compelling plausibility” (42). The tenacity of these rumors over time and across 
ostensibly divided historical eras underscores the ongoing presence of riot as an integral part of 
our nation’s enduring legacy of race and class oppression.  
 Americans do want to see someone stand up to the riotous presence, as Colonel Sherburn 
does in Huck Finn’s “Lynching Bee” scene. Sherburn appears quite the hero to Huck when he 
“takes his stand, perfectly ca’m and deliberate” and defies the raucous members of the lynch 
mob that would hang him (145). Sherburn’s speech indeed makes us feel like celebrating manly 
independence and self-assurance when he disparages the mob for its cowardice: “Because you’re 
brave enough to tar and feather poor friendless cast-out women that come along here, did that 
make you think you had grit enough to lay your hands on a man? Why, a man’s safe in the hands 
of ten thousand of your kind –as long as it’s daytime and you’re not behind him” (145). Sherburn 
defines himself in contrast to the mob, among which he declares there is “only half a man” and a 
bunch of cowards who will “hang yourselves onto that half-a-man’s coat-tail, and come raging 
up here swearing what big things you’re going to do” (146). According to Sherburn, the mob is 
cowardly and pitiful because “they don’t fight with courage that’s born in them, but with courage 
that’s borrowed from their mass” (146). Standing alone against the mob and against its 
cowardice does indeed appear to be the mark of Sherburn’s singular manliness, especially when 
the mob suddenly disperses, its would-be leader “looking tolerable cheap” (146).   
 In making this final observation, Huck seems to have forgotten the crime that has 
provoked the mob in the first place. Sherburn, self-proclaimed man amongst men, has killed an 
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innocent man in cold blood. Old Boggs is obviously drunk and has come to town swearing to kill 
Sherburn, who is apparently a random representative of Boggs’s anger at being “sassed,” as the 
locals “wonder who he’s a-gwyne to chaw up this time. If he’d a-chawed up all the men he’s ben 
a-gwyne to chaw up in the last twenty year he’d have considerable ruputation now” (141). The 
amused tolerance of the townspeople identifies Boggs’s threats as empty and the man as a local 
joke who “never hurt nobody, drunk nor sober” (141). Although clearly aware of Boggs’s 
penchant for drunken drama, Sherburn shoots him dead in the middle of the street, with Boggs’s 
young daughter looking on. Sherburn may have satisfied his own requirements for justified 
violence—after all, it is daylight and his victim was facing him—but his deed is no less cowardly 
than the proposed violence of the mob. Before Sherburn shames them with his rhetoric of manly 
independence, it is the mob who works in service of justice in their collective effort to punish 
Sherburn for his predatory behavior. Confused by the abrupt turn of events, Huck decides not to 
stick around after the mob disperses, and instead he goes immediately to a circus (147).   
 Twain’s description of the circus scene in Huck Finn does provide a rather apt metaphor 
for the riotous presence of white American ideology. Huck’s first impression is of the orderliness 
and the loveliness of it all, in contrast to the attempted lynching he has just witnessed, as the 
performers “come riding in, two and two, and gentleman and lady, side by side” (147). The 
graceful procession, however, quickly seems to spin out of control, as “faster and faster they 
went, all of them dancing, first one foot in the air and then the other, the horses leaning more and 
more, and the ringmaster going round and round the center pole, cracking his whip and shouting 
‘Hi!—hi!’ and the clown cracking jokes behind him” (147). This is fine and well, and Huck is 
fantastically amused by the elaborately choreographed show, until “by and by a drunken man 
tried to get into the ring—said he wanted to ride” (148). This drunken man disrupts the show, is 
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heckled and cajoled by the performers and the ringmaster, and eventually causes a near-riot 
within the ring as spectators “begun to pile down off the benches and swarm toward the ring, 
saying ‘Knock him down! Throw him out’ and one or two women begun to scream” (148). This 
drunken man, who we soon find out is actually part of the show, enjoys a raucous, wild ride 
around the ring before peeling off the layers of his disguise. Huck is both thrilled and surprised 
to see that the imposter is one of the ringmaster’s own men, and he believes the ringmaster to be 
truly astonished as well. Huck is terribly impressed with the performer’s antics, believing that 
“he had got up that joke all out of his own head, and never let on to nobody.” While Huck admits 
to feeling “sheepish enough to be took in so,” he adds that he “wouldn’t ’a’ been in that 
ringmaster’s place, not for a thousand dollars” (149). Just as he fails to understand that the man’s 
antics are part of the show and that the ringmaster has been in on the sham all along, Huck fails 
to recognize that the image of white independence, embodied both by Sherburn and by the 
rabble-rousing circus performer, is a similar sham of greater proportions. 
  
Imperium in Imperio 
This new revolution which had begun went on. The Klan increased in numbers and in power,—
an imperium in imperio,—until its decrees were far more potent and its power more dreaded, 
than that of the visible commonwealths which it either dominated or terrorized. 
—Albion W. Tourgée, A Fool’s Errand: By One of the Fools 
 
 If the circus scene from Huck Finn stands in as a metaphor for the riotous presence in 
action, for the normal functioning of an American social structure predicated on ideologies of 
white manly independence, then the secret African American government of Sutton Griggs’s 
Imperium in Imperio serves as a metaphorical circus within a circus. In Twain’s novels, the 
Africanist presence of which Morrison writes is uncomfortably suppressed, latent and 
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troublesome, similar to but separate from the revered revolutionary potential of peasants and 
poor whites. Huck Finn’s lynching scene, significantly, is enacted entirely by whites. Boggs is 
white, Sherburn is white, and the mob is white. There are black characters present—“nigger boys 
in every tree, and bucks and wenches looking over every fence; and as soon as the mob would 
get nearly to them they would break and skaddle back out of reach” (145)—but they are 
spectators, kept at arm’s length from the action of the scene. Huck’s description of their presence 
is extremely brief but notable, because the blacks in the background enable the resolution of the 
conflict between Sherburn and the white mob. The ghostlike presence of the slaves allows for 
Buck Harkness, the would-be leader of the mob, to retain some degree of manhood. Even 
Sherburn still regards Harkness as “part of a man” though Sherburn’s speech is designed to 
utterly embarrass and demoralize Harkness and the others (146). The presence of the slaves, 
however, neutralizes the conflict and positions the mob as both capable and worthy of 
redemption. Not as “manly” or as righteous as Sherburn, neither are they as debased as the 
fleeting creatures in the background who know the true power of the lynch mob. In Imperium in 
Imperio, Sutton Griggs both replicates and inverts the terms of the riotous presence, bringing the 
African American characters to the forefront of the conflict and displacing the white characters 
behind the fences and tree lines of his characters’ developing personal politics. 
 Accordingly, Griggs’s narrative focuses on two men who have been shaped by the riotous 
presence in American culture and on the challenges they face in mounting a concentrated African 
American resistance effort within a white supremacist culture. If white supremacy indeed looks 
like the multi-layered performance of Huck Finn’s circus, and if white independence and 
qualified resistance are both built into the script, then what must real resistance, real 
independence, real black nationalism look like? For Griggs’s Imperium, the structure of which 
 202 
mirrors in many ways the structure of the white American government, the terms of black 
independence can neither be cast in the same terms as white independence nor can they be 
cleanly separated from the demands of white supremacy. Black resistance and the false-
consciousness of white freedom are co-dependent, and, for Griggs’s dual protagonists upon 
whose unfreedom the riotous presence thrives, the parasitical nature of white freedom becomes a 
nearly insurmountable obstacle to peaceful or intellectual strategies of collective resistance. The 
riotous presence virtually forces Griggs’s fictional regime to undertake the violent overthrow of 
the standing national government in pursuit of freedom. Like Connecticut Yankee, Griggs’s 
Imperium in Imperio follows the structural logic of white American independence and 
necessarily ends in tragedy, suggesting that black self-determination can also be parasitical. 
 The African American presence, subtle and separate in Twain’s lynching scene, becomes 
more pronounced in Griggs’s novel, calling to mind the historical interdependence of white and 
black, foreign and domestic. In the 1830s and 1840s, as at the turn of the twentieth century, 
American imperialist politics were inseparable from the politics of racial repression within the 
nation’s geographical borders. In 1831 the Supreme Court relegated Native Americans to the 
economic and geopolitical hinterland of “domestic dependent nations” via its decision in 
Cherokee Nation v. The State of Georgia, thereby “plac[ing] the foreign inside the geographic 
boundaries of the nation,” according to Kaplan (27). The Texas Revolution in 1837, the US 
annexation of Texas as a slave state in 1845, and the Mexican-American War from 1846-1848 
further contributed to increasing anxieties among white Americans about maintaining the 
separation of foreign and domestic and to the solidification of mutually constitutive and 
explicitly gendered imperial metaphors of domesticity and Manifest Destiny. Embedded within 
these twin rhetorical structures for antebellum Americans was an innate fear of the seemingly 
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limitless frontier and of the racial others who must be either eradicated or absorbed within the 
nation’s mobile borders. Gendered discourses of domesticity deploying “the home as a bounded 
and rigidly ordered interior space” served to counterbalance or stabilize fears of miscegenation 
and of economic displacement generated by expansion and encounter (Kaplan 25). The 
metaphorical home was a safe-haven, a protected internal domain conceptually removed from 
external contact and therefore from the possibility of racial and national contamination.  
Antebellum discourses of domesticity and of Manifest Destiny also shared with each 
other and with postbellum imperialist discourses underlying ideologies of American 
exceptionalism underscored by the existence of racial others. In tracing the thrust of American 
nationalist thought from the optimistic Anglo-Saxonist pride of the early republic, in which 
environmentalism outstripped essentialism in terms of racial and national difference, to the 
increasing “belief that the Americans were the most distinguished descendants of the Anglo-
Saxons” (81), Horsman defines a particular nationalist conception of “the ‘American’ as a 
distinctive race, a race in which was combined the best elements of the Caucasians . . . [and] was 
usually given the historical attributes of the Anglo-Saxons” (164). Democratic politician John L. 
O’Sullivan coined the phrase “Manifest Destiny” in the 1840s in response to those who opposed 
the annexation of Texas and therefore the Providential geopolitical spread of American Anglo-
Saxonism (Horsman 219). Accordingly, Kaplan identifies the paradox of America’s exceptional 
nature “in its exemplary status as the apotheosis of the nation-form itself and as a model for the 
rest of the world. American exceptionalism is in part an argument for boundless expansion, 
where national particularism and international universalism converge” (16). Imperialist 
discourses, like the inseparable discourses of Manifest Destiny and domesticity, “share a 
vocabulary that turns imperial conquest into spiritual regeneration in order to efface internal 
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conflict or external resistance in visions of geopolitical domination as global harmony” (Kaplan 
31).   
Early national and antebellum imperialist discourses of spiritual regeneration were 
fundamental to the redeployment of a reinvigorated white Protestant nationalism in the mid 
1860s and, consequently, to the renewal of American imperialism in the wake of Reconstruction. 
Blum argues that “religious rhetoric and metaphors also played key roles in literary and political 
calls for reconciliation, permeating a broad ‘culture of conciliation.’ Writers and politicians, 
including the eccentric editor and presidential candidate Horace Greeley, regularly cloaked 
reunion in sacred garb and claimed that God ordained solidarity among whites” (13). Discourses 
of spiritual regeneration, then, worked to rationalize and to enable Northerners’ abandonment of 
their civic responsibility to freedpeople in the South as well as in the North. Overriding the more 
sectionally divisive push for racial uplift, religious leaders promoted white racial unity in place 
of (and disguised as) national reunification. This rejuvenated rhetoric of white Protestant 
nationalism, derived from early national providentialism and the antebellum providentialism of 
Manifest Destiny, “played a vital role in the rise of the American global empire in the 1880s and 
1890s. National reconciliation at home and imperial efforts abroad had a dialectical relationship. 
Reunion enabled the United States to focus its energies on foreign lands and in turn created 
stronger feelings of national identity at home, and northern white Protestants were pivotal in the 
outward and militaristic thrust of the nation” (Blum 16). 
 In a novel that, like Twain’s Connecticut Yankee, imagines a sort of internal imperialism 
in which the tensions between expansionist narratives of progress and the violent divisions they 
engender are doubly present, Griggs engages with similar internal divisions within black 
America. In the late nineteenth century, Tunde Adeleke observes, more militant black 
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nationalists and Pan-Africanists pursuing “their schemes for the freedom and elevation of fellow 
blacks and Africans” also “displayed ideological ambivalence by embracing the ideals of the 
dominant Euro-American culture against which they (especially Delany and Turner) professed to 
be struggling” (10). These radical race men shared with their more moderate contemporaries at 
least a partial subscription to white narratives of civilizing progress. As Michele Mitchell 
contends, “at times, even anti-imperialist blacks all but suggested that some form of civilizing 
conquest was necessary if Africa ever hoped to keep apace with Europe, North America, and 
Asia” (56). African Americans were, like whites, ideologically divided along unstable class lines. 
In the violent context of Jim Crow, “aspiring and elite men were likely to feel that their hard-won 
gains were slipping away,” and even those who opposed expansionism “relied upon a trope of 
manhood constructed around race, as did men who believed class mobility could be best 
achieved outside U.S. borders” (Mitchell 56). For black men as well as for white, this imperialist 
moment exposed a distinct clash between ideal notions of class mobility and racial and national 
agendas. 
 Rather than simply focusing on the best route for black resistance or black nationalism to 
take, Imperium in Imperio addresses the apparent dualism of militant and accommodationist 
strategies of black resistance to white supremacist oppression. Representative of apparently 
irreconcilable dogmas, “militant” figures like Martin Robison Delany, W. E. B. Du Bois, and 
Malcolm X have been consistently paired by historians and cultural critics alike with their more 
moderate contemporary counterparts Frederick Douglass, Booker T. Washington, and Martin 
Luther King, Jr., respectively. Washington and Du Bois were both complex thinkers, but they 
were soon perceived to represent clearly defined and opposing positions—and they found 
themselves performing these roles. As Adeleke contends, “Black Americans generally longed to 
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be identified and accepted as Americans. This explains why, for much of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, black American nationalists, and indeed, black American leaders in general, 
regardless of ideological disposition, espoused integrationist aspirations and values” (2). Despite 
marked and complex ideological positions, African American leaders “combined feelings of 
alienation and deprivation with faith in classic American middle-class values of industry, thrift, 
and economy” (Adeleke 2-3). The challenge for race leaders at this time was to negotiate their 
exclusion from and simultaneous subscription to American ideals of representative freedom, 
sovereignty, and exceptionalism.   
 Imperium’s Bernard Belgrave and Belton Piedmont may appear to represent ideologies 
similar to those of Du Bois and Washington, yet Griggs is careful to represent the complexity of 
their positions as well as the significant constraints imposed upon black leadership by the 
parasitical nature of white freedom. Like Twain’s Connecticut Yankee, Imperium in Imperio does 
not reach a satisfactory solution to its narrative conflicts, nor does it offer adequate alternatives 
to the status quo. Imperium in Imperio explores the evolution and effectiveness of both 
conservative and militant responses by the black community to white supremacist oppression in 
the late nineteenth century. The story unfolds via the parallel lives of the novel’s dual 
protagonists, light-skinned and affluent Bernard and his dark-skinned and impoverished 
counterpart, Belton. Friends and rivals since childhood, Bernard and Belton are reunited as adults 
after Belton miraculously survives an attempted lynching in Louisiana and subsequently murders 
the white eugenicist doctor as he prepares to dissect Belton’s apparently lifeless body. Belton 
escapes, then calls on Bernard, an accomplished lawyer, to defend him before the Supreme 
Court. This encounter leads to Bernard’s unanimous election as the first president of the 
Imperium in Imperio, a secret African American government operating parallel to the US 
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government and established via the union of those “secret orders already formed by negroes” 
(Griggs 132). Griggs eventually pits Belton’s conservatism against Bernard’s militancy in a final 
oratorical showdown over the proper usage of and response by this well-funded and unified 
black organization. The novel ends with Bernard’s resolutions—which include the Imperium’s 
infiltration of the US Navy, formation of secret alliances with foreign enemies of the US, and 
seizure of the Texas capitol—adopted by the members of the Imperium but not yet set in motion. 
Belton, for his dissension, is executed by a firing squad made up of members of the Imperium 
and commanded by Bernard (173-174). 
 Griggs is perhaps best known for Imperium in Imperio despite the fact that his first novel, 
as Finnie D. Coleman has convincingly argued, represents the early conceptual stages of what 
would become Griggs’s signature uplift philosophy. Over the next thirty-four years, Griggs 
wrote four more novels and numerous political pamphlets in which he developed and revised his 
science of collective efficiency, which was, according to Coleman, “a commonsense approach to 
racial uplift, social mobility, and political activism” (109). Griggs subsequently wrote 
Overshadowed: a Novel (1901), Unfettered, a Novel (1902), The Hindered Hand; or, The Reign 
of the Repressionists (1905), and Pointing the Way (1908). Two of these novels included 
supplementary non-fiction material. Dorlan’s Plan (Sequel to “Unfettered”: a Dissertation on 
the Race Problem), in pamphlet form, was appended to Unfettered, and The Hindered Hand 
included A Hindering Hand; Supplementary to the Hindered Hand, A Review of the Anti-Negro 
Crusade of Mr. Thomas Dixon, Jr., an open letter written by Griggs in response to The Leopard’s 
Spots (1902). According to Coleman, “reviews of [The Hindered Hand] and praise for the 
supplement suggested to Griggs that there was a market for his political writings independent of 
his fiction” (117). Griggs went on to write many more pamphlets and political tracts, including: 
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Wisdom’s Call (1910), his first book-length political work and a collection of excerpts from his 
earlier pamphlets; The Story of My Struggles (1914), a uniquely personal and autobiographical 
text; and The Science of Collective Efficiency (1921), which sets forth Griggs’s personal and 
political doctrine of pragmatic black uplift and collective self-help. In The Guide to Racial 
Greatness; or, The Science of Collective Efficiency (1923), Griggs combines his “philosophy and 
a methodology for accomplishing Black uplift” (Coleman 127).   
 Griggs works to identify and illuminate the problems his community faces in their efforts 
to become an outwardly recognizable community and to represent the processes by which any 
efforts toward black resistance have been shaped and constrained by ideologies of white 
freedom. Belton has been influenced by the narratives of “Tourgée (and, of course, a host of 
other contemporary writers, black and white)” and, consequently, as Schmidt suggests, “Belton 
assumes that Africa embodies savagery. He suggests that the horrors of the middle passage and 
slavery and war had one saving grace—the American descendents of Africans now have access 
to the English language and European Enlightenment arguments for liberty and equal rights” 
(76-77). Whereas Belton has absorbed one version of a fractured American cultural narrative, 
Bernard has internalized yet another version of the same narrative. Despite his best efforts, 
“Bernard’s Imperium ironically comes to mirror the obsessions of another invisible empire, the 
Ku Klux Klan. Bernard’s methods of combating white supremacy lead him to adopt its 
nationalistic rhetoric of violence and also its determination to keep free of pollution the racial 
and cultural purity of the black body politic” (Schmidt 78). Although their methodologies differ, 
Griggs suggests that Belton and Bernard ultimately want the same thing—a thriving and unified 
black nation modeled on or absorbed within an idealized white America. 
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 Griggs’s challenge, then, as a novelist and as a political philosopher, is to find a way to 
cast black freedom in terms independent of white supremacy, or, perhaps, to conceptually 
modify the processes of the existing social order. His refusal to propose a clear resolution to his 
novel or to openly support either of the positions represented by either Bernard or Belton 
characterize Griggs’s denial of the compartmentalized categorical responses made available to 
him within a white supremacist culture. Gloria T. Hull suggests that Imperium in Imperio, like 
Delany’s Blake (1859-62), is “at least partially fulfill[ing] the methodological requirements for 
socialist realism,” because both Imperium in Imperio and Blake only partially fit within the 
parameters of this genre as Hull defines it. Delany “leaves [his revolution] in progress” and 
Griggs’s “secret, elaborately-organized black ‘nation within a nation’” is still “steadily 
transforming American society.” While both novels “go beyond critical realism to a more 
detailed depiction of the revolutionary struggle,” they stop short of “a confident portrayal of the 
future society” (151). It is perhaps this stopping short which leads Kali Tal to argue that 
Imperium “reflect[s] a profound pessimism about the possibility of achieving justice and equality 
‘within the system’” (67) and prompts Coleman to suggest that Imperium is “an intellectual call 
to arms” (58) but one with a “rhetorical strategy [which] proved to be extremely problematic” 
(69).34 Each of these critics suggests, at least on some level, that the betrayal of the Imperium’s 
revolution at novel’s end represents a deficiency in Griggs’s political philosophy or in the plot of 
his novel, whether a metaphorical throwing up of his hands or an ambitious but somehow 
aborted political undertaking. As readers invested in the outcome of the epic confrontation we’ve 
been led to expect, we want to see the conflict through to its resolution. Also conditioned by the 
riotous presence, readers expect to see the cycle play itself out so that it can begin again. The 
text’s complex set of frames instead suggests that Griggs may have been committed to an 
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affirmative denial of the options available to him, that the ending is less of a non-ending than the 
act of seeking of a wholly different sort of ending. 
 Although the fate of the Imperium is left hanging in the balance at novel’s end, Griggs 
stakes a powerful claim to a revised national narrative by virtue of his novel’s double frame. As 
Coleman observes, “signifying on the politics of the authorizing preface, Griggs speaks himself 
into his text and his text into being by doubly framing what is already a framed text” (44). In this 
way, Griggs positions himself as authoritative narrator in the spirit of white authenticating 
prefaces appended to antebellum slave narratives, poetry, and even novels by African 
Americans. “When Griggs sent Imperium in Imperio to the Editor Publishing Company in 1899, 
he refused to have his authorial presence spoken into being by a White editor” (Coleman 44).  
Griggs’s rebuff is all the more significant in the revolutionary context of Imperium’s plot.  
Claiming for himself narrative autonomy and political autonomy as well, he refuses to have his 
African American revolution sponsored by a white benefactor. In other words, he refuses to play 
Jim to an editorial Tom Sawyer. Such an endorsement, or authentication, would undermine the 
political thrust of his novel and of his racial uplift philosophy. If Griggs were to welcome a white 
patron into the fold, it would not have been the mere narrative for which the white sponsor 
spoke, but the revolution itself, constituting a veritable request for white leadership and 
reinforcing white ideologies of independence. Despite what remains a problematic authorial 
intrusion into his own novel, Griggs’s self-implicating framing device does doubly play on his 
revision of the nation’s split beginnings and, accordingly, the pursuant national and historical 
narratives that will shape its future.   
 Even more poignant than his self-authenticating preface is Griggs’s postscript entitled 
“Personal (Berl Trout)” (175). In this brief first-person postscript, Trout, a character in the novel 
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and a confessed member of the Imperium, voices his remorse for his own part in Belton’s 
execution and his fear for the future of the Imperium with Bernard as its leader. In his closing 
admonition, Trout bemoans the loss of Belton as a political leader for the African American 
community: “When he fell, the spirit of conservatism in the Negro race, fell with him. He was 
the last of that peculiar type of Negro heroes that could so fondly kiss the smiting hand” (175). 
On the other hand, Trout proclaims that “born of distinguished parents, reared in luxury, gratified 
as to every whim, successful in every undertaking, idolized by the people, proud, brilliant, 
aspiring, deeming nothing impossible of achievement, with Viola’s tiny hand protruding from 
the grave pointing him to move forward, Bernard Belgrave, President of the Imperium in 
Imperio, was a man to be feared” (175). With Trout’s exaggerated distinctions between these two 
polarized leaders, Griggs mobilizes the alternating discourses of sycophancy and brutality that 
limited the political options of black leaders.  
Importantly, Griggs illustrates that men like his contemporaries Washington and Du Bois, 
like Belton and Bernard, are performing their respective roles according to the limitations of a 
white supremacist culture and the American ideologies of white independence that even they 
subscribe to on some level. Even as Belton’s accommodationism appears to compromise the 
integrity of a race, it also represents an abstract and imperfect spirit of compromise and 
heterogeneous group subjectivity that is necessary somewhere, in some way, if the cycle of 
violence is ever to be broken. Belton appears to be succeeding to the secondary role proscribed 
for him within white narratives of white freedom while Bernard’s projected internal invasion of 
the white US represents, in contrast, a more aggressive, individualist push for independence. 
Bernard and the others are so caught up in their refusal to be subjugated that only Belton seems 
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to recognize the fatal flaw in Bernard’s plan: violent revolt does not so much defy white 
supremacy as it replicates it in different, similarly destructive terms.    
 Trout’s ultimate act of betrayal, in which he reveals the existence of the Imperium, 
presumably to members of the white national government, is not necessarily evidence of the 
failure of the Imperium as a political project or of the failure of Griggs’s revised national 
narrative. “With Belton gone and this man at our head, our well-organized, thoroughly equipped 
Imperium was a serious menace to the peace of the world. A chance spark might at any time 
cause a conflagration, which, unchecked, would spread destruction, devastation, and death all 
around,” Trout writes by way of explanation for his traitorous act (176). On the surface, Trout’s 
act appears to be one of concession, particularly as he hopes that because of his revelation the 
Imperium “might be broken up or watched” (176). However, given Griggs’s multiple frames, 
Trout’s confession is equally evidence, provided for the benefit of both his white and black 
audiences, of how precarious this balance between peace and devastation truly is, and of how 
heavily that balance depends on the good faith of both conservative and more militant African 
American community leaders. Should the white community fail to appease more moderate black 
leaders like Belton, those same leaders will lose the trust of their communities and be replaced 
by men like Bernard, who will not be so eager to compromise. 
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Rumor, Race War, and The Specter of Cooperative Democracy 
Democracy has become the goal of our age. But not all men as we find them in the world today 
are able to conduct a successful democracy. This is possible only where there is a sufficient 
preponderance of certain traits and the following out of certain principles. Without the necessary 
traits and principles a group may have the form of a democracy, but it will be but a hollow 
mockery.  
—Sutton E. Griggs, Foreword to Guide to Racial Greatness; Or, The Science of Collective 
Efficiency  
 
 As Twain does in Connecticut Yankee, Griggs modifies the thrust of nineteenth-century 
Anglo-American imperialist narratives, but he does so by conceptualizing an African-American 
racial-national exceptionalism in terms similarly reliant on the tempered success of the American 
Revolution. Where Twain’s reversal in Connecticut Yankee is both geographical and temporal in 
that American exceptionalism turns back on the “mother” country and its glorified past, Griggs’s 
inversion is also geographical in that it predicts a foreign invasion of American soil from within. 
Not coincidentally, it is the prior Republic of Texas that is to become an independent republic 
once again in Griggs’s Imperium. Where Twain’s Connecticut Yankee looks to the past as 
ultimately changed by and dependent upon the future, Griggs looks to the future as he rewrites a 
distinctly Anglo-American historical narrative of democratic idealism as Afro-American and 
recasts the future of the nation as a result. Griggs’s novel, in fact, anticipates and complicates 
Twain’s later rhetorical construction of two Americas. This doubling, for Griggs, occurs equally 
within white America’s incongruous extension of cherished democratic ideals and within the 
internal division between black and white America.   
 In its replication and attempted reparation of the structure of ideal constitutional 
democracy, the Imperium reflects the violence of white American structural principles. As 
Coleman intimates, the militancy of Griggs’s novel was not in his advocacy of a military solution 
to the “race problem” but in the suggestion that one of the “options offered to White America . . . 
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included the possibility of violent reprisal” (70). The options outlined by Griggs are merely those 
dictated by the riotous presence, and he is careful to illustrate how that would likely play out. 
“The militancy that so many critics have rightly focused upon in the novel,” Coleman insists, 
“derives from the fact that Griggs offers solutions that require mainstream America to make a 
choice: either relinquish the rights and privileges that accrue to all Americans and live in peace, 
or maintain the status quo and risk all-out war” (70). Essentially, Griggs poses the same 
questions with which Bernard and Belton grapple for white Americans. Once qualified 
independence is achieved via violent revolution, are we willing to maintain our sovereignty 
through more violence? Or is there some other way to effect revolution in which underlying and 
faulty ideology is fundamentally disrupted? In creating his Imperium, Griggs exploits a 
contemporary version of a rumor which arose during slavery and persisted into the postbellum 
world—that slaves or oppressed blacks would (rightly) rise up against their white oppressors and 
not simply rectify but completely reverse the social order and the relations of master and slave. 
 This historically persistent rumor of impending insurrection took on new significance in 
the summer and fall of 1865, just months after the official end of the Civil War, when “mutually 
reinforcing rumors of a world turned wholly upside down either by federal government fiat or 
armed black insurrection” circulated among blacks and whites in the rural South (Hahn 128). 
These rather vague and general rumors were predicated, for both blacks and whites, on the 
knowledge that freedmen and women now vocally expected to be compensated for their labor—
if not for the labor they had already provided as slaves, then for their subsequent labor as tenant 
farmers, sharecroppers, and independent artisans. Freedmen claimed that they were entitled to 
Southern land bought with the proceeds from the sale of generations of their own families, the 
land they had worked with their own hands and backs, the land by which their labors had 
 215 
produced the commodities that sustained consumers in the North (Hahn 135). Such veritable 
demands for compensation violated the seemingly inviolable genteel hierarchy of race relations 
in the South. The more disturbing feature of the freedpeople’s claims for many whites, however, 
was that their collective actions “demonstrated that slaves had become familiar with and could 
appropriate a powerful, if contested, national political discourse that exalted manual labor and 
associated freedom with economic independence” (Hahn 135). That white southern planters as 
well as ex-slaves expected something to happen by the end of the year, whether significant 
government interference or a widespread uprising, suggests that planters at least subconsciously 
understood that the freedmen’s appropriation of this political discourse exposed the planters’ 
own hypocrisy and the insincerity of white Americans who openly claimed or merely enjoyed 
the privileges of whiteness.   
 Many white southerners initially feared that the federal government might seize their 
lands and redistribute them among the freedpeople who had worked them during slavery, or that 
the government would endow each family with “forty acres and a mule,” as many blacks 
expected.35 However, by September it had become clear that those white officials who would 
fight for the division and redistribution of Confederate lands made up a radical minority. Most 
white southerners now overwhelmingly declared a fear that “disappointed freedpeople” would 
“take matters into their own hands by the only means left available: concerted violence” (Hahn 
146). While blacks generally expected some sort of meaningful change to occur by Christmas, 
whites marked this same holiday as the point by which disgruntled ex-slaves would rise against 
their former masters, instigating “a race war, ‘a negro Jubilee insurection,’ [sic] when the ex-
slaves, reenacting the ‘horrors of Jamaica and St. Doming,’ would attempt to murder or drive off 
their former masters” (Hahn 128). The protracted affair would come to be known as the 
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Christmas Insurrection Scare of 1865, which in terminology and in dominant historical memory 
rhetorically and conceptually reduced (and continues to reduce) freedpeople to their former 
status as slaves. White southerners’ use of the term “insurrection” to describe the anticipated 
result of widespread tensions and anxieties between and among blacks and whites even after 
Emancipation discursively reasserts southern whites’ claims to national and governmental 
authority. In the aftermath of the Civil War, whites of both regions were conceptually realigned 
in terms of their collective classification of and opposition to black “insurrection,” or, more 
accurately, the assertion of black claims to economic and political independence. 
 Vague and unsubstantiated rumors of land distribution resonated much differently within 
the African American community but in ways that significantly ran parallel to their trajectory 
through the white South. As Hahn observes, “the rumors, the ‘extravagant’ ideas of what 
freedom might bring, that is, played a significant role in defining the political communities of 
rural blacks newly emerged from bondage” (135). For whites, these rumors inspired increased 
aggression and vigilance against measures of black economic and political progress, which in 
turn promoted the inevitability of violent black uprising. These same rumors served as points of 
communication for dispersed blacks, and, more importantly, “as safer ways in which to introduce 
themselves as political actors; and as potent means for shaping–and advancing—the terrain of 
political debate” (Hahn 135). Whether or not the rumors of property distribution would turn out 
to be true, they had thrown the white folks into a frenzy and provided the freedmen with a basis 
for increased expectations and demands in terms of labor, mobility, and compensation. Upon the 
expectations and demands grounded in these rumors, freedpeople built a community of 
resistance. Many refused to sign contracts with planters until after the first of the year, thereby 
pressuring some planters to offer better terms in order to keep existing laborers working or to 
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attract new workers. Widespread refusals by freedmen to enter into contracts disrupted the 
existing labor system in the rural South and, in many ways, freedpeople’s collective belief in or 
manipulation of the Christmas rumors served to give them an upper hand in contract 
negotiations.   
 That the fears of many whites ran directly to insurrection and the complete reversal of 
existing power structures illustrates how conceptually impossible it was for them, even those 
who did not approve of physical violence against blacks, to envision a negotiation or a more 
balanced restructuring of labor and political relationships so that freedmen might be granted not 
total domination but more balanced access to the promises and practice of US American 
citizenship. The parasitical nature of white freedom, the foundational idea that freedom must be 
hierarchical and that there must be some identifiable other by which to gauge, measure, and 
enact independence, defines the parameters of white resistance to the upward mobility of ex-
slaves. These rumor cycles illustrate the tenuous stability of such a flawed social structure, and 
they also speak to a missed opportunity in the pivotal moments following the end of the Civil 
War.   
 Writing for multiple audiences simultaneously, Griggs enacts a version of the same 
rumor cycle that fueled expectations of Christmas riots in 1865, drawing on the mobilizing 
potential of white political repression and politically-motivated violence against blacks. The very 
existence of the Imperium in Griggs’s novel capitalizes on white assumptions that African 
Americans and African-American subversives are withholding vital information from whites 
generally and white authority figures in particular. This secret government, formed in response to 
the failure of the “General Government” to “protect the negro in his rights” (132), also 
recognizes the Imperium as a necessary reaction to their own exclusion from the fold of the 
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“General Government.” Griggs’s declaration that this failure results primarily “because of a 
defect in the Constitution” (132)—the ultimate American national narrative—implies that the 
Constitution itself is a document of secrets, not to be taken at face value. In setting up such a 
complex and elaborate binary, Griggs taps into the political power inherent in rumors born of 
civil division and dissension to dramatize what it might look like—for blacks as well as for 
whites—if the worst, and perhaps consciously unacknowledged, fears of the most virulent white 
supremacists actually came true. Griggs’s Imperium is not riot at all but the longstanding, well-
funded, hyper-vigilant, hyper-organized, and thoroughly disciplined reflection of everything that 
the US government purports to be in theory but in actuality is not—at least as long as the 
Imperium remains a closed secret. With the Imperium, as with the historical Revolution on 
which it is modeled, the latent possibilities are greater than the realization. 
 The conflicts and pending resolutions set forth in Imperium in Imperio are firmly rooted 
in the material world of the late nineteenth century, which provides a basis for the novel’s 
disruption of Anglo-American inheritance myths dating to the American Revolution and beyond. 
In Griggs’s fictional world, the Imperium has “wisely invested” money donated to the 
organization by its founder, an independently wealthy “negro scientist” and author who lived “in 
the early days of the American Republic” (130). The Imperium has increased its wealth, through 
the apparently covert purchase of land and the collective earnings of its citizens, who “own about 
$350,000,000. And all of this is pledged to our government in case it is needed” (133). All told, 
the Imperium has access to $850,000,000 for “secur[ing] the recognition of the rights of our 
people” who are “determined to be free and will give their lives, as freely as they have given 
their property” (133). The wealth of the Imperium has clearly been earned via the backbreaking 
and bloody work of African American slaves and painstakingly saved despite efforts by white 
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masters, and later white employers, to render any meager payment they might receive for their 
labor void through trickery or compulsion. In this way, the legacy of the Imperium and its 
ideology of independent resistance reflects white Revolutionary ideologies and the building of a 
white nation on the labor and moral superiority of its citizens. However, despite the fact this 
subversive network has collected substantial resources and virtually surpassed the mainstream 
government on which it is modeled, material wealth cannot effectively undermine dominant 
ideology.  
 Griggs’s repeated references to the historical lynching of black postmaster Frazier Baker 
point to the incongruence of economic opportunity and white supremacist ideology within 
American culture. While quantifiable prosperity and social mobility are for white Americans a 
direct effect of their successful Revolution, the same upward struggle and tangible achievement 
for black Americans is grounds for violent retribution. Baker is represented in Griggs’s Imperium 
by the fictional character Felix A. Cook, “a colored man of ability, culture, and refinement” who 
was appointed postmaster of Lake City, South Carolina, by President McKinley (137). The 
fictional Cook is brutally murdered, his home is burned, and his wife and children are horribly 
injured, all because local whites object to his acceptance of the coveted position of postmaster 
(138). Griggs returns again and again to the Cook family’s tragedy in the final chapters, 
emphasizing the frequently fatal consequences for African Americans who pursue the sort of 
gainful employment and economic independence that has traditionally been reserved by whites 
for whites. Griggs reiterates the fact that Baker’s commendable struggle for economic success 
does not fit within cherished narratives of white freedom. In his efforts to cast his own lot in 
those terms, Baker is brutally rebuked, as will be other black Americans who try to access their 
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own freedom within the parameters set by cherished white narratives of rugged individualism 
and perseverance. 
 In constructing his Imperium, Griggs elevates the underlying rumors of political dissent 
that plague American national narratives of democracy and union to a position of prominence. 
He restructures the ongoing conflict between white and black, generally represented as a mere 
quarrel between masters and slaves, as a war between nations, thus anticipating his own 
developing philosophy of pragmatic racial uplift. “When one race moves in to administer affairs 
which another race feels should be under its jurisdiction,” Griggs argues in Guide to Racial 
Greatness, “there is an inevitable clash of spirits between the two” (30). As Griggs makes clear, 
this “inevitable clash of spirits” is, at least in part, exacerbated by perceptions of weakness: “The 
group unable to avail itself of its material resources is often likewise unable to maintain law and 
order, or to conduct a progressive civilization. This weakness invites aggression even as sores are 
a standing invitation to flies” (30). In Imperium, Griggs recasts African Americans as an 
independent nation, nearly as old as the US, and more efficient to boot, thereby working to 
alleviate dominant white assumptions of racial and political weakness among African Americans 
as a group. Because white America assesses political and social value in terms of material 
wealth, and, more importantly, because the acquisition of material wealth, the proceeds of their 
own labor, and access to natural resources have been categorically denied African Americans by 
whites under the rubric of democracy, Griggs constructs his potential uprising in just those terms. 
 Although Griggs’s initially favorable reception by the black intellectual community based 
on Imperium in Imperio’s “militant radical plot” eventually turned to open criticism of his 
perceived accommodationism, contradictory acceptance of black inferiority, and insistence on 
the accountability of black leaders for “failures in the Black community” (Coleman 25; 124), 
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Griggs maintains in Guide to Racial Greatness an emphasis on the importance of leadership as 
representative of the people. A considerable part of this responsibility, according to Griggs, lies 
with the people themselves: “It is a joint task for a group to get its consensus of opinion up to 
those in charge of affairs, so as to enable those in authority to note the effect of things that are 
done” (15). In the context of Griggs’s novel, this mandate has dual significance for the Imperium 
and for the white US government. The text of the novel asserts that it is the Imperium’s duty to 
communicate with and to impress upon the national government their dissatisfaction with the 
status quo, of which they prove themselves more than capable. The postscript, however, implies 
that Belton no longer represents the interests of the Imperium as a majority, so they have, 
functioning effectively as a group, removed him from his leadership position. Griggs is equally 
adamant in Guide to Racial Greatness that one of the joint tasks required for functional 
collective efficiency is “the deposing of unworthy leadership” (16).  
 Despite its controversial and arguably convoluted ending, Griggs’s Imperium in Imperio 
insists on an alternative narrative of American history and American politics of which both 
Belton and Bernard are part. Respectively representative of conservatism and militancy, Belton 
and Bernard are polar opposites in terms of their skin color, economic status, oratorical style, and 
especially their politics, yet both exist only as the inverse of the other. Griggs’s narrative is about 
this interdependency within the contemporary black community, just as it is about African 
American history, military revolution, or mob violence. In the same vein, Imperium 
painstakingly reveals the interdependency of a white US American body politic and the lives and 
labors of black Americans. The alternative government that Griggs creates is not meant to stand 
alone, as Trout’s betrayal suggests, and such an amputation is ultimately impossible. The 
Imperium exists within and as the inverse of white America, but neither can exist independently 
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of the other. What is true for governments is also true for the narratives that write them into 
existence, which define national identities and reflect the subjectivities of citizens. Griggs’s 
narrative endeavors to become a part of, to shape and to change, a standing US American 
national narrative, but to do so on his terms. Griggs’s narrative is the subversive, insurrectionary 
rumor that runs apparently contrary to national myths of democratic citizenship, but it is also the 
harbinger of compelling plausibility. 
 If Griggs’s science of collective efficiency is a directive by which to build and perfect an 
independent, cohesive, and politically successful African American community, Guide to Racial 
Greatness can also be read as a subversive document detailing a strategy for the destruction of 
white supremacist hegemony from within. Individualism, Griggs asserts, is the destructive 
doppelganger of the group. “The Individualist,” Griggs argues, “is so sure that his tubercular 
viewpoint of life is right that to him an altruist is either a rank fool, or some one merely posing as 
having an interest in society superior to his interest in himself” (44). This missive serves as a 
warning for black communities like the Imperium in Imperio and promotes Griggs’s general 
argument of individualism as contrary to group efficiency and the completion of joint tasks. 
However, Griggs provides an alternative scenario in which he describes the difficulties of 
operating within an individualistic group. “Behold then,” Griggs writes, “the fate of a man of 
exceptional strength in the midst of an individualistic group. His first battle is with the jealousies 
of those who themselves would like to sit in the seat of power” (56). While Griggs speaks here 
about group membership in broad terms, he seems to be speaking not to African Americans or to 
white supremacists but to potentially subversive whites who might, with a little support, be 
inclined to defy cultural norms in support of a more coherently unified subjectivity. “But, in 
groups where individualism prevails, the neutrals who constitute the overwhelming masses, and 
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who could determine issues, often are so engrossed with their individual tasks as to leave the 
exceptional man to battle single-handed with those contending with them. In the co-operative 
groups where the units have acquired the habit of throwing themselves into the tasks of others, 
they go to the rescue of the exceptional character” (56). This could easily be an invitation to 
dissenting whites to defect from the dysfunction of white supremacy and join ranks with a new 
and integrated “co-operative” community, where exceptional character and commitment to 
ideals, rather than neutral maintenance of the status quo, will be nurtured and appreciated.  
 Despite trafficking in the fantastic and looking forward to significant social 
transformation, both Twain and Griggs situate their cultural criticism squarely within the 
problems of history. Like Griggs’s Imperium, Twain’s Connecticut Yankee plays into and makes 
use of an ongoing culture of rumor/fear that is immediately linked to the potential for underclass 
acquisition of property and the ruling class’ understanding that this acquisition equals their own 
loss of property and therefore wealth, comfort, and power. The prevailing feeling among whites 
in the late nineteenth century, as evidenced by the majority’s conceptual leap from labor unrest 
among black workers to armed insurrection, was that loss for one group equals gain for another, 
and vice versa, so that it is a cultural impossibility to conceive of material, political, or personal 
gain for a previously oppressed group as just that. A legacy of American racial slavery is that 
social balance comes to be seen (by whites and blacks alike) not as the equitable division of 
property and power between citizens of all stripes but as a limited amount of property and 
corresponding power which is passed back and forth between members of different groups, 
consequently tipping weighted scales for or against. In this formulation, gain for one is always 
loss for another and can be seen in no other way.  
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 This is the underside of the national narrative, Twain and Griggs reveal, the complicated 
interdependency of gain and loss, of conqueror and conquered, and its intersection with raced 
and gendered “bootstrap” narratives of class transcendence. These fundamental fractures portend 
violence again and again, in each new manifestation and in each new conscious reworking of the 
system. Warning against the dangers inherent in trying to recreate a people’s revolution—the 
dangers of recreating the same failures, of falling into the same traps, of displacing the same 
fundamental human elements—Twain and Griggs suggest that the violence of imperialism, of 
capitalism, of lynching and of riot is insurmountable within the context of standard narratives of 
progress and civilization. In constructing actual or imminent violent revolutions in terms of the 
subversive community’s ability to undermine an oppressive culture’s sense of security, Twain 
and Griggs suggest that the terror of white supremacy is insidious, self-replicating, and adaptable 
to different cultural moments. 
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oppressors. Each features a secret society of dedicated revolutionaries, a charismatic leader or genius, a face-off 
between those blacks who advocate violence and those who cannot bring themselves to do so” (67). Black militant 
near-future fiction is decidedly secular, as opposed to black near-future fantasy, which Tal describes as 
“distinguished from science fiction because it relies on supernatural or metaphysical means to achieve its ends” (76). 
Black near-future fantasy, in which Tal includes Ishmael Reed’s Mumbo Jumbo (1972), Toni Morrison’s Song of 
Solomon (1977), and Toni Cade Bambara’s The Salt Eaters (1980), emphasizes spirituality; “The genre of black 
militant near-futurist fiction, however, is built upon the renunciation of that spirituality and belief in magic” (76). 
The distinction Tal draws here is significant, because Imperium in Imperio, like Connecticut Yankee, is situated 
entirely within the material world and draws on a combination of Enlightenment ideals and nineteenth-century 
techno-bureaucracy for its revolutionary solutions. 
35 In Reconstruction, Eric Foner suggests that William T. Sherman’s “Special Field Order No. 15” is perhaps the 
origin of the widely-circulated “forty acres and a mule” phrase. Sherman’s order provided for the setting aside of a 
tract of land in the South Carolina low country exclusively for black settlement. “Each family would receive forty 
acres of land, and Sherman later provided that the army could assist them with the loan of mules” (Foner 70). As 
Foner makes clear, Sherman’s provisions were only intended to be temporary, a response to “the immediate pressure 
caused by a large number of impoverished blacks following his army” (Foner 71). 
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Coda. Meditations on An Activist Agenda 
Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution inevitable. 
--John F. Kennedy, 1962 
 
In his introduction to Robespierre’s Virtue and Terror, Slavoj Žižek suggests that true 
egalitarian revolution cannot exist independent of terror. In order to resist losing the momentum 
of revolution within the “abstract terror” of “the ‘big’ political revolution,” the moment of 
revolution must be followed by “the ‘concrete terror’ of imposing a new order onto daily life” 
(xxxvi). In other words, revolution must be a radical reversal of the status quo in which an 
egalitarian dictatorship—“the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ is another name for the violence of 
the democratic explosion itself”—must be maintained via terror. “The ‘dictatorship of the 
proletariat’” Žižek explains, “is thus the zero-level at which the difference between legitimate 
and illegitimate state power is suspended, i.e. at which the state power as such is illegitimate” 
(xxx). Žižek contends that rather than humanism or terror, where humanism is the positive term, 
or humanism and terror, with each either positively or negatively perceived, the only viable 
choice is “‘humanism or terror,’ but with terror, not humanism, as a positive term” (xiii). “This 
is a radical position difficult to sustain,” he admits,” but, perhaps, it is our only hope: it does not 
amount to the obscene madness of openly pursuing a ‘terrorist and inhuman politics’, but 
something much more difficult to think through” (xiii).  
Fundamentally, my own concern with popular and historical differentiations between 
legitimate and illegitimate violence mediated within the language of democracy is grounded in 
my desire to pursue an activist agenda, not merely to meditate on the past but to offer new 
perspectives for reflecting on the present and on possibilities for shaping a better, more 
egalitarian future, ideally a future in which the state does not govern by force, threats, or 
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violence. It did not occur to me at the outset that I might find some, if not all, of the answers for 
which I had been searching in Žižek’s formulation of terror as a means to a true humanism that 
empirical democracy, by its very nature, renders impossible. This coda, then, is not a manifesto, 
and it is not a call to arms. It is, however, a somber reflection on the conceptual and practical 
differences between true radicalism and liberal humanism, terms that are often, and dangerously 
so, synonymous in the rhetoric of the conservative Right as in the language of the moderate Left. 
In thinking through my own driving questions, I have also been, in terms similar to 
Žižek’s, thinking through a radical revision of the relationship between terror and democracy, of 
the place of one within the other. Early in my writing process a friend from a different university, 
who also works on terror and its relationship to democracy and the state, read a draft of my first 
chapter at my request. Afterwards, she poignantly asked whether I was advocating or opposing 
violence as a legitimate form of resistance against oppression (state or otherwise). At the time I 
was not impressed by this question. It felt like an oversimplification of my work and of the very 
conflicts and inconsistencies I was working to complicate with my analyses. In the months that 
followed, however, this question haunted me. Was I advocating violent resistance? I wanted to 
think of myself as an activist, as someone who worked for peace. But could peace ever be 
implicit in violence? Or, on the other hand, was violence necessarily implicit in peace? In 
promoting a discourse of differentiation between the normative violence of the state and the 
unsanctioned violence of an oppressed minority, I was indeed suggesting that some violence was 
legitimate—slave insurrections, for example—and some violence—imperialism, slavery, 
lynching, white riots—was oppressive. In short, I was in danger of replicating the very language 
I wished to demystify. At the same time, the last thing I wanted to do was to elide the differences 
between the violence of the oppressed and that of the oppressor. My friend had asked a smart 
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question after all, as she usually does, and the fact that I couldn’t immediately answer it troubled 
me. 
I do not now mean to intimate that I have reached a satisfying conclusion or that I have 
formulated a plan for gleaning lasting peace from an inherently violent society. What I do want 
to suggest, as I reflect on what I have written in these pages, is that the very functional, structural 
nature of ideal representative democracy and liberal humanism do make arguments like Žižek’s 
both necessary and plausible. American Democracy, as a political system, is not the same as 
egalitarianism, although this is what many of us have been led to believe. In fact, the empirical 
nature of democracy presupposes hierarchy. “In the cruelest of ironies,” Andy Doolen asserts of 
America’s national foundation, “the American rhetoric of equality was articulated not simply 
over and against an imperial logic of racial domination, but within that very logic. In the new 
republic, whiteness declared independence, using terror as its founding vocabulary” (xvi). Within 
the framework of Žižek’s claims, Doolen’s observation suggests that white supremacy has 
embraced terror as a means to maintaining a certain kind of “democratic” social order based on 
hierarchical exclusion in which democracy itself is normative. “Paradoxically,” Žižek argues, 
“the underlying premise of democracy is thus not only that there is no political agent which has a 
‘natural’ right to power, but, much more radically, that the ‘people’ itself, the ultimate source of 
sovereign power in democracy, does not exist as a substantial entity” (xxxii). Even in a properly 
functioning voting democracy, there will always be a minority who “are not simply a minority: 
in learning the result of the vote (which runs against their individual votes), they do not simply 
learn that they are a minority—what they learn is that they were mistaken about the nature of the 
general will” (xxiii). 
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In the context of American white supremacy, Žižek’s evocation of a minority who are not 
just a minority turns basic assumptions about the nature of democratic practice on its head by 
positing the minority as acquiescent to a normative system of inequality. Following Robespierre, 
Žižek explains that 
Every legal order (or every order of explicit normativity) has to rely on a complex 
‘reflexive’ network of informal rules which tells us how we are to relate to the explicit 
norms, how and when we are allowed, solicited even, to disregard them, etc.—and this is 
the domain of habit. To know the habits of a society is to know the meta-rules of how to 
apply its explicit norms: when to use them or not to use them; when to violate them; 
when not to use a choice which is offered; when we are effectively obliged to do 
something, but to have to pretend that we are doing it as a free choice. (xviii-xix) 
These informal rules, these habits, are thus in place to order a society that is predicated on 
disorder, on disagreement, and on the structural subjugation of a dissenting minority. 
Theoretically, the paradoxical nature of democracy presupposes the systematic suppression of 
rational debate, thus situating violence as the only viable recourse to the violent subversion of 
peaceful resistance. American democracy, then, is a form of tyranny, not its antithesis. Put in this 
way, Žižek’s claim that the “dictatorship of the proletariat” must be maintained via terror is not 
nearly so shocking when tyranny and terror are posited as integral parts of even of the seemingly 
benign democratic structure. 
I want to situate my criticism of the venerated white civil rights pioneer Albion Tourgée, 
as well as of the other white writers I address I this study, within this philosophical framework, 
specifically with respect to the habits of democratic society. In replicating and acquiescing to the 
normative habits of majority white supremacy, white liberals become complicit in the very anti-
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egalitarian white supremacist project we/they work to undermine. This line of thinking has 
potentially debilitating implications for someone like myself, a self-identified white liberal, who 
is doing similar work in the twenty-first century. In other words, if the disparate agendas of 
conservative white supremacists like Thomas Dixon and “radical” white liberals like Tourgée are 
ultimately complementary, as I have argued, what does that say about the future of radical white 
activism in a white supremacist society? How does that position the cultural work that I am 
doing in the name of humanitarianism and cross-racial unity?  
Tourgée, in advocating for a color-blind consciousness, betrayed the demands of history 
even in his commendable effort to keep the peace. He promoted a notion of democratic equality 
that was fundamentally irreconcilable with America’s history of race slavery and oppressive 
violence. His color-blind philosophy, in simplistic terms, suggested that we start over again, that 
we ignore the past and trust in “the people” to reclaim the present. And reclaim it they did. In the 
context of Reconstruction and national reconciliation, Tourgée’s was ultimately a conciliatory 
stance, one that sacrificed deep equality for visible civility, and, in turn, helped to obscure an 
opportunity for real social change inherent in the crisis moment of Reconstruction. In leveling 
this criticism, I do not mean to suggest that Tourgée was consciously involved in the promotion 
of white supremacy, but the fact that he was not is even more troubling. Because I want to 
maintain this pressure on my own work, because I want to remind myself of the dangers of 
conciliation and the price of peace, I am not prepared to let him off the hook. To do so would be 
to follow in his erroneous footsteps and to participate in an unproductive discourse of deferral, to 
acquiesce to the normative habits of white supremacy and racial repression.  
Despite my best intentions, I harbor the very real fear, in the back of my mind, that I am 
merely perpetuating the culture I want to change. Tourgée, after all, was vastly unpopular in his 
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time, considered a radical, even risked his life for his ideals and endured significant persecution. 
(I have as yet done nothing of the sort.) Yet Tourgée was still not radical enough to overcome the 
constraints of a racist culture, a culture in which the values of race, racism, and terror are 
ingrained, are built into the discourse of democracy. What I do not want is for my criticism of 
Tourgée’s conciliatory stance, or my reading of Žižek, to suggest that only violence can be 
radical enough. Or that whites can never be truly radical. To suggest that would certainly be to 
proliferate racial essentialism, under the guise of cultural construction. As many important 
thinkers, including Tourgée, have observed, slavery does more harm to the master, in 
psychological terms, than it does to the slave. With this in mind, perhaps I can suggest that in 
order to be truly progressive, whites must not be merely liberal but actually radical, at the very 
least more radical than the virulent white supremacists who actively court and demand the 
consent of the majority and who demonstrate the explicit and implicit habits of the social order. 
Whether or not this radicalism requires violence remains to be seen. 
 Channeling Robespierre, Žižek condemns inaction as complicity in much the same way 
as I have criticized Tourgée’s desire for compromise as conciliation. According to Žižek 
there are no innocent bystanders in the crucial moments of revolutionary decisions, 
because, in such moments, innocence itself—exempting oneself from the decision, going 
on as if the struggle I am witnessing does not really concern me—is the highest form of 
treason. That is to say, the fear of being accused of treason is my treason, because, even if 
I ‘did not do anything against the revolution’, this fear itself, the fact that it emerged in 
me, demonstrates that my subjective position is external to the revolution, that I 
experience ‘revolution’ as an external force threatening me. (xvi) 
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In terms of my overall argument, this suggests that peace or order or an egalitarian ideal is not 
implicit in inaction. I must choose sides, because to refuse to do so is to accept the status quo, to 
oppose the revolution on the simple grounds that it is “an external force” of which I am not a 
part. This is, at least in part, why Tourgée’s color-blind ideal failed to achieve the social and 
cultural “revolution” he thought he foresaw. This is also why its progeny continue to fail in the 
twenty-first century. In a white supremacist society, color-blindness is acquiescence to the status 
quo. It is an ideal entrenched within the habits of the majority, a sanctioned violation, a 
normative function rather than a revolutionary one.  
 In its March 1968 report, the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, 
convened by President Lyndon Johnson and led by Illinois governor Otto Kerner, Jr., concluded 
that “Violence cannot build a better society. Disruption and disorder nourish repression, not 
justice. They strike at the freedom of every citizen. The community cannot—it will not—tolerate 
coercion and mob rule.” The implicit “community” is the elite white majority, made up of the 
“citizens” whose “freedom” is threatened by the unruly underclass black mob, the very mob by 
which the social order is defined in opposition. Unlike the white mob, which is free to disregard 
the explicit norms, the black mob exposes the incongruence between the explicit norms and the 
force of habit, the way those norms are upheld and negotiated within the body politic. These 
words—Violence cannot build a better society—written in the spirit of identifying the roots of a 
social problem and formulating recommendations for its remedy, have the deceptive ring of 
commitment, of conviction and change. Yet they are ultimately words of conciliation, of 
reducing the spirit of revolution to a limited discussion of the symptoms of racial oppression.  
Focusing on the “worst” riots of the summer of 1967, in Newark and Detroit within a 
two-week period, the Kerner Commission set out to answer three basic questions: “What 
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happened? Why did it happen? What can be done to prevent it from happening again?” These 
guiding questions, apparently transparent in their simplicity, nonetheless neglect to take into 
consideration the ingrained racial fears and associated rumors, exacerbated in times of economic 
crisis, that fuel the violence of riot. As the Kerner Commission’s systematic recommendations 
suggest, these questions address the symptoms of racial violence rather than the underlying 
disease of built-in inequality. Modern race riots, like those investigated by the Kerner 
Commission, and those in Los Angeles in April of 1992, have their roots in American empire 
and in the cultural politics of chattel slavery. As Gary Alan Fine and Patricia A. Turner point out, 
“since the first European slave traders shackled their African captives in the bowels of their 
ships, there have been rumors that blacks will rise up in rebellion” (42). And history has 
substantiated many of these rumors. 
Yet the historical persistence and the ultimate plausibility of these rumors inspires fear in 
the elite white majority rather than radical action in solidarity with the oppressed. The normative 
habits of society call for repression of violent resistance rather than embrasure, and, 
consequently, for more repression. As Fine and Turner observe, “many whites hold tightly to the 
protection offered by the second amendment because of their fears of racial violence. They 
suspect that if they were treated as blacks have routinely been treated, they would rise up in 
armed revolt against their oppressors” (42-43). Sovereign inequality perpetuates a vicious cycle, 
as the Kerner Commission’s report illustrates. In the riots erupting over the summer of 1967 (as 
in nineteenth century race riots), “the overwhelming majority of the persons killed or injured in 
all the disorders were Negro civilians.” This, coupled with the Commission’s assertion that the 
“civil disorders of 1967 involved Negroes acting against local symbols of white American 
society, authority, and property in Negro neighborhoods—rather than against white persons,” 
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implies that racial violence is both the problem and the exclusive domain of the non-white raced 
Other. These assurances serve to minimize the fears of white Americans, to remind them that 
they are not the targets of the implicitly raced violence, that instead their institutions are, which 
somehow allows for the conceptual separation of societal norms and the institutions that support 
them. The underlying assumption is similar to that of a color-blind ideal: if we even out the 
judicial system, if we even out welfare and living conditions for blacks in the ghetto, if we elect a 
black president, then we are post-race and post-racism. 
This is not to say that in following Žižek’s argument I am suggesting that white 
radicalism or cross-racial unity are doomed. In fact, Žižek intimates that true revolution lies in 
conquering our fears, particularly fears predicated on group membership and identification of 
Others. “Measured against this background,” Žižek writes, “revolutionary-egalitarian figures 
from Robespierre to John Brown are (potentially, at least) figures without habits: they refuse to 
take into account the habits that qualify the functioning of a universal rule” (xix). In other words, 
to be truly radical, one must fundamentally defy the social order. To compromise, is, again, to 
proliferate the status quo. As Žižek observes  
It is only such a radical stance that allows us to break with today’s predominant mode of 
politics, post-political biopolitics, which is a politics of fear, formulated as a defence [sic] 
against a potential victimization or harassment. Therein resides the true line of separation 
between radical emancipatory politics and the politics of the status quo: it is not the 
difference between two different positive visions, sets of axioms, but, rather, the 
difference between the politics based on a set of universal axioms and the politics which 
renounces the very constitutive dimension of the political, since it resorts to fear as its 
ultimate mobilizing principle: fear of immigrants, fear of crime, fear of godless sexual 
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depravity, fear of the excessive state itself (with its burdensome taxation), fear of 
ecological catastrophes—such a (post)politics always amounts to a frightening rally of 
frightened men. (xxvi) 
Robespierre and John Brown, Žižek suggests, subvert the circular nature of fear and incomplete 
revolution by sacrificing themselves and their subjectivity. Žižek is not necessarily talking about 
suicide or martyrdom per se, but rather of “the Master [a]s the figure of sovereignty, the one who 
is not afraid to die” (xvii). 
Quite simply, I think it is fair to say that radicalism requires sacrifice, even the sacrifice 
of the self to greater humanity, which is much easier said than done. I am comforted somewhat 
by conversations I had not long ago, wherein Donald Pease suggested, and I paraphrase freely 
here, that Barack Obama’s Constitutional movement resituates leadership and society in such a 
way that renders non-violent radicalism a potential reality. Pease spoke of Obama in terms 
similar to those Žižek uses to describe Robespierre, in which both situate themselves in relation 
to the people via the use of the second-person “you” and the first person “we” or “us.” Pease 
positions Obama, as Žižek positions Robespierre: “He is not the master exempted from the 
collective, the ‘I’ outside ‘we’” (xvi). In his use of “you,” when addressing the people, Obama, 
like Robespierre, invests the people with the leadership power that we (the voting majority) have 
entrusted in him. It will take the “we” to enact a fundamental change in the structure and habits 
of the social order. Obama’s “we,” as Pease points out, is a cross-racial we. It is a service-
oriented volunteerist we. It is an opportunity, as Chesnutt suggests in The Marrow of Tradition, 
to embrace the potential for real social change inherent in the chaos of the present. 
At this moment our nation is indeed at a crossroads, as we have been many times before. 
“Throughout the [twentieth] century, “ Fine and Turner observe, “relations between white and 
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black Americans have been marked by persistent tension interrupted by periodic cataclysms. The 
eruptions occur when the tenuous racial equilibrium becomes disrupted by economic, social, or 
cultural shifts, unexpected at the time, although clear in retrospect” (44). We are again at a crisis 
point, wherein the euphemistically-termed economic downturn has and will continue to 
exacerbate tensions between groups, especially racially-identified groups. There are choices to 
be made, and those who refuse to act will be guilty of treason, guilty of reaffirming the status 
quo, of reaffirming the habits of an inherently racist society. 
I would like to think that Chesnutt, were he available for comment, would agree. After 
all, I suggest in chapter 1 that Chesnutt is breaking open an oppressive white supremacist 
discourse of justified white revolution and the manufactured threat of “negro domination.” 
However, I also argue that Chesnutt is viewing the rupture inherent in the Wilmington race riot 
as an opportunity for renewal, for a reconfiguration of the social order that can only come from 
chaos and devastation, and therein from the destruction of racial binaries. Chesnutt’s conceptual 
embrasure of chaos is not predicated on a denial of history, as is Tourgée’s flawed color-blind 
ideal. Rather, Chesnutt recognizes race as a fundamental part of American sociopolitical culture 
and of the structural mechanisms and habits in place to sustain the cultural order. He does not 
envision change in terms of conventional definitions of equality, for equality assumes that there 
is some fundamental balance to be achieved, some linear force of progress yet to be reached. It is 
in this assumption that racial lines are redrawn, that the problems of the past are reconceived 
rather than resolved, and that structural white supremacy is further obscured. Chesnutt, however, 
is primarily concerned with the unpredictable human element, and he imagines a world in which 
the political order works with rather than against the chaos of human existence. 
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